Evolution of Ethics

The Greek Philosophers

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EVOLUTION OF ETHICS.

VOLUME I.

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS,

PROF. HYSLOP.

THE BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

THE ETHICS

OF THE

GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

A LECTURE GIVEN BEFORE THE BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION, SEASON OF 1896-1897,

BY

PROF. JAMES H. HYSLOP,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND ETHICS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

AUTHOR OF "ELEMENTS OF LOGIC," "ELEMENTS OF ETHICS," "HUME'S TREATISE ON MORALS," "DEMOCRACY," AND "LESSONS IN LOGIC."

Edited by Chas. M. Higgins, with portraits of the Philosophers, together with extracts from their works, and Editorial Notes to show their close relation to modern thought. Concluding with a brief Life of Socrates.

PUBLISHED FOR THE

BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION,

BY

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

Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON.

MEMORIAL.

To Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,

BORN NOV. 26th, 1842 ; DIED JULY 29th, 1897.

THE SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE

BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

SERVING TWO TERMS, 1883-1884.

RE-ELECTED FOR THIRD TERM, 1897.

ESTEEMED AS A MAN : BELOVED AS A FRIEND :

HONORED AS AN ABLE OFFICER AND MEMBER.

PRESIDENTS OF THE BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

PROF. FRANKLIN W. HOOPER,

1881–1882.

MR. Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,

1883–1884.

DR. LEWIS G. JANES,

1885 to 1896.

MR. Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,

1897.

MR. HENRY HOYT MOORE,

1898–1900.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE present lecture on The Ethics of the Greek Philosophers is one of a course on The Evolution of Ethics delivered before the Brooklyn Ethical Association in the years 1896 and 1897. Some of these lectures were also given at the Cambridge Conferences at "The Studio House" of Mrs. Ole Bull in Cambridge, Mass., of which conferences the late Dr. Lewis G. Janes was then director, having been previously President of The Brooklyn Ethical Association for several terms. The full list of these lectures is as follows:—

ORIGIN OF ETHICAL IDEAS,
Dr. Lewis G. Janes, M. A.

ETHICAL IDEAS OF THE HINDUS,
Swami Saradananda of India.

ETHICS OF ZOROASTER AND THE PARSIS,
Mr. Jehanghile Dossabhoy Cola, of Bombay, India.

ETHICS OF BUDDHISM,
Anagarika H. Dharmapala, of Colombo, Ceylon.

ETHICS OF THE CHINESE SAGES,
Prof. F. Huberty James, Imperial University, Peking

ETHICS OF THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS,
Prof. Jas. H. Hyslop, Columbia University, New York

ETHICS OF THE STOICS AND EPICUREANS,
Rev. Merle St. Croix Wright of New York.

ETHICS OF THE HEBREWS,
Rabbi Joseph Silverman of New York.

ETHICS OF THE MOHAMMEDANS,
Mr. Z. Sidney Sampson of New York.

ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
Prof. Crawford Howell Toy, D.D., of Harvard University.

ETHICS OF THE GERMAN SCHOOLS,
Miss Anna Boynton Thompson of Boston.

UTILITARIAN ETHICS,
Dr. Robert G. Eccles of Brooklyn and
Prof. Benjamin Underwood of Quincy, Ill.

ETHICS OF EVOLUTION,
Rev. John C. Kimball of Sharon, Mass., and
M. Mangassarin of New York.

This series of lectures was proposed and arranged chiefly by our former esteemed President, Mr. Z. Sidney Sampson, whose death in 1897, followed by some changes in the Association, has been one of the causes which have helped to delay the publication, but it has now devolved on the undersigned, a member of our Committee on Comparative Religion, to edit and publish this interesting series, which it is believed will be found to be an important addition to the previous volumes of lectures issued by the Association, as it contains perhaps some of the best work of the Association and one which is particularly harmonious with our title and scope, giving as it does a complete outline or general comprehen-

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LECTURE HALL, BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASS'N.

sion of the history and philosophy of Ethics as shown in the various schools or sects of the world.

Most of the lectures of the series as above listed are now in plates ready for printing, and all of these lectures will be ultimately included in one large volume which will be issued in due course, while some one or more lectures will be issued in smaller special volumes according as their special importance or popularity may warrant.

The present lecture of Prof. Hyslop on The Ethics of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle has been thought of sufficient individual importance and interest to form a little volume by itself which is now issued as one of the first of the series. And we think that a glance through this little book will justify our estimate and show that Prof. Hyslop is a great student and able expositor of the teachings of that great trinity of Grecian intellect who have probably left more effect on the thought and belief of our European races and civilizations than any other men in History. Prof. Hyslop has thus given us in this little treatise a very comprehensive view of the general character and special influence of each great thinker and with a keen and clear analysis and easy presentation has so distinguished and epitomized their distinctive teachings that at one sitting we can get a fairly good and general view of the three most influential philosophers of the past, putting in a popular, easily assimilable form what is generally regarded as a rather abstruse subject.

To better illustrate the points in the lecture and more clearly show the exact character of the ancient thought, we have, with the assistance of Prof. Hyslop, selected and arranged a series of quotations from the best translations of the works of the philosophers, which we have

included in the appendix, and which will demonstrate the beauty, clearness and force of the actual thought of these giants of the ancient intellectual world and prove to us how much we are really their heirs and debtors along so many lines of thought and influence. On the subjects of The Nature and Constitution of the Universe, on Matter and Spirit, Soul, Deity, Ethics and Immortality, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have probably left on us a greater impression than all other men, and will be found to have furnished most of the philosophical arguments which have been echoed and re-echoed, more or less consciously or unconsciously, by others ever since that distant age when these great original thinkers or expounders first expressed or recorded them, and with little real advance over these old thinkers. We therefore regard it of the greatest interest and importance that men of the modern age should pay more attention to the study of ancient thought and appreciate far more than they do the great work done by the old thinkers, as only in this way can we get a correct view of our own age and understand what progress we have really made ourselves, and in many cases it will be a good check to our conceit, and a great help to modest and truthful views to find that we have not made as many or as great or as original contributions to our "progress" as we may have imagined.

In this age of advancing womanhood, it is interesting to look back to that brilliant age of Greece, when woman-philosophers, poets, and rhetoricians, contended for prizes with men and often won them on their merits, and when we might see the greatest masculine intellects of the day sitting at the feet of brilliantly educated women and learning from them, Socrates for instance at the feet of Diotima, the great Pythagorean woman-philosopher

who taught him the true philosophy of the universal principle of Beneficent and Creative Love, as is shown in the extracts from the Symposium.

The names of Sappho, B. C. 600, and Myrtis and Corinna, B. C. 500, are famous in the annals of poetry and the history of Greece. Corinna was a great educator as well as a great poetess, and the teacher of Pindar, the chief lyric poet of Greece, over whom she won the prize for poetry five times in public contests. Aspasia to whom—whether rightly or wrongly—a questionable name has been popularly attached, was, without question, a most brilliant and accomplished woman, a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric in Athens and the composer of the orations of Pericles, one of the greatest statesmen of Greece, in the most brilliant period of her history. It would be hard to find women in our own day of such relative eminence in letters and public life, and this striking fact should help to make the study of ancient thought and ancient thinkers and writers attractive and interesting to us at this day.

Special attention is also called to the extracts from the Phædo and other works on Virtue and the Immortality of the Soul, giving the remarkable thoughts and arguments of Socrates and showing the exaltation of ideas, and the clearness and beauty of the old Greek thought. And these thoughts, it must be remembered, were recorded nearly five hundred years before any part of the New Testament was composed and will be found to give a clearer statement of the main doctrines of the prevailing popular religions than can be found in the Old or New Testaments themselves, such doctrines for example as absorption in ideal virtue, abstraction from a worldly life and living for a future state of perfection after

death; Immortality of the Soul, Heaven, Purgatory, and Hell, etc.

The ancient Egyptians, above all other peoples, seem to have had the most elaborate and intense belief in immortality of the soul, resurrection of the body and future states of rewards and punishments, and from them these doctrines seem to have spread to the races on both shores of the Mediterranean. Indeed, modern investigations have clearly shown the undoubted influence that ancient Egypt had on ancient Greece in art, religion and philosophy, and have also shown that Europe was probably first peopled, or at least most influenced in its civilization, from the adjacent Africa and not from the distant India as had been the most popular theory for many years.* The clear teaching of the Greek philosophers on immortality, etc., as now shown in the extracts herein given, is therefore a good illustration of this Egyptian influence long before the Christian era, as the Greek teaching is almost identical with that which was prevalent in ancient Egypt,† and the Greeks generally acknowledged their debt to Egypt and Chaldea for many of their ideas (see the extracts from the Timæus in the appendix).

It is also interesting to here note that in Aristotle we will find the great prototype of the modern Scientific, Rational, and Evolutionary Schools, as he had clearly anticipated the modern ideas of Natural Development or "Evolution," also "Utilitarianism" in Ethics and a broad "Democracy" in Politics. Indeed, in reading over the strong sentences of Aristotle, we will be often

*See works of Maspero, Petrie and others on Egypt. Also lectures of Amelia B. Edwards (Harper & Bros.) and Prof. Sergi on The Mediterranean Race (Scribner & Sons).

†See new translation of the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" by E. A. Wallis Budge of the British Museum—Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago.

struck with what we might call the remarkable *modernity* of his thought, and in his Politics this is particularly apparent, so that if we did not know the author we might now and then suppose that we were looking over a recent high-class political speech, an editorial in the day's paper, or a magazine article from the latest issue.

We therefore think it will be interesting and agreeably surprising if the man of to-day will read over our extracts from the Politics giving Aristotle's clear ideas on Public Schools and the careful education of the young on physical, mental and moral lines; his remarkable emphasis on the use of music in education and its ethical values and dangers, etc.; his denunciation of excessive athletics in education and his exposure of the fallacy that the professional athlete is necessarily a good physical type, which some of our best modern authorities are only now beginning to rediscover. It will be equally interesting and refreshing to note what is said on "business" and "leisure" and on war and peace in his views on the Best or Ideal Life, and the superiority of culture and character or "goods of the soul" over mere wealth or worldly success; his condemnation of all government except that based on the consent and for "the good of the governed" and his denunciations of all wars of conquest and the domination of one race by another through mere force. All of this will be found to have an extremely "advanced" or "modern" tone, yet it was written nearly twenty-four centuries ago by a thinker who was one of the highest products of an old civilization, which with all our modern conceit we must admit was probably, in its best examples, characterized by as high a standard in the physical, the ethical and the artistic as the human creature has ever attained on earth.

We have therefore made the most extensive extracts from the "Politics" because of this great general interest and because they contain so many points illustrating the true principles of general or applied ethics as well as of broad politics.

The little states of ancient Greece with their active versatile peoples, their able statesmen and philosophers, seem indeed to have experienced almost every phase and kind of politics and form of government, and had thus worked out for us the examples and problems of almost every kind that we have since had or now have to deal with in modern ethics and politics, and it will certainly be both interesting and instructive for us to now look over the treatment of these questions and problems by one of the greatest political philosophers who lived twenty-four centuries before us, and to note his criticisms and commendations of the false and true in Ethics, in Democracy and in Free Institutions from that distance of time. In our natural "Anglo-Saxon" and "Teutonic" bias, we have been perhaps too much inclined to accept the too popular idea that the main inspiration for all our modern free institutions originated in "the forests of Germany" or on "the shores of the Baltic," forgetting that most of our modern institutions were first thought out and most of our modern problems tested at a much earlier age in a more complete way on the classic shores of the Mediterranean from whence we have undoubtedly also got so much of our speech, our thought and our civilization.*

*In an old English History by Nath. Bacon, published in London in 1647, an interesting theory of the origin of the Saxons is given, viz., that they sprang from some of the Macedonian legions of Alexander's army which penetrated to the far north of Europe. If this should be true, we could thus, after all, trace the free institutions and liberal ideas of the Saxon directly back to the old Greek period and to the broad influence of Aristotle, who was the tutor of Alexander and the great political and ethical philosopher of the Macedonian Court.

STUDIO HOUSE OF Mrs. OLE BULL.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

The central figure among the Greek Philosophers was, however, the great old Master, Socrates, who for his high moral sense and wonderful reasoning powers was called by his distinguished young pupil Alcibiades, the enchanter and conqueror of all men in conversation or disputation, as expressed in the "Symposium." And it must not be forgotten that Socrates was more eminent in *Moral* Philosophy than in anything else, his work being devoted chiefly to *Ethics* and but little to *Physics*, for which latter he seems to have had more or less contempt. Even the most superficial student cannot fail to notice a remarkable parallel between Socrates and Christ in many features connected with their life and death, and in their character and teachings, so much so that Socrates might properly be called the "Pagan Christian" if not the "Pagan Christ," and the several extracts given in the Appendix and in the inserts from the teachings of Socrates will, we think, show this resemblance or relation at a glance. In his pure theistic conception of God and the government of the Universe (which was not of course uncommon in the Pagan world), in his vivid belief in the personal immortality of the soul and its future states of probation, reward and punishment, his serious belief in Divine Inspiration, his doctrine of Love, and his earnest contention for a life of ideal virtue and unworldliness, he approached most closely to the belief of the primitive Christian sect itself. And not only is it strictly true to say, as before indicated, that the Christian's own scripture nowhere contains such a clear, distinct, and detailed account of their own doctrine of the soul and its future, as can be found expressed in the words of Socrates, but it is perhaps not too much to say that no extant writing anywhere contains so good an expression of these doctrines and of the philosophic

arguments in support of them as could be found in the words of Socrates in Plato's Phædo over four hundred years before the appearance of the Christian sect.

Not only, therefore, is this old Greek Master found to stand pre-eminent in the teaching and exposition of some great religious doctrines, but a further notable and most interesting fact, which should be more appreciated by ethical students of our own day, is that Socrates also seems to have been really the father of Modern Utilitarian Ethics. This modernly revised ethical theory was clearly outlined and developed by Socrates and afterwards was taught by Aristotle, the pupil of Socrates' chief pupil—Plato—and later on was given a very full expression by Epicurus, an immediate successor of Aristotle, who, after Socrates, was probably the clearest exponent of the Utilitarian school of ethics in ancient times: And we have shown in the Appendix how identical is the teaching of Socrates with the teaching of that great master of the modern utilitarian school, Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, a point which should be more known and appreciated than it now seems to be—and should add interest to the study of those great pioneers of thought, the Greek Philosophers, in which we hope this little work may be of some help.

To add a pictorial interest we have obtained and inserted a number of portraits of the Greek philosophers, some of which are seldom seen, to better acquaint our readers, not only with the ancient thought, but with the personal appearance of the great thinkers themselves, who have so deeply influenced the morals and the thought of the human race.

We have also added a brief sketch of Pythagoras and his school, the great predecessor of Socrates and Plato, who had probably the greatest influence on their thought,



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and we have concluded the work with a life of Socrates in condensed form to give a better idea of the great personality who so dominated and influenced all later schools of Greek thinking.

We have to thank the Open Court Publishing Co. of Chicago, and also the Walter Thorp Co. and G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York, for the use of some of these portraits.

CHAS. M. HIGGINS,

Of Committee on Comparative Religion,

Brooklyn Ethical Association.

271 Ninth Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.,

May 1st, 1903.

FORETASTES AND KEYNOTES

FROM

THE GREAT PAGAN PROPHETS

SOCRATES,

PLATO,

ARISTOTLE.

"*Outside the sacred literature of the world, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were the main factors of civilization. They fulfilled a truly sublime mission in their day and nation, for in the fourth century B. C. these philosophers and their disciples made an end to the more ancient materialism and built up those systems of philosophy, including the natural sciences, which have exercised so vast an influence upon the progress of man, and still do in very many instances. They were the great prophets of the human conscience in the pagan world.*"

Davis—"Greek & Roman Stoicism."

SOCRATES ON IMMORTALITY.

B. C. 399.

"And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes.

"Then, Cebes, beyond question the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!

"But then, O my friends, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit, not only of their body but of their own evil, together with their souls. But now, as the soul plainly appears to be immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.

"Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do, in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize and the hope great.

"Wherefore I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these arrayed she is ready to go on her journey below when her time comes."

Plato's Phædo.

THE SOCRATIC-UTILITARIAN THEORY OF ETHICS.

"Then I should say to them in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason except that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures?"

"And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because afterwards they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states, and empires, and wealth."

"Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?"

Plato's "Protagoras."



SOCRATES.

B. C. 468 to 399.

THE GREAT ANCIENT EXPONENT OF THE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE OF THE IMMORTAL SOUL, AND THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF UTILITARIANISM.

(From bust in Villa Albani.)

WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE.

Folly and Ignorance.

To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know those things whereof we are ignorant, is next to madness.

The chief wisdom of man consists in not thinking he understands those things which he doth not understand.

There is but one good, knowledge, one ill, ignorance.

Socrates 399, B. C.

CHARACTER AND SINCERITY.

There is no better way to glory than to endeavor to be good as well as to seem such.

Good men must let the world see that their manners are more firm than an oath.

In the life of man, as in an image, every part ought to be beautiful.

An honest death is better than a dishonest life.

Socrates.

POLITICAL MORALITY.

They are not kings who are in possession of a throne or come unjustly by it, but they who know how to govern.

A king is ruler of willing subjects according to the laws, a tyrant is ruler of subjects against their will, not according to the laws, but arbitrarily.

That city is strongest which hath virtuous men; that city is best wherein are proposed most rewards of virtue. That city lives best which liveth according to law and punisheth the unjust.

Faith should be kept more strictly with a city than with private persons.

Whatever inconvenience may ensue, nothing is to be preferred before justice.

Socrates.

VIRTUE AND FILIAL DUTY.

Virtue is the beauty, vice the deformity of the soul.
The greatest of vices is ingratitude.
The greatest obligation is that to parents.

Socrates.

RELIGION.

The Gods are to be worshipped according to the law of the city where a man lives.

The best way of worshipping God is to do what He commands.

Our prayers should be for blessings in general, for God knows best what is good for us, our offerings proportioned to our abilities, for He considers integrity, not munificence.

Socrates.

PRUDENCE.

Be not forward in speech, for many times the tongue has cut off the head.

When a man opens his mouth, his virtues are as manifest as images in a temple.

In war, steel is better than gold: In life, wisdom excelleth wealth.

When a woman saith she loveth thee, take heed of these words more than when she revileth thee.

A young man's virtue is to do nothing too much.

Socrates.

PLATO, the great idealistic philosopher of the Grecian schools, having the deepest influence on both the religious and philosophic thought of Jewish and Christian sects. It has been said of the great Jewish Philosopher Philo—contemporary with Christ and the Apostles—that he was so great a follower of Plato, that it was a common saying among the ancients that "either Plato Philonises or Philo Platonises." (See Preface in the works of Philo Judaeus, translated by C. D. Yonge.) St. Augustine, one of the most learned and influential of the Christian "Fathers," in his "City of God," naively acknowledges that "none come nearer to us than the Platonists."

It is interesting also to note that a mystic or divine quality was imputed to Plato by his followers, similar to that claimed for Christ, viz., that he was a divine incarnation or super-human being. In the life of Plato given in Stanley's History of Philosophy, he states that:—"Plutarch, Suidas and others affirm it to have been commonly reported at Athens that he (Plato) was the son of Apollo, who appearing in a vision to his mother, a woman of extraordinary beauty—she thereupon conceived."

"He did not issue from a mortal bed.
"A God his sire, a Godlike life he led."

"Some therefore affirmed he was born of a Virgin, and it was a common speech among the Athenians that Phœbus begat Esculapius and Plato, one to cure bodies, the other souls."

The name "Plato" seems to mean broad, and was given by his father Ariston, on account of the literal or figurative "broadness" in the physical and mental qualities of his gifted son. It will be seen in the portraits that the brow on the handsome face of Plato has the broadness and smoothness of a "plateau," which doubtless means the same as "Plato." And as to the mental sense of the word, it is certain that few thinkers were more elevated and extended in their writings or so broad and profound in their thinking as this immortal pupil of Socrates, hence the fitness and beauty of his name "Plato."



PLATO.

B. C. 400.

From original marble bust in the Vatican.

HONESTY AND RECIPROCITY.

"*In the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple: Thou shalt not touch that which is mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may I, being of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should do to me.*"

Plato's "Laws," 400 B. C.

THE ETERNAL.

"*Now the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning, but the beginning has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of something, that would have no beginning. But that which is unbegotten must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, or anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten. But if the self-moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then must she also be without beginning and immortal.*"

Plato's Phædrus.

CIVIC VIRTUE AND TRUE STATESMANSHIP.

"*Facts easily prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities.*"

"*Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom and of virtuous and wise action. God is witness to us of this truth, for He is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external goods, but in Himself and by reason of His own nature.*"

"*Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the performance of good actions. Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily.*"

Aristotle. 350 B. C.

LIFE AND PEACE.

"*The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and all actions into those which are necessary and useful and those which are honorable: there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is useful and necessary, but what is honorable is better. In such principles children and persons of every age should be trained, whereas even the Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to be the best governed, and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be more useful and profitable.*"

"*Facts as well as arguments prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of those military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire: like unused iron they rust in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.*"

Aristotle. B. C. 350.

CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED.

Right vs. Might.

"Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right."

"Yet many appear to think that a despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practicing towards others; they demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behavior is irrational."

"Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain domination over their neighbors, for there is great evil in this. No such principle and no law having this object is either statesmanlike, or useful, or right. For the same things are best for individuals and for states and these are the things which the legislator should implant in the minds of his citizens."

"Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved, but first of all they should provide against their enslavement and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism."

Aristotle, B. C. 350.

THE DIVINE MISSION OF SOCRATES.

"*For this is the command of God, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue come money and every other good of man, public as well as private.*" * * *

"*I am that gadfly which God has given the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you.* * * * *And that I am given to you by God is proved by this: that if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns, or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually, like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; this, I say, would not be like human nature. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; they have no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.*" * * * *

"*For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no Gods, and convict myself, in my own defense, of not believing in them. But that is not the case; for I do believe that there are Gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them.*" *From the Apology.*

Prof. JAMES H HYSLOP.

PREFACE.

The lecture which is here published in book form was an attempt to reduce the conceptions of Greek ethics to the same terms as those in which modern problems in this field express themselves. Too many philosophers merely transliterate the language of antiquity instead of translating it. The consequence is that we as often fail to discover that in the past we are dealing with the same intellectual and moral problems as in the present. I have endeavored, therefore, to see the Greek thought on ethics with the eyes of a modern student. How far I have been successful must be left to others to decide. But there seems to me a perennial lesson for serious men and women in the efforts of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to reanimate while they modified the sturdy morality which they thought produced the civilization they saw on the decline. The *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato, and the *Ethics* and *Politics* of Aristotle are equally good as missionary appeals to revivify the conscience of the race as they are scientific treatises to enlighten its intellect. They should be read with constant reference to the problems that interest in social and political morality. The selections from Plato and Aristotle which have been made by the Editor and myself are designed both to illustrate the conceptions of Greek philosophy and to show their affinity with present day questions.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

New York, March 26, 1903.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE.

The series of lectures on The Evolution of Ethics will probably be issued in three volumes as follows :

Vol. 1, The Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Vol. 2, Origin of Ethical Ideas, Ethics of Evolution, and Utilitarian Ethics.

Vol. 3 will probably contain all the remaining lectures of the course.

We now issue the volume on the Greek Philosophers as the first of the series, not because the Greek systems are necessarily first in order of importance or chronology, but because they properly deserve first place in our regards, as we believe it cannot be denied that to the Greek and Latin thinkers we are most indebted for the greatest and most direct influence on our own political, moral, religious and scientific thought.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

BY PROF. JAS. H. HYSLOP.

The interest in Greek philosophy is perennial. It resembles the immortality of Homer. The Iliad and the Odyssey have not done more to stimulate and nourish the imagination than the philosophers have done for the understanding and the conscience. Whenever we wish to discuss fundamental principles in philosophy and literature, or the great outlines of theory in both departments of thought, we return to Greece, and there we find the object of our suit in all its simplicity and fascination. Homer, like his own Cimmerian shades, is found only in the twilight of fable, and philosophy, like epic poetry in its antiquity, traces its origin to the confines of mythology. But in both branches of its intellectual activity Greece reflects the naiveté of childhood, until its problems become well defined in the speculations of the later schools. It is this very simplicity, however, that constitutes both the fascination and the value of Greek philosophic thought. It deals with first principles in a way that seems always and everywhere to characterize the rise of philosophic reflection. The spontaneity and naturalness of this development make it especially

attractive to all who enjoy an emancipation from the artificial methods and burdensome shackles of scholastic dogmatism. It goes direct to nature and fact for its data, and keeps near enough to common experience to avoid mere romancing, while it remains profound enough to originate the spirit and methods of science and philosophy. This naturalness of Greek reflection was and is the true genius of speculative inquiry, and naive as were many of its thoughts, they exhibit a sagacity and penetration that astonishes us when we consider the character of the period as compared with the advantages of our own. The concrete form of these speculations often seem odd and childish enough, but the general principles at their basis were as profound and far reaching as anything that can to-day boast of an origin in riper reflection. Hence whenever we wish to divest ourselves of the impediments adhering to existing formulas and illustrations with their illusory associations we have only to return to those sources of philosophy which, though they border on the simplicity of childhood, have power to stimulate inquiry in a way that is not rivaled by any other race of thinkers. This is the one reason that Greece is the great academic source of philosophic education and culture.

The chief interest, however, with which we are here occupied is that period of reflection which begins with Socrates and ends with Aristotle. Not even all of the aspects of this period will require our attention, but only those which deal with its ethics.

It was an age of unexampled intellectual, as it was of political, activity, both having been brought about by the same causes: namely, the emancipation of the Greek consciousness from the thralls of tradition, and the victory over Persia at Marathon and Salamis. The former

secured intellectual, and the latter political, freedom, and both a civilization without a rival at that time, and which remained as long as the old morality retained its leavening power. Greece became conscious of herself and of her power in this emancipation of her people, and so secured that spontaneity of action, intellectual and political, which is the only guarantee and protector of a great civilization. Her strength against outside enemies gave her self-reliance, and the taste of freedom fortified her against hostile forces within. Besides all these there was, of course, a variety of influences, social, literary, and philosophical, which stimulated intellectual activity of all kinds, and so supplemented the purely political agencies in awakening Greek life to a consciousness of its powers and vocation. There was a large class of people, aristocratic in possessions, tastes, and habits, and with leisure, or free from toil and pain as the Greeks expressed it, to lead a contemplative or reflective life. This class set to thinking about things cosmic, personal, and social, and the very first impulse opened up a fairy-land of wonders in nature that fascinated the imagination like the discoveries of Columbus and the theories of Darwin in later times. In thus opening up the secrets of nature, the Greeks were stimulated in an inquiry as intoxicating as the gold fever of Peru and California. Trees, plants, ocean, seasons, stars, numbers, elements, and all animate or inanimate things were objects of mingled worship and curiosity. A discovery in any of these fields was the signal for the most impetuous and childish theories. It was only natural, and though their systems were very naive at first, they soon gave rise to problems which have a perennial interest and an importance for every individual who seeks a knowledge of nature as well as culture. "Consider," says Mr. Alfred Benn, "the lively

emotions excited among an intelligent people at a time when multiplication and division, squaring and cubing, the rule of three, the construction and equivalence of figures, with all their manifold applications to industry, commerce, fine art, and (military) tactics, were just as strange and wonderful as electrical phenomena to us; consider also the magical influence still commonly attributed to particular numbers, and the intense eagerness to obtain exact numerical statements, even when they are of no practical value, exhibited by all who are thrown back upon primitive ways of living, as, for example, in Alpine traveling, or on board an Atlantic steamer, and we shall cease to wonder that a mere form of thought, a lifeless abstraction, should once have been regarded as the solution of every problem, the cause of all existence." What is said in this passage referring to Pythagoras can also be said of Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras. The physical speculations of the Ionian school, the pantheistic conceptions of Anaximander and the two Eleatics, Xenophanes and Parmenides, the dialectic of Zeno, the perpetual flux or evolution of Heraclitus, the naive atomic theories of Empedocles and Democritus, and the theological system of Anaxagoras—all of these indicated an intellectual fermentation of vast significance both in their destructive influence upon traditional ideas and in their constructive power for molding a new civilization. But upon these influences I cannot dwell further, and allude to them at all only to remark their importance in a complete estimate of the period which I am to discuss more carefully. I can only examine in the briefest compass possible the most general philosophic and moral attitude of mind characterizing the whole period preceding Socrates.



PYTHAGORAS.

(569-471. B. C.)

From an ancient Cameo.

Preceding the Socratic period, which I am to consider, there were two phases of intellectual development whose characteristics require to be noticed in order to comprehend rightly the new tendencies inaugurated by Socrates. They may be called the philosophic and religious movements. Both of them terminate with the skepticism of the sophists, who will come in for some consideration. But the philosophic attitude of mind was characterized by *cosmic* speculation. They were first attempts to explain the universe and afterward endeavors to formulate maxims for the regulation of conduct. The phenomena of nature were reduced to some kind of unity, whether of being or of motion, elements or substance, and their action according to some definite law. When ethical maxims were reached they took the form of injunctions to conform conduct to this unity, to the law of nature, to the harmony of the universe. It is important to remark the conception of morality involved in such a view of things. It is identical in general conception and terms with that of Mr. Spencer and evolutionists usually, in that it represents morality to be an adjustment to the laws of nature, or in evolutionistic parlance, environment. This conception and point of view make morality external. It represents morality merely as action adjusted to external forces and requires nothing but the intelligence and prudence instigated by fear to achieve it. Such a thing as the Kantian good-will is either unnecessary or unintelligible in this condition of mind. Obedience to the fixed laws of the cosmos is the one course that leads to the highest good, which to the Greek was always pleasure, unless we except Plato and the Stoics. It is hardly proper to say that this obedience was a duty, or felt as a duty, because the very conception of moral obligation, born from the sense of a

conflict between one's own inclinations and the constraint of conscience, which looked at an ideal above nature and more especially characterized Christianity, was unknown to the period of which I am treating. The sense of conflict was often enough felt, but it was the sense of a conflict between a weaker and a stronger power, and not between human desires and a divine will preconceived as just and benevolent. The Greek consciousness or belief was that man was *a part of nature*, not dualistically opposed to it, as either equal or inferior to it, and this conception held the mind to the assumption of a complete harmony between the ultimate order of the world and man's interest. The highest good, therefore, was conceived as man's interest in obedience to superior power, and not respect for its laws as the expression of a personal will. Consequently, prudence became the highest virtue, which was wise obedience to power, not respect for moral personality. This prudence, therefore, did not involve merit for good-will as distinct from knowledge or intelligence, but threw the whole responsibility for virtue or excellence upon wisdom or knowledge of the laws of nature. The good man was the wise man; the man who knew the laws of the cosmos and obeyed them whether he had any respect for them or not. The prudent (*vorsichtiger*) man was as good as the religious saint, or even better, and had his rewards for mere prudent self-interest quite equal those of the seeker after eternal life. It was assumed that his will inevitably lay in the direction of the good, which was conceived as personal interest and pleasure, and all that any one could be said to lack when he failed to achieve it, or "virtue," was wisdom or rational knowledge of the universe. Man's whole duty was to get a knowledge of nature and to prudently adjust his conduct to its laws,

not to seek an ideal above nature in some transcendental state of existence. The ignorant man, if he ever attained the good at all, merely stumbled upon it, but the rational man who was conscious of what he aimed at was "virtuous" for that reason. *Consciousness or self-consciousness* was the Greek's conception of virtue. *Conscientiousness* is the increment which later thought adds to that as the conception of morality, and so supplements knowledge by good-will as a condition of virtue.

In order to see the close relation between early philosophy and ethics we must keep in mind that both in his speculative and practical reflections the pre-Socratic thinker directed his attention to the external world. Both his philosophy and his ethics were cosmic. To state it more technically his point of view was cosmological, that is, cosmocentric, as distinct from anthropological, that is, anthropocentric. This position favored humility and obedience, as the anthropocentric view, whatever its merits in other respects, often tends to an exaggerated self-estimation. Nevertheless the Greek had no humility and the later Christian had less pride. There were other reasons for this fact. But the reference to cosmic and external conditions, under the philosophic impulse, was not accompanied or inspired by any sense of fear, at least among the philosophers. The common mind may have lived in terror of the forces of nature, because it thought them the manifestation of lawless gods and demons. But in the reflective stage of development this fear was banished. This was probably because the movement was controlled by the more philosophic minds of Greece, who were in their times the ideals of calm and dispassionate temperament, and hence the ethical consciousness represented by them was of the rational type, duly exempt from fear and superstition on the one hand,

and from an exalted and exaggerated estimate of human life on the other. Not being able to awaken the influence of love for an impersonal law, as Christianity awakened it for the law of an idealized personal God, the ethics of the period under notice could have no other motive than a calculating prudence, exempt from the disturbing influence of fear, hope, and love. Its whole principle was adjustment to an external order, and morality was rational submission to it. There was no high estimation placed upon man in any sense that his good lay in conquering the world, but only in conforming to it. The point of view, as I have said, was cosmocentric, not anthropocentric, and this meant that man must subordinate his life to the cosmos instead of subordinating nature to himself. This same conception was reflected in politics, in which the ethical norm was "passive obedience" to authority minus the "divine right of kings," though there are traces of even this idea, with none of its idealization, however, as later civilization tried to construe it. But morality in this conception expressed a sense of limitation, and though the whole movement was characterized by a calm and rational view of this limitation, its tendency was to make the Greek conscious of thwarted effort and restricted liberty in the satisfaction of desire, and this he resented with all the bitterness characteristic of a liberty-loving race. Hence the universal lamentation at the hardness of fate, though this weakness generally escaped the philosophers whose habits of thought and action insured a mental equilibrium that has fixed the popular conception of their character for all time. They taught and practised that balance of feeling and will which enables men to battle with the storms of nature and destiny, and to seek their highest good rather in obedience to cosmic laws

than in rebellion against them. The average Greek was a born rebel, because he could respect neither nature nor the gods, and it was a hard lesson to learn that the cosmos had the first claim upon his allegiance. But this necessity—for it was a necessity rather than a duty to the Greek, because, on the one hand, he found neither personality in nature nor morality in the gods, and on the other, his own conception of the good did not transcend personal interest—this necessity of submission to nature was the whole ethical teaching of the philosophic movement previous to Socrates, and it was identical with the religious attitude of mind in the same period, except that the forces that exacted obedience were impersonal and could not utilize all those associations which are connected with the idea of personality. Though they could not evoke love, as the human attitude of mind toward them, they did not awaken in the philosophers the sentiment of fear. The age and its necessities taught the fatuity of cowardice and the benefits of rational adjustment to nature.

The second intellectual movement which both preceded and accompanied the philosophical was the religious system of ideas. This founded all morality upon the will of the gods. It was not reflective in its type, but manifested those naive ideas regarding the basis of morals which characterize all religious beliefs. It fostered the morality of fear. It was like the philosophical movement in producing the sense of subjection to an external law, or authority, but it was unlike that movement in its conception of the law to be obeyed. The religious consciousness of that time obeyed divinities that were the embodied *genii* of caprice and libertinism, and hence it could live only under the domination of fear, which such beings would inspire, especially that they

held men's life and fortune in their hands. At first men animated even nature with capricious laws and lived in terror under it. Long after they had found the cosmos a seat of fixed laws they still attributed to the gods the caprice and wontonness that nature had shared at an earlier time. No genuine morality is possible under such a system. The calculations of prudence and virtue are not possible where nature and the gods are not regular, and to caprice the gods added personality without morality. Hence they could inspire nothing but fear. On the other hand, the philosopher's cosmos was the seat of irrevocable order, and he could learn to calculate its action, to sacrifice his desires to it for remoter rewards, and to contemplate its course with equanimity, while the religious mind had to quake and tremble before the prospect of an arbitrary and unjust interference with its plans, hopes, and aspirations. Nothing but superstitious fear could exist under such a system of conceptions, and man still remained the servant of external agents, and his morality or conduct nothing more than prudential obedience under restraint. The philosophic mind could cultivate an intellectual calm, the calm of Fate, or the consciousness that the course of things was inexorable, and that it could be propitiated by neither fear, nor hope, nor love, but the religious mind, having no fixed order with which to reckon, but only a lot of capricious personal beings to propitiate, could only lead a life of fear and terror. In the absence, therefore, of the philosopher's calm and insight, the two alternatives for man's regeneration were either to deny the existence of the gods, or to moralize them. Skepticism did the former; Christianity did the latter.

This skeptical tendency was represented by the sophistic movement in which there were three factors

having much interest in the development of philosophy. They were: (1) Its doctrine of the so-called relativity of knowledge, both intellectual and moral. (2) Its agnosticism, or even denial, regarding the existence of the gods. (3) Its theory of conventionalism regarding the origin of morality. There was also in the school an incipient recognition of the place occupied by pleasure in the determination of conduct in so far as the individual is concerned. This might very well be called the fourth factor in sophistic thought. All of them exercised a profound influence upon current conceptions of morality. The first led to a change from the cosmological to the anthropological point of view. The second led to a denial of the religious consciousness and the authority of the gods. The third and fourth in connection with religious skepticism created a tendency toward libertinism.

The meaning of the sophistic theory of the relativity of knowledge was that all ideas and truths were relative to the individual who perceived them. At this period of reflection many of the Greeks, and more particularly the sophists, became conscious of the contradictions in human experience and beliefs. For instance, what appeared hot to one man was cold to another; what one called large another called small; what one called right another called wrong. Differences of opinion seemed irreconcilable. Every man appeared to have nothing but his own sensations to consider in his reflections and was without assurance that they were in any respect like those of his neighbor. All this was expressed by saying that all knowledge and ideas were relative and none of them absolute, which was only to maintain that there was no common measure of experience and truth, that every idea was true, every act right for the man who

thought so. I cannot go fully into this doctrine at present, but I hope I have made it clear that it was a most radical skepticism in regard to all the beliefs of common sense. The consequences of it are, or ought to be, apparent to every one. It leaves every one free to follow his own convictions and impulses without hindrance except from superior power. There can be no appeal to common ideas and principles, and reason can only mean what each man thinks and believes for himself and without regard to others. The doctrine of conventionalism carried the principles of skepticism still farther. After denying the existence of the gods and their relation to morality, and the existence of absolute truth, this doctrine of conventionalism was an attempt to explain how the actual code of moral practice came to be accepted and to be a common one. There was no doubt about the fact that a common code existed, but so far from being the spontaneous adoption of the individuals in society the sophists held that it was due to the passive convention of citizens in obedience to the superior power of the state, which in most cases was an arbitrary prince. With the growing demand for individual and political liberty, and the hatred against tyrannical rulers, this idea only reinforced the individualism of sophistic psychology, and tended to destroy the authority of the state in the estimation of the citizen who could claim upon the basis of this philosophy the sole right to determine his own conduct. When pleasure was set up as the positive motive for every man's action, and each individual was regarded as his own rightful judge of what was right or wrong, or what pleasure he could pursue without the legitimacy of hindrance or interference on the part of others, we can well imagine what moral chaos must follow upon the application of such a theory to social and political action.

Now Socrates originates the reaction against sophistic doctrine in philosophy, ethics, and politics. In order to understand what he accomplished and what he represents in the history of thought, at least by way of suggestion, we must examine three characteristics of the man: (1) His method. (2) His doctrine. (3) His personality.

The method of Socrates begins with his attack upon the sophists, which covered his own pretense of ignorance behind the keenest of innuendo and satire against the sophisms of these skeptical wiseacres. He did not question their theology, or rather anti-theological beliefs, as the main point of attack. He might have defended the existence of the gods as the first position to be sustained in the reconstruction of ethics. But he did not choose this resource. Whatever belief in the gods he maintained he held either as a pious opinion of his own or as the *terminus ad quem* of his philosophical theories. But avoiding the prior reconstruction of theology, he pushed sophistic skepticism to its logical consequences and directed his attack upon the sophists' boastful claim to a knowledge of virtue and of the best means to attain it. He ridiculed their personal arrogance and resented their conceited and ignorant claims to superior knowledge in all matters of virtue. But in his argument with them he showed great shrewdness and sagacity. He made no pretensions to knowledge himself. He confessed that he was only a seeker after truth, and instead of asserting anything that would require proof on his part, he carried on his discussions with the sophists by a series of questions which shifted the obligation of assertion upon them and which were couched in a way to expose their ignorance by exhibiting their contradictions while pretending to be instructors of youth in matters of knowledge and virtue. He asked for definition and meaning where the

ordinary man wanted facts. Consequently he had to deal with *conceptions*, *ideas*, rather than with *objects*, external things and laws. His process of induction, definition, and dialectic argument turned on the clarification of one's ideas, and the establishment of a *real* or certain, as distinct from an *illusory* or uncertain, knowledge. His object in this was, of course, to show the sophist that he had not thought out his ideas to their consequences, and that his contradictory conceptions, with his psychological individualism, unfitted him to be the intellectual and moral guide to the Athenian youth. But in the process Socrates assumed and used a point of view of whose significance he was not himself conscious. *He began his inquiries with ideas and not with things*, and the consequence was that he completely reversed the point of view from which the study of philosophy began. Instead of looking primarily at the external world, or the objective facts which skepticism denied or questioned, he forced the sophist to discover in his individual ideas the contradictions which this class had found in general knowledge, and consequently he compelled his opponent either to admit his own confusion or to reconstruct his view of knowledge. But in the intensity of his occupation with mere ideas Socrates ceased to take an interest in speculations about the cosmos. The sophists, of course, prepared the way for this by their skepticism in regard to the validity of sensory knowledge. But they did not openly avow any contempt for physical speculation. Socrates, however, ridiculed all attempts at determining the nature of the stars, for instance, or explaining the physical universe. He said he could learn nothing from the study of nature. He did not care for a walk along the river bank for the contemplation of the trees, or for any study of physical phenomena. He was,

on the contrary, a complete agnostic in regard to the possibility of physical science, as it was then called. Man and his conceptions were his supreme interest, while a knowledge of the physical world was ridiculed either as impossible or as a hot-bed of fancies and illusions. This position, of course, was only the logical consequence of sophistic psychology, though with Socrates this attitude of mind was rather a matter of moral temperament than of logical reflection upon the philosophical problems of the time. It was due to the intensity of his interest in ideas which monopolized attention and tended to turn men from the contemplation of the external universe to reflection upon themselves. It was a quiet substitution of the anthropocentric for the cosmocentric point of view in the consideration of truth.

But this agnosticism in physical science requires some attention in the light of the criticism which is sometimes directed against it. The contempt for physical science which Socrates expressed sounds very strange in our ears, especially after all the triumphs of modern inquiry under that name. Had it been called metaphysics, which it really was, there would be no protest against his judgment by those who are inclined to ridicule him for his opinion. But, as it is, Socrates' impeachment of physical science is taken as a defense of the process of burrowing in one's own reflections for a solution of the world's mystery, like the Hindu sage who is said to solve the riddle of the sphinx by sitting under his palm tree and looking into his navel. Socrates here seems to favor the scholastic method which science so vehemently despises in philosophy, and which it illustrates so vigorously in the weaknesses of Hegelian language, namely, the attempt to construe the whole universe from the standpoint of self-consciousness.

But accusations of this kind betray complete ignorance of both the acuteness of Socrates and of the actual conception of physical science which he attacked. Mere propositions are not safe guides in regard to the meaning of past ideas. The form of expression which literally translates the past may conceal its real content. The physical science of Socrates' time, as denominated in the doctrines of Thales, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, along with others, was nothing but a priori metaphysical speculation about the physical universe, and deludes the average scientist of the present day because he allows himself to be deceived by the name and contents of ancient inquiry without regarding the viciousness of ancient method. Moreover the admirer of Mr. Spencer should not be counted among the critics of Socrates. But physical science in Greece was not an attempt to catalogue the facts of nature after the method of modern scientific and inductive procedure, and to suspend explanation until the laws and uniformities of nature were adequately known, but it was a resort to the widest and wildest speculation upon the most meager data conceivable, and under conditions that made it impossible to penetrate the mysteries of the cosmos. The limitations of such knowledge, as suspected by Socrates, were entirely justifiable suppositions, and nothing would meet the modern condemnation of science more readily than this a priori speculation about the universe which Socrates eschewed, though with even better reasons than he knew. It was rather a spontaneous interest in man and his conduct that animated Socrates and diverted him from watching the stars than any philosophic conception of the limitations of human knowledge. His agnosticism was thus not against physical science as we understand the term, namely, as

a process for empirically determining the laws of nature, but against metaphysical efforts to construe the origin of phenomena and of organic existence in terms of some simple substance and by a purely speculative method. This is precisely the contention of modern science, which ought to claim Socrates as the father of empirical inquiry in the field of physical phenomena, or at least as no opponent of it, though he formulated no principles by which the limitations of knowledge to phenomena could be determined, instead of reproaching him with the introspective method of studying nature. What Socrates actually aimed at was identical with the practical interests of present science, except that it was moral, not physical. His object was to turn men to attainable results, even if they were only the clarification of ideas and the moralization of the will.

But the mere fact that he turned away from current physical speculations and demanded an examination of our logical conceptions, while he applied a dialectic use of them against the sophistries of Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, and their class generally, created a new tendency, and a new point of view, the anthropocentric as opposed to the cosmocentric, as they have already been denominated. Besides its influence upon philosophic method, which was to make it psychological and idealistic, as distinct from the physical and realistic type of thought, it established an entirely new direction for ethical reflection. This too became subjective as against the objective point of view in the older philosophy. Man was turned in upon himself for a knowledge of the moral law. Reflection upon himself and not upon external nature became the method of determining one's duties. The habit of self-analysis thus initiated and involved in the criticism of one's conceptions transmitted its influence

to the desires, and they became objects of introspective examination and regulation. The ethical consciousness thus turned away from the cosmological order of nature to find the law of action and its promised reward in the subject itself. The effect of this with its emphasis upon the virtue of self-control, which is the index of man's own responsibility for the good and not nature, was to create in man a wholly new idea of himself, namely, that sense of his dignity and worth which was wholly impossible under the idea that he was merely an instrument in the hands of Fate, of nature, or of the ruler to accomplish some other end than his own. The old cosmological ethics had taught submission, if not humility, though it could not wholly prevent fear and slavish obedience. The new psychological and anthropological point of view awakened courage and self-confidence, and with them reinforced the pride which an aristocratic society had fostered, even when the order of nature elicited no respect for itself. This pride could take the direction of vanity, or of man's dignity, importance, and moral mission in the universe, according to the character of the individual who maintained it. The last was its form in Socrates and Plato, and it marked the rise of that conception of man which no subsequent morality has forgotten, and which no future ethics can ignore, even when it is necessary to correct its aberrations, and though it is incumbent upon it not to ignore the limitations which an eternal order places upon self-estimation. "Know thyself," *Γνωθι σεαυτον,* is an important maxim for a man who wishes to secure self-control and for one who would possess the psychological equipment for instructing and leading his fellows in the path of truth and virtue; but if it conduces only to pride and vanity, an exaggerated sense of human

importance in the economy of nature, or to a demand for liberty and impunity in conduct, it requires to be corrected by emphasizing that subordination to external nature, or adjustment to the laws of the universe, which the old cosmological point of view so effectively instilled, and which checks transcendental aspirations, based upon wishes instead of facts, by substituting obedience for libertinism on the one hand, and impracticable idealism with other-worldliness on the other. But self-examination is necessary to avoid both extremes, and the method of reflection which Socrates initiated supplied this want.

So much for the method of Socrates. But the most interesting feature about his position is the content of his doctrine. In spite of his departure from the cosmological method he adopted one of the fundamental ideas of the cosmological school. We have seen that the cosmocentric point of view emphasizes the necessity of knowledge as a condition of securing the fruits of prudence and of successful adjustment to nature. Obedience to the laws of nature was the form of expression that this pre-Socratic ethics assumed, but it demanded for its realization rational knowledge. Socrates, presupposing the natural prudence of men, took up this assumption of the cosmological school and advanced it to the position of the highest good. This was that knowledge is the one great "virtue" (in Greek parlance, excellence) or condition of moral life. The idea in its main features was thus not entirely new, but in fact the distinctive doctrine of Greek thought, though Socrates had raised it to the supreme place, whereas before it had been one of many ideals. The Greek admired knowledge on its own account as well as for its utility, and hence Socrates only kept within the limits of racial ideals when he chose one of them for the pinnacle of an ethical system. But he

simply retained the main principle of the cosmological period without its method or its object. Previous thought assumed that men resented obedience to nature and required adjustment of will to attain virtue. But Socrates, assuming that the will was already set in the direction of its desires, thought that the want of knowledge was the only reason for man's failure to attain the object of desire. Hence he did not make "virtue" a product of will alone but an object of the intellect, wholly forgetting the attributes of will that constituted morality for the majority of men, though realizing them in his personal character, and remaining unconscious of the maxim so often quoted from Ovid, as indicating the frequent discord between knowledge and virtue:

Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.

But assuming that men would pursue the good or virtue if they knew what it was, he made knowledge the highest good and excused vice by tracing it merely to ignorance. The two formulas which expressed his doctrine, and which were paradoxical even to the Greeks, though less so to them than to us, were, first, that "knowledge is virtue," and second, that "no man is voluntarily bad." Both of them should be examined carefully.

It seems exceedingly strange that any man should advocate the proposition that knowledge is virtue. Nothing appears more absurd than this real or apparent identification of knowledge and morality. The distinction between them is radical with us. But the fact is that the whole paradoxical character of his formula lies in the errors of translators. Stated in this literal, or transliteral, manner it wholly conceals the real intention of Socrates. Translators should know more of psychology and philosophy before they attempt to interpret the

Greeks for us, and I know of no better illustration of their intellectual poverty as a rule than the usual formula which they adopt to express the idea of Socrates, confusing the conceptions and associations of the term for us with the very different ideas of the Greeks. "Virtue" with them was a general term for *excellence* of any kind, whether physical, intellectual, or moral, though there was at least a vague feeling that a decided difference existed between physical and moral excellence. Socrates, indeed, thought of this "virtue" or excellence, namely, knowledge, as a good to be attained as a condition of successfully pursuing personal and other interests, but not as a quality of will, nor of the act attaining and aiming at this end, and hence in order to obtain the true conception of Socrates' doctrine we have to interpret his "virtue," not as a quality of will or conduct, but as the skill or intelligence required to obtain the good which the individual was supposed to be seeking. Consequently, when he says that knowledge is "virtue," he means that it is the most important excellence or quality of being which man can aim to attain. It stood for Socrates as the *summum bonum*, in so far as it was the necessary condition to the satisfaction of desire, though he admitted or assumed that it was the *means* to the good which all persons seek without the necessity of being urged to do so, or without failure, namely, interest or pleasure. With Socrates men's intentions were right, and their failure to attain the object of volition was not due to any moral depravity of will as we conceive the matter, but was traceable to ignorance, and hence the imperative duty to gain knowledge, if desire was to be satisfied without miscarriage; that is, if the good was to be attained. This conception of his doctrine is not so paradoxical as it seems in the usual form of statement,

because of two facts: (1) Because "virtue" is found to mean excellence in general, and (2) Because Socrates conceived knowledge as a means to an end already sought, and not as the real ultimate good, though it seemed to stand for this in his system.

This interpretation of the formula of Socrates is born out by a similar examination of the second paradox in his theory, namely, the proposition that "no man is voluntarily bad." Here again translators are at fault. They have assumed too readily that both "bad" and "voluntary" connote the same in English as in Greek, an assumption which is totally false. In modern parlance, itself due to conceptions and a history which we cannot recount here, "bad" denotes either depravity of will, or evil consequences, such as pain, or both; and "voluntary" expresses three facts, namely, consciousness, autonomy, and purpose. But in Greek thought "bad" denoted only disagreeable results, and "voluntary" (ἑκών) mere intention without reference or implication in regard to autonomy. Consequently, to say in our phraseology that "no man is voluntarily bad" is both to deny the freedom of the will and to deny the idea of moral depravity of will. But if translators had said that Socrates taught that no man intentionally or consciously sought what he thought injurious to himself they would have expressed exactly what Socrates meant, and the proposition would not have appeared so paradoxical. The proposition seems absurd to us because, as I have said, it appears to deny the freedom of the will on the one hand, and the fact that man does consciously, if not purposely, choose the worse act on the other. But if Socrates had been told that his doctrine contradicted the freedom of the will he would either have laughed at us or told us that he could not understand such an accusation. The

fact is that "involuntary" is not the proper translation of the Greek term for which it stands in the proposition. The reason, or one reason at least, for this is that the Greek language did not distinguish between will and desire. The same term did service for both conceptions, while modern philosophy makes the distinction between choice and desire (organic or instinctive craving) so clear that there is no illusion as to the meaning of the voluntary and involuntary. The term desire, of course, is equivocal. But no man to-day calls his desires voluntary in so far as the term describes merely natural or constitutional appetites, but only when he conceives them as conscious acts of decision or preference. When he contrasts desire with will he means distinctly to imply that desire is either an organic state of consciousness which we find in experience to be an index of a want, or craving minus the final act of excluding its alternative object from possible election. The former has no element of will in it, and the latter, though it may represent one stage of consciousness involving will, can only be the will in deliberation. But distinguishing as we do between will and desire we can very well suppose that a man can will what he does not desire. Socrates, however, could not do this because psychology had not yet sufficiently analyzed the phenomena of conation. Neither he nor his contemporaries clearly saw the need of this distinction, though they instinctively felt that there was something paradoxical and illusory about his proposition, while they left the riddle where they found it. If, therefore, we attempt to bring out his meaning we should read his formula so that it should express the fact that no man purposely desires evil. This would sound much less paradoxical, because we concede easily enough in common parlance that men can act against

their desires and do wrong though they do not desire the wrong on its own account. Still there is something equivocal in this statement, because we know or believe that some men do desire what is wrong or evil. But here again our word "evil" does duty for two different conceptions which we at least try to distinguish clearly, namely, physical evil and moral evil. Physical or non-moral evil is conceived as some form of pain, or consequence that is opposed to desire, and moral evil as a perversion of will or quality of action in volition that excites the resistance of conscience. Now Socrates could conceive but one "evil," and this did not distinguish between the physical and the moral; that is, physical and moral evil were the same thing, and the defect called vice was a defect of knowledge. This evil or pain he always conceived egoistically and for this reason did not see the necessity or occasion for recognizing a prohibition on anything that was not so related. We can say that a man can desire the wrong, but not the evil, but Socrates, not distinguishing between wrong and evil, could not use both propositions, but had to choose between saying that man consciously desired evil and that man did not consciously desire evil. Socrates was, of course, asserting a truism in his doctrine when we understand what he meant to maintain. With him there was no evil, that is, moral evil, out of relation to consciousness or intention, which is perfectly true. But his formula for expressing this truth was equivocal. He did not always distinguish between consciously doing what is evil and consciously doing what we know to be evil. Assuming then that we never desire evil, that desire and will are the same, and that there is no evil out of relation to desire, we can see what the proposition of Socrates meant to express. It was that no man consciously

desires what he knows to be evil or opposed to his personal interests. The pain or evil which he considered as opposed to desire always had a reference to the subject of the act or volition. The wrong was always to himself, and this was never purposive.

But then why did Socrates enunciate such a truism? The answer to this question is that he was aiming to assert, in the interest of the importance which he attached to knowledge, that all men sought the same object, namely, their own personal interest, but were ignorant of the means of attaining it. He thus assumed, as every Greek would assume in agreement with our Manchester economists perhaps, that the highest good, in so far as it is an object of desire, is known, this being his own interest, but that, in so far as it was an object of knowledge, it is not always known. Socrates did not enter into any inquiry to determine or prove what the highest good, as the ultimate end of volition, should be, because he assumed that this was both known and unquestionable. This was a problem of later ethics. He wanted to emphasize the fact that the failure to attain it was a defect of knowledge in regard to the means, and not of will. Socrates was in no respect a believer in total depravity, in so far as this characterized a bad will, but the great sin of man, if sin it could be called, was ignorance, the want of the intelligence and skill to attain the good which he naturally sought. Hence Socrates said, on the one hand, that no man consciously sought his own injury, and on the other, as an explanation of the evil which men actually suffered, that knowledge was the one need which man required to supply in order to satisfy the real object of his volition.

This analysis of the position of Socrates brings us to two conclusions which it has been our object to show,

and which could not have been indicated clearly without removing the paradoxes of his doctrine. They are: (1) The purely practical nature of the Socratic ethics, and (2) Their extremely individualistic character, at least in respect of the reference of the good to be realized. Both of these require further comments in order to understand the fundamental trend of the Greek moral consciousness.

Socrates after all did not transcend sophistic doctrine in his theory. He was himself a sophist in the best sense of that term, which literally denoted a wise man, but in the person of the later members of the school had degenerated into a synonym for conceit and charlatan wisdom. In regard to method, however, Socrates was a sophist, and in both his psychological and ethical assumptions remained, at least for the sake of argument, upon the level of the men whose doctrines he so critically examined. He argued and debated precisely as they did, and took the attitude of an instructor of youth, though careful to exhibit more modesty, humility, and consistent agnosticism than these purveyors of wisdom. In it all, however, he was terribly in earnest, and less governed by personal gain than the sophists whom Plato lampooned. It was only in a latent sympathy with the religious conception of the world that he departed from the skepticism of the sophists. But in spite of the religious tinge of thought in his mind he did not start with this doctrine as the basis of his ethics. He was too dexterous a logician to be entrapped in this way. He made no effort to combat sophistic skepticism by proving the existence of the gods, nor did he try to show that morality was founded in the will of such gods as he admitted to exist. He kept silence upon this point, whether from discretion or not it is not necessary to say, though it may be a libel to suspect that Socrates had any discretion at

all. But he showed no tendency to revert to the old religious view of morality. Nor did he question the sophistic doctrines that every one must be the measure of truth, and that pleasure or personal interest was the real *summum bonum* for every man. With this settled or assumed he had only to show, as already indicated, what means were necessary to attain this good. Even when he sought a definition of virtue itself he was not trying to determine any other end in conduct than personal happiness or satisfaction, but only to show the form in which that happiness could be gained without any admixture of evil. The Socratic morality, therefore, was practical, not theoretical. He was bent on showing men that the chief problem was a knowledge of the "good" as the means to the desired end. Hence he could maintain that "virtue" could be taught, because it was merely the problem of imparting knowledge of the causal relation between certain acts and their consequences. It is only when we reach Plato and Aristotle that we find a definite conscious effort to reconstruct ethical theory from the point of view of the *end* of conduct as well as the means. But Socrates was still a sophist in the conception of both his ethics and his calling, namely, in considering himself an instructor respecting the means to a good already assumed rather than respecting the correction of men's idea of this good, though his method of criticizing conceptions led to this very result. Nevertheless, his whole conception of the ethical problem was that of a man who felt only the need of educating the intellect in regard to the conditions necessary for attaining a presupposed end. These he conceived as knowledge, as the education of the logical faculties, as the sharpening of the cognitive insight, as nothing but clear ideas. Such a thing as a perverted

will he could not understand, but only a perverted intellect. He assumed that a man will always do the right if only he knows what it is. This is true enough when the man is conscientious, a condition of mind which includes respect for the interests of others as well as self. But when he regards nothing but his own interest, or personal satisfaction in a form incompatible with the welfare of others, though knowing what this good for others is, there is much more than the education of the intellect necessary. Socrates is here banking on the flexibility of the will, which is ready to modify its ideal at the demand of better insight, while the fact is that the form of our ideal concretely conceived often requires as much modification of the will to arrive at the true good as it does education of the intellect or reason to see the way to it. Hence Socrates gets no further in his conception of ethics than the problem of educating the intellect. The problem of "educating" the will he did not see, and perhaps would not have seen or understood had it been pointed out to him. He remained upon the general level of the Greek consciousness of his time, which was extravagantly absorbed in the pursuit of knowledge. The Greek exaggerated the importance of reason, and especially of speculative reason, so that a life of mere knowledge seemed the only satisfaction necessary for the attainment of perfection, the socio-economic system with slavery on the one side and aristocratic habits and tastes on the other favoring leisure and scientific pursuits as the occupation of gentlemen. In such a civilization will or action would not be idealized. Knowledge would naturally be the highest good, or the excellence which free men would estimate most highly, while the moral virtues of will which we consider would be limited to the dependent classes. Socrates, though nothing of an

aristocrat in his taste, person, or manners, remained by this conception, which led to the contemplative rather than the active life.

The second characteristic of the Socratic ethics is no less interesting than the first. It is the individualistic point of view assumed by him, if not in the means of attaining self-satisfaction, certainly in the end which action had to subserve. We have already remarked that Socrates did not transcend the sophistic view in his tacit assumption that every man is governed in his conduct by his own personal interest. This was a truism with Socrates. The high tone of language employed about virtue, which we understand from a changed point of view, charging it with conceptions and implications of later history, availed to conceal from the modern mind either the naked individualism of his doctrine or the complete absence of an altruistic object, though it recognized altruistic means to an egoistic end. Socrates never thought of making the interest of others an end, but only a means to one's own higher interest. In this way his individualism was made objectively consistent with social welfare. Modern ideas make others than the subject ends in themselves, and not merely means to the subject's interest. That is, we treat justice as an end and not merely as a means to personal welfare. But Socrates, though he went beyond his contemporaries in the recognition of the means to virtue, did not transcend them in the motive which he advanced. Consequently, in spite of the social content of his ethical position, it was individualistic in its motive efficient. It may be objected, of course, that this view is not pure individualism, and I do not care to insist too vehemently for the position. But when we consider that, besides the individualistic motive in his doctrine, there was not a clear

consciousness in Socrates of the conflict between individual and social interest, not ideally, but in fact, we can understand both the paradox and the egoism of his theory. He was understood by the average Greek to mean, when he taught that justice would result in good to the agent of it, that this good would be the satisfaction of the personal interest which the individual sought without regard to the welfare of others. This is well illustrated by the question raised in Plato's "Republic," asking whether justice always results in satisfying personal interest. Socrates no doubt had an ideal that was calculated to change the conception of his race, but his instinct for practical ethics, and the desire to put his doctrine in terms of common experience, made him appeal to conceptions that were lower than his ideal. Hence he was not understood to maintain or admit a real conflict between personal and social interest. The whole practical effect of his position was to keep alive, not by his life, but by his theory, the egoistic assumptions of the Greek consciousness. The Greek ideal was: "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost"—the true naked conception involved in the struggle for existence as conceived when we try to eliminate its moral character. Socrates never thought to question such a view as inhuman, nor to teach definitely that a sacrifice of one pleasure or ideal had to be made to secure another. The idea of sacrifice for attaining the true good was not a Greek conception, and Socrates did not inculcate it, so that his individualism, though it was in its means identical with the social ethics of later times, had for its motive and its material results the same effect as that individualism which passes for egoism and selfishness. His own strength of will and respect for justice prevented him from both appearing and being egoistic in his personal

and objective conduct, but his subjective psychology and egoistic motive in ethical theory kept him within the limits of his race, and, consciously or unconsciously, favored personal interest as the only ultimate end of conduct, as against all men being ends in themselves and while invoking altruistic motives, represent the point of view that still justifies the characterization of individualism in Socratic ethics.

But if this view of Socrates be correct, why is it that he has created so much interest in subsequent ages? If his theory of virtue was so individualistic, and if he did not transcend the moral consciousness of his age, which was so individualistic in its motives and objects, why has he been so universally admired, and why has his doctrine been so extravagantly extolled? Why is he regarded as so superior to his contemporaries?

The answer to this question lies in his *personality*, not in his philosophy. Socrates, as a man, was either better than his theory, or he gave it that meaning in his life and conduct which it logically concealed. That is to say, his theoretical doctrine did not give logical expression to the ideas which his conduct embodied. It was his personality that struck his comtemporaries, and that stands out in the estimation of succeeding ages, giving the real meaning to his formulas when his own conceptions did not transcend the main trend of his time. Men see character and interpret theories according to the conduct with which theories are associated. Ideas are rightly supposed either to express facts or to indicate the path of virtue, and assuming that men really intend to pursue the latter when pointed out, a theory pretending to direct the will into a presumably desired course will be adjudged by its influence upon the man who proposes it as a moral guide. Socrates had one of those interesting

personalities of the highest moral type, mixed also with something of the grotesque, which was bound to attract the attention of mankind, and it is to this that we must trace both the extraordinary interest in the man and the concealment of the real import of his doctrine. It was his character rather than his logic that revolutionized the subsequent conception of morality, and it may be safe to say that it is always personality, and not abstract philosophy, that creates mankind's conception of moral conduct and the value of moral theory. Abstract philosophical dogmas have no meaning or influence upon the majority until embodied in a personal life. Now Socrates was not individualistic in his conduct, whatever his motives. His will always waited on his intellect, and hence he was ever ready to do what he conceived to be right and just, which he conceived to be his interest. He refused to recognize any personal interest but that which was consistent with justice or the welfare of others. Hence he never appeared to be an egoist or the subject of selfishness. With his fellows, personal interest was often in conflict with that of others, and when the good was proposed to any one it was conceivable only in individualistic terms which assumed this conflict. But Socrates felt no interest but that of justice, and in so doing generalized the conception so that it was consistent with his will, while his fellows heard the conceptions of an egoist and saw the volitions of an idealist. Thus his personal life evoked veneration and gave meaning to his appeal to interest, though his contemporaries could not feel the identification of justice and interest which he taught, because their interest was on the lower plane of that individualism which could not transcend the conflict between personal interest and that of others, or would not extend the range of its objects, so that an individualistic

motive could encompass a social end. But with a motive efficient upon the level of individualism, Socrates interpreted it in terms of social welfare, though only as a means to his own interest, and yet accomplished all that the social motive is expected to realize objectively. Consequently, his personality obtained all the benefits of a moralist whose theory had transcended individualism.

The personality of Socrates, however, had two wholly distinct features, both of which attracted equal interest, but which unequally affected speculative thought. They are represented in what is known as the real Socrates and the ideal Socrates. I assume, of course, for the moment, and for the purposes of distinction, that the real and ideal are different from each other. In the man himself they were not, but history has so thoroughly idealized him that it does not always make clear the features that the tastes of the present age would regard as very unideal, or, at least, difficult to harmonize with its preconception of what so ideal a man would be. So much is said to exalt the character of Socrates that we constantly forget how he looked to his contemporaries, and we shall miss the full meaning of his work if we neglect the realistic side of his life, which forced upon the sensuous and esthetic Greeks the perception of moral beauty without the expected accompaniment of personal grace and artistic enjoyment, and the effect was to reconcile morality with democratic conceptions.

Now to get at the real Socrates, as the literary and esthetic sense of humor must see him, we should remember that physically he was not a very prepossessing person. On the contrary, his characteristics made him the butt of considerable ridicule. He was a somewhat corpulent, well-fed looking body with shaggy hair, pug

nose, bare-footed, ill-dressed and generally of ungainly appearance. He passed for a Silenus among his companions, and we all know how unattractive this character seemed and seems to an artistic world. The picture of him is that of a man who is so common in his rough and untidy appearance that even an unesthetic age would have to feel some natural repugnance to him, not to say anything of the impression he would naturally leave upon a people so nice and esthetic as the Greeks. "His general appearance," says Professor Blackie in language almost identical with that which I have employed, "was that of a Silenus or satyr, with a flat, somewhat turned-up nose, full prominent eyes, big lips, and in later life, as appears in monuments, a bald head." But these merely physical characteristics were only a part of his peculiarities. With these to handicap him among the beauty-loving Greeks, he added to them an interminable disposition to argue with everybody. In fact, Socrates was a veritable tramp in Athens, only he did not go about begging bread. Perhaps he got this, the cynic would say, without asking and in return for his shrewd conversation. If so, he escaped the laws of Draco, which put tramps to death without a chance for philosophic immortality as Socrates won it, whether he got his bread into the bargain or not. This, however, is the humor of ignorance. But Socrates was certainly an interesting spectacle going about Athens in his bare feet, or poorly shod and with that cynical indifference to the esthetic taste of the Greeks which aroused their interest all the more for its connection with intellectual genius, tormenting every man he could meet with questions or discussions about conceptions, or knowledge, or virtue. To-day he would be treated as a bore or a crank, unless we were sufficiently like him to admire or become

MODERATION AND CONTENTMENT.

We should refrain most from sordid unjust pleasures.

Happiness consists not in luxury and pride. To want nothing is divine, to want the least, next to divine.

He is richest who is content with least, for contentment is the riches of nature.

It is the property of God to need nothing, to need least the nighest to God.

Socrates.

SOCRATES.

THE PHILOSOPHIC TRAMP AND MORAL PREACHER OF ATHENS.—

(See p. 33-34.)

lost in his logical acumen without caring for his appearance. In fact he was like the man who always wants to talk politics with people who do not care a picayune about them, or to ventilate some hobby like the schemes which are to cure all the ills of humanity. He reminds us of some too wise farmer who neglects his stock and crops to sit on the fence all day, debating prohibition, free silver, or the money power. Everywhere we meet this type of man, and we inevitably set him down at once as a crank and a bore, if we are very esthetic and not very serious about life. And this habit brought Socrates, as it does his modern after-type, into trouble with his wife. Xantippe complained that Socrates roamed the streets talking about philosophy when he should have been at work supporting her and his children. We do not know that Xantippe supported Socrates in his pedestrian philosophy and idleness on the streets by washing, as is often the case with our modern "dead beats," but the situation described has a marvelous resemblance to this very thing. Socrates, however, grunted out a not very chivalrous excuse for himself, reflecting on the temper of his other half, himself and the age being impervious to the finer sentiments and duties of a husband, and modern civilization sides with Xantippe. But neither Xantippe's rightful claims nor the alleged acidity of her temper and observations deterred Socrates from keeping up his life of dialectic mischief with every one he could buttonhole on the street corners. But he could not have succeeded in producing the effect he did, had he not been as thick-skinned as he was shrewd and talented, and inspired with lofty ideals which shone out behind the covering of oddities, physical and intellectual, in a way to defeat all concealment. He laughed at his own defects, perfectly conscious of

the way he was regarded by his countrymen, cynically indifferent to it, a good-humored stolid Greek, who could not be offended by any ridicule, nor silenced by any criticism except that which led to his own conclusions. He was an adept at the art of controversy, even when he had no positive doctrine to defend, and if the Greeks ever loved anything it was logical discussion. They were forever at it, whether on the streets or the hustings, and they liked a man, especially in this period of transition from the age of belief to philosophic ideas, who could either produce or solve logical puzzles without discriminating too nicely about his manners and appearance. In this art Socrates showed unusual shrewdness, because he insisted upon his ignorance, thus escaping responsibility for any assertion whatever, though this profession was ironical, and shifting the duty of proof upon his antagonists. This made him a perfect master of the true art of a skeptic, who shelters himself behind questions while his informant must do all the asserting and gets into deeper and deeper water with every question that he tries to answer. Moreover the average Greeks of common sense had felt the destructive influence of sophistic and skeptical thought and did not like the intellectual and moral confusion that it produced. They were also no less impressed than Socrates with sophistic conceit and pretension, and hence they looked on with delight at the shafts of logic which this Silenus of a man thrust into skeptical armor, and though he often produced as much embarrassment in his hearers as he cured, he created much satisfaction in the interest of truth and morality by puzzling skepticism upon its own premises, and this satisfaction was enough for a people who did not want the paradoxes or logical tricks of the sophists for their every-day philosophy. The Greeks had not

forgotten the logical legerdemain of Zeno, and though they were not disposed to follow him in denying the possibility of motion, they admired logic and were great sticklers for the importance of its method and the consistency which it demanded. Hence, when they found Socrates using it in his masterful way to make the confusion of the sophists worse confounded, they gave him an enthusiastic hearing in spite of homely illustrations, grotesque personal appearance, odd manners, and indifference to family obligations. He had a genius for embarrassing charlatans in philosophy, and his own delight was not less than his auditors' when he saw some overconfident antagonist writhing at the bottom of a syllogism for some indiscretion in starting an argument before he had matured and mastered the conceptions which he so glibly used.

But it was the moral character of Socrates, his strength of will, that created the profoundest influence even upon the pleasure-loving Greeks. They were not all of them given to libertinism. A few choice spirits, even when they saw no way out of sophistic logic on matters of morality, felt their better instincts groping after an ideal that involved neither slavish obedience to arbitrary power nor unrestrained indulgence of passion. They awaited only the voice of some one crying in the wilderness to enlist and encourage their moral natures, and though they may have enjoyed most the keen, Damascus-like thrusts of Socrates' logic against sophistic illusions in morality, they were not wholly insensible to the monitions of conscience, when any noble aspirations were suggested in keeping with the best features of the civilization which they had already reached, and hence Socrates, both in his personality and his method, awakened ideals that were in danger of suffocation under

skepticism and libertinism. Behind all his indifference to ridicule, tolerance of others' opinions, and uncouth manners, Socrates was a man of great moral earnestness, and this fact did not escape the notice of the better men who formed a part of his audience. The chief feature of his character which struck the Athenians was his strength of will, his splendid self-control, and his unselfish devotion to justice. At least they found in his resolute purpose to do the right when he knew it his political firmness against the majority in the Prytaneum who wished to violate the law, his determined attachment to some ideal in the midst of every temptation that might be used as an excuse for libertinism, his submission to the law in the matter of his own sentence and execution when offered an opportunity to escape, and the perpetual moderation of his appetites—in all these they found the traits of moral character which they had learned to admire so much in such heroes as Solon, Aristides, and others, who in firmness and constancy of principle, and devotion to justice, which was the Greek righteousness, were prototypes of Socrates in his common life. The Greeks recognized a noble man when they saw him quite as readily as we can, as is clearly shown in many of their heroes, even if their general standard of life was lower than ours. It was this moral strength of will that struck the imagination and commanded respect when his theory of virtue was either misunderstood or felt to be paradoxical and unsatisfactory. Perfect self-control was his peculiar virtue. He did not get tipsy at a banquet while his companions were often said to be found under the table. Perhaps the cynic and skeptic will say that his associates admired him because he could drink more than they could without getting drunk, and if the Greek who wished that his throat

was a mile long when he drank good wine was a typical man of his race, this cynical view might be plausible. But with all deference to the pessimist's view of human nature, many of the admirers of Socrates were possessed of adequate self-control and of insight into the real character of their master, which was as much morally as it was physically constitutional, while those who were themselves the victims of imprudence when they knew the better course saw well enough in the midst of Socrates' geniality of temperament that the master spirit of his life was a strong will thoroughly in subjection to moral law. This was the ideal side of his character, and it had the effect when contrasting Socrates with others of eliciting a new analysis of the ethical problem, and a new conception of morality, a conception that interpreted it in terms of a righteous will instead of mere knowledge.

Plato more clearly than any one else saw the ideal Socrates and painted him in colors which will never be effaced from the memory of history. While he began with admiration for his method and the place which he assigned to knowledge as the highest "virtue," he went far beyond Socrates in the conception and analysis of morality, though he still left enough undone for the critical and analytical power of Aristotle to secure an equal immortality by a still profounder development of ethical problems.

In estimating Platonic ethics we must ascertain his point of departure from Socrates. Plato still remained by the pyschological method of his master, but not by the Socratic contempt for metaphysics. We have already seen how Socrates treated the physical speculations of his predecessors, refusing to learn anything from nature or to look at the external order of the world for

the moral ideal by which to govern his conduct. Not so with Plato. He showed a profounder insight into all the facts with which the human mind is called to deal. He was an all-round genius, the *beau ideal* of his race. It is hard to say whether his sympathies with art, which was little less than the divinity of Greece, were any less than his enthusiasm and power for the speculations of abstract philosophy, a very rare combination of talents and tastes in any age, and especially conspicuous and striking in the disciple of Socrates, and which took the form best calculated to throw all their splendid illumination upon the conception and purpose of ethics. The interest in metaphysics showed itself in his antagonism to Heraclitus, whose doctrine of change and phenomenal evanescence of everything resulted in the sophists' subjective psychology and conventional ethics, the denial of any universal truths, and of any law for the individual will except its own caprices, and in his attachment to the ideas of Parmenides, who had emphasized the importance of the permanent, the universal, and the eternal in the nature of things including human thought and action. Plato took up the thought of the permanent and worked it out as his own in the field of ethics as Parmenides had done in the physical world, and we have as a consequence two characteristics of his position: (1) That morality expresses a law in the nature of things, eternal and absolute, and in no way subject to the caprice of power, divine or human. (2) The subordination of the individual to the whole, or the law of the good which he found in nature as well as in man, and the consequent importance of objective (physical) as well as subjective (psychological) knowledge for the attainment of this end. The first of these positions was Plato's answer to the sophists whose morality was the

whim of the moment; that is, no morality at all; and the second was the doctrine in which we find Plato transcending the pure individualism of his race, though it coincides exactly with the universal civic ideal of Greece, the sacrifice of the citizen to the state, and explains the socialism of the Platonic Republic. This tendency of his system requires for its understanding a most careful examination of his general position.

Socrates, as we have seen, taught that knowledge was necessary to virtue, but he assumed that the will was already set in the direction of the good and that it lacked only intelligence to guide it. That is to say, the *practical* ethics of Socrates neglected the theoretical problem of determining the *end* of morality, and was employed about the means to an end which was assumed to be known. But Plato early discovered that men were very concrete in their choice of objects to realize, and that the abstract idea of interest or pleasure drew no distinction between vice and virtue. Consequently, he saw, or believed he saw, that men were as ignorant of the true *end* of life as Socrates thought them in regard to the right *means* to a presupposed interest, and so he set about correcting the Socratic assumption that pleasure or personal interest was the highest good, at least when conceived as sacrificing the universal good. Both his metaphysics and his psychology led him away from the subordination of everything to the individual. His metaphysics, which seized upon the permanent elements in nature and mind as opposed to the transient, and the ordinary Greek consciousness of the limitations placed upon the arbitrary human will by the cosmos, taught him to find in nature an order to which it was the chief duty and end of man to subject himself. This end he called the Good, which he identified with God, regarding

God, however, as impersonal and as merely the moral order of the world, a position that was reiterated by Fichte in later times. Man's duty was to find out this end and then to ascertain how he could attain it. Thus a double knowledge was required: first, a knowledge, reasoned and speculative in its nature, of this eternal law, of the end, goal, destiny, state, or condition which nature intended man to realize, and second, a knowledge of the correct means to reach it. In the first of these conceptions the human will is wholly subordinated to an end, which, if it is not outside itself in the results attained, is outside of it in the way that duty is presented to it, and so leads to that sacrifice of the individual to the whole which is so prominent in the Republic, and which prepares us for the Stoic pantheism and the Neoplatonic absorption. An end that was not pleasure, that was not consciousness of any kind, and that involved a result out of relation to one's personal identity, but that was an objective universe of law and order, necessitated the complete sacrifice of the individual to realize it.

Plato's psychological analysis led him no less certainly in the same direction. He saw that pleasure was a criterion that had no other meaning for the average Greek than individual personal interest, and more especially the interest of the moment. His predilection for the idea of law, of an eternal order, set him about reconstructing the internal principle of morality in harmony with the cosmic order. All sensations and feelings of sense being transient phenomena, while the objects of reason were permanent realities, or facts of highest worth on that account, he described the pursuit of pleasure as the anarchic reign of passion and impulse. To restrain these inclinations he proposed the imperial

authority of reason. His famous myth of the chariot drawn by two unruly steeds but controlled by the charioteer called reason brilliantly illustrates his conception of the source of supreme power in the determination of virtue. Reason was required, in this illustration, to restrain passion and impulse, or better to guide them, the idea that it restrains being in fact a conception of later thought. And this view represents Plato's doctrine of conscience. But with him conscience was not a motive power or a sense of duty, an injunction imposed upon the will, but it was a cognitive power to point out the right way for impulse to attain the desirable end. In spite of this view, however, Plato's very illustration introduced the idea of a regulative function for reason having the nature of will, as such control of motive forces implied similar agency, and hence it was only a short step to the idea of conscience combining the functions of intellect and will, moving as well as directing volition. With us conscience is insight plus motive, the motive of duty and reverence for an ideal above and beyond passion. With Plato reason was only insight into the course which was a harmony between passion and impulse, and it guided the man, not as an impelling force, but as a chaperon that could furnish wisdom but no power. This conception of it at once took it out of the region of pleasure. The function of reason was to furnish the abstract true, beautiful, and good, not to move the will. In this Plato still remained by the conception of his master. He exalted the importance of knowledge. But at this point he widened the range of its power and objects. Reason or knowledge occupied itself with the whole cosmos of facts, physical and mental, and as Plato refused to recognize anything transient, like feeling or pleasure, as the highest good, he

had to look beyond the individual for it, and he found it in the eternal reality, law, or order behind phenomena, a transcendental ideal condition of things independent of sense and consciousness which only a mystical philosopher like Plato could see or find. But it was the end which he thought nature had in view, independent of the capricious pleasures of passion and impluse. These anarchic tendencies could never discover it, but only attain it after reason had seen the vision of its beauty.

But Plato, as Greek thinkers generally, was monistic and pantheistic in his conception of nature and man, and consequently when he saw reason in nature he assigned it the same function there as in the regulation of the passion, namely, the determination of order. Reason in both the macrocosmos and the microcosmos was the producer of order, and this object was not a mere feeling in the former, so that man's chief end could not be a pleasure. As the psychological good was the harmony between the appetites and the metaphysical good the harmony in nature, and as reason was the function for determining it in both fields, ethics looked beyond pleasure for the ideal, this being merely a transient and subjective feeling, and had in this way to sacrifice the individual psychologically as well as metaphysically. The order of nature being an objective end for realization and demanding the subjection of the will, the whole system subordinated man *to an end other than himself*, and virtually demanded a self-sacrifice that no other system of Greek ethics proposed. But he recognized that this subordination brought man his true good, and nothing was lost in the sacrifice. The only thing, however, that mars this beautiful picture of Plato's ethics is the fact that his system saw nothing of worth in the individual but his conformity to law. Personality and consciousness

were sacrificed to an impersonal end. Plato reconciled the interests of man to the order of nature, but he partly lost sight of the anthropological point of view in getting his position. Consequently there was a tendency in his system to asceticism and mysticism which led to the doctrine of absorption.

Perhaps we should be told that his doctrine of immortality recognized the worth of the individual and supplemented the tendencies of the system to sacrifice man to the whole. But the reply is that there is no better proof of the subordination of the individual to an end not himself than Plato's conception of immortality. This theory may be very fine to those who imagine that it has any resemblance to the Christian idea of it. Words are too often a source of illusion and deception to those who do not take the trouble to go deeper, and if they can only enlist the support of philosophic language they are content to live under a delusion. But Plato never dreamed of a personal survival after death. Such a thing as the retention of personal identity after the dissolution of the body, the continuity of consciousness in all time, was as absurd, or at least as discredited a possibility with him as with the materialists whom he criticized. There was no resemblance between the Christian and the Platonic immortality. So far as the consciousness of the past is concerned Plato's conception was in sympathy with the materialists. But the *substance* of the soul, the subject of consciousness survived, the present personal stream of mental events not being a part of its essence or essential activity, as it was conceived after the teaching of Christianity on the one hand and Cartesian philosophy on the other. This soul or substance of mind could pass into any other embodiment and continue another life, upward or downward according to its nature, just as the atom

can pass from one form of combination to another in modern and ancient physics without destruction. But no consciousness of its past is at all necessary to this continuance. Such a conception involves the most tremendous self-sacrifice on the part of any man who should regulate his conduct in reference to his soul's future in which present consciousness could not participate by way of memory and personal identity. To restrain passion and impulse in order that my soul may not pass into a brute form where I should never know the degradation, is not a conception of immortality that would succeed in prompting many to virtue, more especially a Christian. There is scarcely any parallel to the demand on unselfishness which is implied in the Platonic idea of immortality, and hence again we find in this very feature of his philosophy the most radical and far-reaching conception of the subordination of the individual to the order of the cosmos which any one can imagine. Plato, of course, was hardly conscious of this way of stating his position, because the distinction between the selfish and unselfish, the egoistic and altruistic, conception of life was not yet drawn, and could hardly have been drawn at his time. Greek philosophy was too monistic to conceive any antagonism between man and nature, between the individual and society. The interests of the individual and of the whole were conceived by Socrates and Plato as the same. This, of course, is true ideally but not really, and the average Greek was the last to act up to such a doctrine even when the philosophic trend of his time forced the conviction of such a unity upon him. It required the dualism of Christianity and Cartesianism to develop the opposition between man and nature into formal recognition, placing the greatest value upon the individual, and with it the duty to respect one's neighbor

as one's self, the very condition of preserving any morality at all, because dualism or pluralism tends to establish the same opposition between individuals as between man and nature, and in order to save ethics must place the stress of morality upon making man, or others, ends in themselves in lieu of insisting upon the identity of their interests. But the method of reconciling the individual and the whole by self-sacrifice, consciously affirmed and formulated as above duty to self, does not appear in Plato, and least of all in his conception of immortality, in which the associations of the term affected by later history connect it with the notion of personal survival, while the idea of regulating conduct with reference to the destiny of a being in whose life no connection with the conscious past of the soul surviving is to be found makes a demand upon unselfishness which few men would venture to make on the race, especially upon an average Greek who was a good embodiment of the idea taught by the Manchester school of political economists. But Plato makes it, and in his conception returns in a different phraseology to that sacrifice of the individual which had characterized the cosmological type of thought. The peculiarity and sublimity of the demand lies in the fact that the sacrifice has to be made without a personal and individual interest in its object. In Christianity the demand for sacrifice in behalf of others was attended with an individual interest in the consequences of it. That is to say, Christianity combined individualism and altruism in a way to secure a general hearing. Plato demanded the sacrifice without satisfying individual interest, and hence his idea of immortality cannot be considered as favoring the position that man is an end to himself.

But Plato shows none of the nightmare of terror which

troubled the average Greek when he reflected upon such a fate, or such a sacrifice as this doctrine involved. Plato was above all a philosopher and had learned to reconcile himself to fact, to accept the judgment of his intellect in regard to the law of nature as reflecting what is best for the will. Hence his reconciliation was not that of a man bent on obstinately displaying his courage against adverse fortune, standing like an Athanasius *contra mundum*, or a Stoic dying joyfully on a funeral pyre, but it was that of a man who denied the opposition of nature to his real welfare and loved it for its beauty and harmony. He did not quarrel with Fate, because he saw in the world's order a type of action to be imitated, and a beauty and goodness to be worshiped. Hence rebellion had no temptations for him as it had for the individualist who, emancipated from the tyranny of the gods and princes, set up his own will as the only thing to be satisfied in the world. Plato loved what his intellect told him was the good, and had no temptations which had kept his race between the terror of the gods and the anarchy of libertinism. Consequently he was the first of the philosophers who both in his person and his philosophy substituted *respect for fear* of the law as the condition of virtue and of attaining the good which is the same in man as in nature.

But Plato had his philosophic difficulties nevertheless. He found it a struggle for the average man to realize the ideal, whether there was a harmony between man and nature or not. His problem was not completely solved when he had pointed out the good in the cosmos and suggested that immortality was a fact to be reckoned with in the realization of it and a condition of attaining the harmony of nature with the true interest of man. He had the practical difficulty of getting the common

EMERSON ON PLATO.

"*In Plato you explore modern Europe in its causes and seed—all that in thought which the history of Europe embodies or has yet to embody. The well informed man finds himself anticipated—Plato is up with him too. Nothing has escaped him. Every new crop in the fertile harvest of reform, every fresh suggestion of modern humanity is there. Why should not young men be educated on this book? It would suffice for the tuition of the race—to test the understanding and to express the reason. Who can overestimate the images with which Plato has enriched the minds of men, and which pass like bullion in the currency of all nations? Read the Phædo, the Protagoras, the Phædrus, the Timæus, the Republic and the Apology of Socrates.*

Emerson's Essay on Books

PLATO.

B. C. 427 to 347.

From Stanley's History.

mind to seek this good and to make the sacrifices necessary to realize it. The theoretical problem was easy, but the practical one was very different. The former had only to convince the intellect; the latter had also to move the will and secure its permanent adhesion to the good. Finding in man a hierarchy of conflicting impulses all leading to evil, he had to discover a way to control them, to reduce them to submission, or to direct the will toward the ideal. The agency for accomplishing this end was reason, whose function it was to establish the same order in man that objective reason had established in nature. The passions were blind initiatives of action without regard to farsightedness, and were calculated to turn life into a carnival of debauch, and the only hope of curbing their caprices lay in the regulative power of reason which, though it could furnish no motive power, could furnish insight and directive ideas, impulse having to sacrifice its natural and immediate object for the good which reason discovered. In his conception, therefore, the natural passions did not have the good for their end, and though they remained the motive efficient of the action suggested by reason, their natural object had to be wholly sacrificed in the attainment of the rational ideal. Here we see the ascetic type of philosopher in Plato, and it is the ground of the sympathy of Christianity with his system. In his view virtue or the good could only be attained by heroic methods, by the sublime though repressive restraints exhibited by hermit, sage, anchorite, or martyr. No quarter was to be given to impulse or natural desire in the ideal world. A merciless and rigid asceticism was the only sure way to the paradise of the ideal. We find in the Neoplatonist the logical outcome of this doctrine, a hatred of the things of sense that turns into a morbid

and maudlin antipathy against the world that hardly comports with the philosophic calm and admiration of nature. It is true that the Neoplatonist only carried into his ethics Plato's doctrine of matter as representing his metaphysics of the cosmos and its depreciation of the things of sense, showing the *reductio absurdum* of both metaphysics and ethics which neither completed its evolution nor found its recoil in Plato, because his esthetic instincts on the one hand and his political enthusiasm on the other were adequate restraints upon pessimism and philosophic insanity.

It was the fact that Plato was a healthy human being, coupled with the present prospect that Greece would remain upon the high level of her accomplished civilization, that prevented his own action from being an absurd concession to the popular idea of logic in the interpretation of his doctrine, or a rush of despair into the transcendental as the only escape of a noble mind from the vices of a dying world. His nature and insight were proof against abstract logic, and however rigid might be his theory in its conception of the opposition between the life of sense and the life of reason, as alternatives, no one knew better than he the limitations under which it was applicable. This is strikingly reflected in his composition of the "Laws" after he had written the "Republic." He knew the conditions under which human nature had to exist and work, and his own conduct, because of a healthy and balanced nature, reflected the necessary concessions to sense in the world as we find it, though he did not find it ideal. Plato enjoyed a banquet as well as any one, but he enjoyed the philosophic ecstasy still more, and he constructed his ideal world of opposition to sensuous pleasures as the only clear way of getting virtue appreciated at all, especially by a race that was little

disposed to transcend the world of sense for its ideals, as is shown by its art. He probably saw that it was strength of will in Socrates rather than knowledge or insight that secured him the virtue he loved, and "sizing up" the average Greek of his day as a possible or probable debauchee, he told his fellow men who had weaker wills than Socrates that they could not see or realize the glory of the true, the beautiful, and the good until they had gained complete control of a sensuous life. Every reformer has to tell the victim of vice that he has no hope of salvation except in total abstinence. Not because it is necessarily wrong to gratify sense at all, but because the individual once addicted to intemperance must exhibit a weaker will when the slightest concession is made to temptation than when he absolutely rejects its solicitations. This antithesis between pleasure and the good thus becomes a necessary *practical* device for securing moral strength of will, whatever be its theoretical defects in a world other than the present one: and hence what was to Plato a practical means for securing both a vision and a realization of virtue in a people too much committed to the worship of sense easily assumed the coloring of asceticism, especially in an age when the political ideals of Athens were sacrificed to the conservatism of Sparta and the ambition of Macedonia.

It would take too much time to examine the "Republic" and all that it means for a true estimate of Plato's genius. Among our every-day men of the world it is called an ideal and impractical scheme, a brilliant dream of a noble but impossible mind, repeated from age to age, as the *Civitas Dei* of Augustine, More's "Utopia," Bacon's "New Atlantis," or even Mr. Bellamy's "Looking Backward." But this whole characterization of it with the insinuation that it is a visionary idealism and representative of just

about what the public may expect of a philosopher, spinning fancies out of his contemplative moods, is not wholly fair to Plato. Most sensible readers of it will find little idealism in it, and nothing Utopian, as those terms are understood, though it may be only a difference of ideals that makes us hesitate to apply these terms to it. But whether ideal or not, the scheme was communistic and socialistic, and in respect of both the family and the individual runs directly counter to all that evolution has produced in the course of later history. But in spite of such provisions and of its assumption of Hobbe's state of perpetual war (not a very ideal condition for Utopia in our idea of it), the "Republic" is not to be condemned by men who have never studied it with care and who have not caught the fundamental principle that lay at the basis of it. Plato was undoubtedly hampered, as all men are, by the concrete conceptions of his time in the attempt to give form and body to his ideas, but his ideal of good government was not much, if any, different from our own. *The fit man in the fit place* was the maxim upon which he built. He thoroughly believed in the doctrine of Carlyle, that "the tools should belong to him who can handle them," and we to-day after more than one hundred years of republican institutions are just learning the value of applying this principle to the civil service. The "Republic" is only a treatise on civil service reform. The conduct of men like Alcibiades was a justification of Plato's intentions. We may not be satisfied with the means by which he would secure an ideal government, namely, the selection of aristocratic philosophers for our rulers, and we may perceive more readily than he the limitations of environment under which all reconstructions of society must be made, but if we lay too much emphasis upon this defect we shall forget the crucial principle upon which all good

government must rest, namely, *the intelligence and disinterestedness of its rulers.* Mr. Pater calls attention to this feature of Plato's doctrine, and it explains why Plato chose philosophers for his ideal kings.

Philosophers may not be a very practical tribe to-day. They are supposed, at least by the general public and so-called practical men, to be a class of idealists who are forever playing with purely abstract conceptions, and this is often the case. But in Plato's time and before him they were all-round men of knowledge. They were intellectually and morally the best men in the community. We have seen that it was the philosopher that had overcome the terrors of Fate and counseled a life of calm respectful obedience to the inflexible laws of nature. Everywhere about them the common people were steeped in ignorance and showed no disinterestedness even toward nature, much less toward their fellow men, while their lives were a constant moral panic in the presence of both nature and the gods. The philosophers, however, had not only attained a superior knowledge of nature, but had also acquired that disinterested temper of mind and will which can suppress individualistic passions and interests identified with the moment, and maintain a far-reaching insight and calm faith in the ultimate beneficence of nature and justice. Hence with their habits of will, on the one hand, involving the sacrifice of libertine desires, and their superior knowledge, on the other, involving a comprehensive view of nature and man, it was only natural that Plato should look to them for ideal prophets, priests, and kings; if only we refer to the arrogance and self-conceit of our modern politicians who so unanimously laugh at the far-sightedness of the more intelligent classes, we shall obtain abundant confirmation of Plato's insight into the social need of every age for the intelligent and disinterested man

to guide its destiny, though we have not yet found, any more than Plato, the proper way to secure his services. Moreover both the existence of the "Laws" and an occasional sense of humor and idealistic weakness consciously recognized even in the "Republic" itself show that Plato was building for a world that he did not expect to realize, and so was trying, as he did for the individual in the sacrifice of the passions to the reason, to present for the ruler an ideal which might stir the conscience of his country, and to demand of its aristocracy duties as well as privileges.

Aristotle shows a wholly different type of intellect from that of his master. He is more rigidly scientific. He is almost, if not absolutely, without an esthetic sense, and never indulges in humor. Plato was a typical Greek in his esthetic appreciation, while he had as keen a sense of humor, though it was lofty and refined, as any laughter-loving man could demand. Aristotle had neither time nor taste for the pleasantries of life, but was serious in temperament, though not puritanical, and eliminating the sentimental and emotional from his reflections he made himself severely scientific in his study of philosophical problems, so that when we come to read him we miss the literary charm, the delicate touch of humor, and the brilliant play of imagination and figure that confer immortality upon Plato, even when much of his philosophy seems unintelligible or absurd. But if we lose these characteristics when we come to the disciple, we gain in thoroughness and clearness of psychological analysis and limitation to facts for knowledge and the regulation of conduct. This fact must be appreciated by an age which especially admires scientific method and the severe elimination of literary embellishment and padding from the discussion of profound philosophic problems, and emotional interests from the determination of truth.

ARISTOTLE.

AFTER THE STATUE IN THE SPADA PALACE, ROME.

Plato never separated metaphysics from ethics, but Aristotle makes this separation the first step in his procedure. He does not say that this is a necessary condition of his system, nor does he discuss such a problem as their relation. He simply writes on ethical science without alluding to metaphysics at all. One might imagine that he had no interest in this recondite subject, or that he knew nothing about it, if we had to judge him by his treatise on ethics alone. But the fact is that no one in antiquity wrote a more elaborate and profound system of metaphysics than Aristotle, and we can wonder how he could indulge his sense of the unity of science when he came to deal with the theory of morality.

The explanation of the peculiarity just mentioned is the fact that Aristotle was a true Socratic in ethics without sharing the contempt which Socrates had for speculative philosophy. He realized that, whatever man had to consider in adjusting his conduct to cosmic law, he must find in himself the spring to this adjustment and the benefit that was to accrue from it, and not condition the practical rules of life upon some prior system of reflective philosophy which should be the result and not the determinant of a moral life. Not that Aristotle would deny a reflex influence from speculative doctrine upon ethics, or a value for practical conduct in metaphysical theories, but only that both ethical science and much of practical action are not dependent upon a prior philosophic system of the external universe. Perhaps his sense of the unity between man and nature was stronger than that of the Greeks generally, so that in tacitly abandoning the dualism of Plato he had no occasion to determine morality by the transcendental goal which the cosmos reserves for man's pursuit. Hence, though he recognized the necessity of metaphysics as the completion

of man's knowledge, the unity between man and nature made it unnecessary to condition ethics, at least of a practical kind, and this was largely all that he sought, upon a previously constructed system of metaphysics. In this method he in reality followed the spirit of Socrates, though he had emancipated himself from the contempt which Socrates entertained for cosmic knowledge.

The first step, therefore, which Aristotle takes in the discussion of the ethical problem is to show that all moral action is determined wholly by reference to the *end*, or the object at which the will aims, the τέλος of volition. He would admit that the object of nature and that of the human will ought to be the same, but he would, like Socrates, turn the mind to self-reflection for its determination of this object rather than first deciding the purpose of nature, as in Plato. Hence he says absolutely nothing about cosmological, theological, or conventional theories, but rises at once into heights superior to all of them, while at the same time asserting a criterion of ethical conduct which can, in its first power at least, be determined within the limits of the individual consciousness. Socrates and Plato, by emphasizing human ignorance as the great sin, practically left the impression that it was what men did not know that determined the good or virtue, but Aristotle, by putting the stress upon the end of volitions, limited morality to what man could be conscious of. In all of them it was an object to be known that determined virtue, but in the former the knowledge of the object was all that was necessary, while in the latter the intention was the main desideratum. In this last conception ignorance of the means played a minor part in virtue, so that virtue became a quality of will rather than, or as well as, knowledge. Consequently the initial basis of ethics with Aristotle took on a scientific form. If cosmological and

theological or conventional theories are to obtain any standing after such an enunciation of principles, it will be on the condition that their norm be capable of interpretation as an end related to human welfare and volition, and not either a blind limitation of man's liberty, the passive submission to external law, or the non-purposive action that may happen to realize objective good. The criterion of Aristotle is first subjective, that is, determinable by human consciousness, and then if objective forces have their resultants expressible as possible ends of volition, they have a recognizable place in ethics. But they cannot otherwise obtain it, and we are left with the broad universal principle that the final determinant of moral action, whether the expression of divine or human agencies, must be an end, or object aimed at, the quality of conduct being thus determined by the will rather than by the intellect alone. The law of nature, the will of the gods, or the decrees of political authority and convention have no meaning or relevancy in this conception unless they recognize ends applicable to the volitions of the subject upon which they are binding. Aristotle's predecessors would have admitted as much had this analysis been presented to them. But they were so bent upon emphasizing the importance of speculative knowledge that they consciously or unconsciously concealed the place which the will and intentions had in morality.

But Aristotle is not on this account individualistic in his conception of ethics. He recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, that the ethical postulate must be within the reach of scientific method, and thus be an object of purposive intelligent consciousness which he finds in the individual man. But he does not thereby exclude from this object the idea that it shall be an extra-personal fact. His most general principle, affirmed or implied, is that, whatever

it is, it must be conceived as an end to the being who is to realize it, and who is to be responsible for it only as intending it. The individual supplies the knowledge and the initiative, and receives the praise or blame, or, in other words, has moral responsibility apportioned according to the intention and not according to consequences beyond the ken of consciousness. This, of course, is not the language of Aristotle, but it is the meaning of his conception of morality, in which he terminates before he completes his analysis. The individualistic element, therefore, in his system, though not egoistic in its intention, is found in the part which the subject must play in the recognition and initiation of the end, which last is not limited to a subjective result, though always consistent with it, as conceived by Socrates. This extra-personal element he recognizes in the end of action when he comes to define it, and he thus transcends the individualism of the sophists who never admitted an extra-personal element at all. Aristotle does not define the end as pleasure (ἡδονή), nor as comformity to nature, to convention, or to the will of the gods, but as *welfare* (εὐδαιμονία), which is sometimes translated as happiness, but which ought to be translated a well-ordered condition of being, or a well-organized and disposed state of functions. Perhaps the conception can be best expressed, at least approximately, by the modern term *perfection*, which would mean for Aristotle the proper condition of being for a healthy and harmonious exercise of functions. This idea not only takes him beyond the individualistic hedonism of the sophistic school, because pleasure is not the only end for action, but repeats in a psychological form that which had been given a metaphysical and cosmological meaning in Plato. Plato recognized an extra-personal end to which the individual was sacrificed, as we have seen, but it was not so clearly

reconciled with personal good as was the conception of his disciple. Aristotle, however, in choosing welfare, or perfection, interpreted as the ideal condition of organic beings, prepared the way for the recognition of others as ends in themselves, instead of their being mere means to a personal end, as in Socrates, or means to an impersonal end, as in Plato. This perfection could be either or both personal and extra-personal. Moreover, inasmuch as the end recognized by Aristotle was not a transient feeling like pleasure, it reinstates Plato's conception of reality or permanence as the moral object of volition, though it is made personal in the disciple, while it was impersonal in the master. I mean by personal, of course, a condition in man himself. Hence Aristotle simply gives personal meaning to the Platonic reality.

This conception of welfare took Aristotle directly away from the asceticism of Plato. Welfare demanded some concessions to sensuous objects; the life of pure reason did not. With Plato reason furnished the object of action, and passion the motive power. With Aristotle passion might furnish an object as well as motive, while reason could furnish also an object of its own, but never any motive, though it was always the only guide to the rational, whether in the domain of sense or other functions. Hence, instead of sacrificing the desires to obtain morality, Aristotle granted them a legitimate field of activity and merely subordinated their gratification to the supremacy of reason. Plato also insisted upon the supremacy of reason, but it was a supremacy based upon the denial of all moral rights to desire. With Aristotle its supremacy was consistent with a legitimate function for desire. Instead, therefore, of subordinating the individual to the whole by requiring some transcendental condition like the moral order of the universe as we found

it in Plato, we see in Aristotle that concessions are made to the ends of sense, and the ideals of the concrete man. Though Aristotle made a contemplative life the highest ideal, this being for the Greeks of that time a speculative or philosophic, as we should now call it a scientific, vocation, he admitted moral possibilities below this height. He allowed the natural functions of man to determine an object for volition, and simply required that their proper action be regulated by reason, whereas we should say conscience, giving it both cognitive and motive power. In this concession to the desires we see that Aristotle did not require the immortality of the soul, a transcendental survival from the toils of our prison house, in order to realize morality, though this view did not antagonize or deny the value of an ideal world beyond the grave. The virtue of Aristotle lay in volition, not in the object attained by it, though the good might lie beyond the action in which virtue was realized. With Plato, as we found, virtue was realized in the conscious attainment of the good which lay beyond mere action and the will. But with virtue consisting in the intention and the good in some realizable perfection of the subject within the limits of actual existence, Aristotle reinstates the value of the individual which his master had sacrificed, and in doing so he lays the foundation for opposition to both the socialism and the pantheism of Plato, and finds an escape from the temptation to build ideal republics, supported upon the immolation of their citizens. But after the saner attempt of Plato in the "Laws," he constructs his theory of governmental institutions with greater reference to individual development as well as to the conditions of human nature, and his work in this direction has remained monumental.

The simple principle that determined the whole result

of his thought, in politics as well as ethics, was the doctrine of *the mean* (μεσότης), as it was called. Armed with Plato's conception of reason regulating passion, and with the universal Greek notion of moderation, the μηδὲν ἄγαν, "nothing overmuch," Aristotle conceded desire not only a legitimate but an ethical function, provided its satisfaction observed a mean between excess and deficiency, and thus placed himself upon terrestrial ground in his doctrine of morality, though not displacing the ideal that might require a transcendental world for its realization. He thus became the sanest and healthiest type of the Greek philosophers, at least in his scientific conception of the ethical problem, whatever we may think of the practical difficulties involved in the concession to the appetites, which, as Plato saw, could be more easily controlled by abstinence than by moderation. But with all such practical obstacles to its application without insight and common sense, Aristotle's position has the merit of theoretical accuracy, and of boldness in recognizing that man must construct his ethical ideals within the limits of realizable human ends, and that he should not run after will-o'-the-wisps in impossible worlds. He saw that the conditions of man's present life had to be satisfied, whatever the hereafter might be, and rightly regulated; that conscience has for its object and duty the restraint of passion and the direction of higher desires instead of moaning over the limitations of sense and longing for release from the body in order to gain the reward of virtue. Thus the doctrine of *the mean* kept Aristotle in the world of real life while it allowed for any ideal condition that might come within the ken of knowledge.

Other doctrines can only receive mention, as carrying the analysis of ethical problems farther than his predecessors.

By the distinction between intellectual or natural and moral or acquired virtues (excellences) Aristotle escaped the paradoxes of Socrates and Plato about the identity of virtue and knowledge, and the question whether virtue could be taught. Aristotle, at least in effect, maintained that the natural virtues or excellences were constitutional perfections in the individual, while the moral virtues were the direct product of the will. Consequently he was enabled to maintain against his masters the voluntary nature of vice, and ever since his time the term "virtue" has denoted only a quality of will, except in those survivals which speak of the "virtues" of medicine, etc. His outline of freedom and responsibility, the distinction between the two ideas not being explicitly drawn, can hardly be surpassed by any modern writer. His conception of moral virtue, the term moral being tautological to us owing to Aristotle's own influence, was that of a *confirmed habit of will*, not any fortuitously capricious motive. This view was a natural consequence of the general conception of virtue as an excellence of any kind in which it was most easily conceived as constitutional and static. Hence an individual act which did not represent a habit, no matter what the motive, could not be called a "virtue," though the Aristotelian distinction between natural and acquired excellence finally led to the recognition of even individual acts as morally good, and character came to stand for the fixed nature of the will which makes it "virtuous." But Aristotle's idea conceived moral merit as a quality of the subject indicating some inner fixity of character, and thus to some extent anticipated the position of Kant, who insisted that morality essentially consists in the idea of law, both as an imperative and as uniformity of action. Aristotle, of course, did not recognize the notion of an

imperative, but he did remark the idea of uniformity which puts the "virtue" in the will, whatever merit we may come to assign to the volition itself.

Aristotle's treatment of the particular virtues is coldly analytical, somewhat uninteresting to the modern mind, and is carried out along the line of his principle; namely, the mean between excess and deficiency in the gratification of impulse. No special importance for us attaches to this part of his work, except the length of the discussion on friendship, which, with the fact that quite as much attention was given to it by Plato, raises the question whether it does not indicate the conscious necessity for emphasis by the moralists of the time upon some of the social virtues as a counter-influence to the naturally egoistic tendencies of Greek life.

When it comes finally to a summary of the influence which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle exercised upon modern ethical doctrines there is an interesting and complicated problem to solve. Each of these philosophers appeals to a different type of mind. It was the personality of Socrates that gave him an influence upon after ages more than his method; for this latter had to be developed by other hands before its usefulness could be appreciated. His strength of will and martyrdom for his convictions made him, as in the case of all men like him, the center of interest for that class of hero-worshipers who like moral courage better than mere intellectual insight, and example better than precept. Plato, on the other hand, is attractive to all speculative minds of a mystical sort and who delight in transcendental conceptions, the airy visionary universe of pure thought, demanding those empyrean flights of fancy which justify the description of metaphysics as the poetry of reason. Over these Plato exercises an influence bordering on enchantment, and

scarcely any man with philosophic, literary, and humane instincts of any kind can escape the magical charm which he inspires. Aristotle, however, is the antithesis of this. He was to some extent the moral contrast of Socrates and the intellectual contrast of Plato. He was the embodiment of the strictly scientific mind, too prudent to die for the sake of obstinacy, as his flight from Athens to avoid a second disgrace to philosophy very well shows, and too critical to indulge in poetical metaphysics. His moral ideals involved no sacrifices like those of Socrates, and his philosophy no passion like that of Plato. He was coldly critical and scientific in method and temperament, poised equally between the two extremes of moral enthusiasm and speculative idealism. He is the philosopher of *facts*, an example and the hero of those who ask no favors of the universe but to know the truth, and no transcendental world to stimulate the inspiration and hopes of their morality. The general influence of all of them, however, lies in the spirit of reflective thinking which they cultivated. This has not thrown much light on modern practical issues, but only upon the theoretical basis of morality. Whatever has been required for solving the perplexities of theoretical ethics has received its impulse from this school of thinkers. They furnish the dry light of reason in the determination of what morality is and means, but none of the warmth of feeling and motive power which practical life demands, and though this fact is no discredit to the work of scientific analysis, which is always important, it indicates the limitations of Greek speculation. Insight and truth are of primary importance, though ineffective without power. Greek consciousness was almost wholly scientific curiosity, even when it touched upon the moral issues of life, and the shadows of its exaggerated worship of reason

still extend over all countries that have been molded by its culture.

To measure its value, however, by its inefficiency upon moral life in individual cases is to mistake both its nature and its mission, though such an accusation of its defects would be a pertinent criticism against those who identified knowledge and virtue. But to him who had distinguished, as Aristotle had done, between the speculative efforts of the intellect and the moral impulses and products of the will, it was only a recognition of individual responsibility for practical results to maintain that philosophy only furnished enlightenment and not moral character. Reason could point out the path of rectitude, but it could not impel a man to take it, except at the expense of that freedom which is as dear to the moralist and philosopher as knowledge can be. The intellect could supply the truth, but the will had to supply the moral impulse. Nevertheless, the distance between light and power is a short one, and the whole intellectual momentum of Greek thought, though circumscribed by the horizon of mere knowledge or wisdom, expended its illuminating power upon the speculative ideals of truth, beauty, and courage, and halted only at the limits of that moral enthusiasm which characterized the impulse of Christianity. Plato and Aristotle were the highest development of this tendency, though they represent the obverse and reverse sides of human genius, both in regard to the accomplishments and the spiritual influence of speculative thought. Plato was the idealist, and Aristotle was the realist. The one lived in the transcendental world of abstractions, and gained possession of human aspirations by directing them into the fairy-land of ideals; the other remained in the empirical world of concrete facts, actual reality which chastened the speculative

impulses of reason by counseling the lessons of humility. If philosophy ever betrays her genius in her incarnations, the characteristics thus described are even reflected in the creations which sculpture has brought down to us of these two men. Plato appears with his broad and elevated brow, cheerful countenance, and speculative eye looking dreamily into the great infinite of invisible existence, and with ecstatic vision keeping watch over the gates of immortality and God, as if he could utter the language of Tennyson's "Ulysses":

> Yet all experience is an arch where through
> Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades
> Forever and forever as we move.

But Aristotle with frigid, resolute, and drawn features, as if repressing the temptations of fancy, looks straight into nature, and having no purpose,

> To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
> Of all the western stars,

sternly represents man's messenger of fact within the limits of reality. For him the abstractions of time and eternity have no fascination, and he will follow no will-o'-the-wisps into the bogs of transcendentalism. But making the real not so bad, and the ideal not so fine as Plato, he circumscribes the objects of duty by the world of scientific facts, and hence the main virtue which his philosophy was calculated to inspire was that of every truly scientific mind; namely, the courage to disenchant the will of its demoniac passion for aspirations which neglect the most important duties of actual life, and hence to reconcile desire to the limitations of the world. He knew, to appropriate the language of Carlyle in reference to Mt. Vesuvius, that "the earth, green as she looks, rests everywhere on dread foundations were we further down, and Pan, to whose music the nymphs dance, has a cry in

"Pythagoras was eminently a practical person, the founder of a school of ascetics and socialists, a planter of colonies, and nowise a man of abstract studies alone."

Emerson's Essay on "Books."

PYTHAGORAS.

500 B. C.

him that can drive all men distracted": and hence, as in such conditions every man must choose between bravery and death, the resources of virtue must lie in the cultivation of knowledge and a resolute obedience to the laws of nature. But Aristotle also knew that nature had her compensations for the man whose moral consciousness, like that of the Stoic, gathers its impulses from courage and reverence for the actual world, and fearless of fate, serenely assaults the illusions which one finds in the real and the other in the ideal. He found both in nature, and his calm scientific spirit, with something of the vindictive austerity of Stoicism and the brave humility of Spinoza, demands of human life

> **One equal temper of heroic hearts,**
> **Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will**
> **To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.**

The passing of the gods under the ægis of skepticism may be marked by a shadow, and hope may be frustrated for a moment by the loss of its previous ideals, but the recovery of self-possession and the consciousness that life offers its best rewards to him who respects facts bring with them the "everlasting yea" of Carlyle, the light of truth and the power of virtue to shed their luster over the speculations both of history and of hope.

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PYTHAGORAS AND HIS SCHOOL.

PYTHAGORAS was one of the greatest, if not *the greatest* philosopher preceding the age of Socrates and Plato, and had a deep influence on their thought. He traveled over most of the known world to study the wisdom of its sages and is presumed to have learned much from the Brahmans of India, the Priests of Chaldea and Egypt, and the Magi of Persia, and he lived for many years in Babylon and Egypt before returning to Greece and Italy.

He established most extensive religious or monastic orders throughout Greece, Italy, and other Mediterranean countries which in discipline and doctrine closely resembled the early Hindoo and later Christian orders. For example, they practiced abstinence from animal foods, and also, strange as it may seem, from *beans*. They also observed celibacy, avoided bloody sacrifices, used a special dress and believed in the reincarnation of souls, like the Hindoo and Buddhist orders, and counselled a life of great purity and moderation.

Pythagoras seems not only to have been a world-student of Religion, Ethics and Philosophy, but also a great Moral Reformer and Cosmic Philosopher, as well as an able Politician. His religious confraternities of men and women became so numerous and powerful in Greece and Italy, and of such intellectual and political influence, that they were considered a menace to the

state, and were finally suppressed as dangerous to it, just as in a similar way Christian religious orders have been suppressed in some European States in modern times.

Pythagoras was also believed by his followers to be more than human, or actually divine, a son of Apollo, through a miraculous or divine conception by his mother, and thus an incarnation of God in human form. And it is also related of him that he rose from the dead *after a long burial.*

These ideas of human deification or divine incarnation were, however, not unusual in the beliefs, mythologies or legends of the Mediterranean and Oriental races before the time of Christ. And the same idea of divine incarnation was indeed also applied to Plato, and of course many of the Greek and Roman rulers were actually declared to be incarnations of God and reverenced as divine, for example, Alexander the Great, Nero, and others.

The common belief held by the Mediterranean and Oriental races in the pre-existence and eternal nature of the soul and its repeated rebirths or reincarnations, together with the general belief in the multiple personality of God, as shown by their Polytheistic and Henotheistic conceptions, as well as the popular belief in the close personal relations existing between Gods and men—and women too—led to the easy adoption of this doctrine of miraculous conception and divine incarnations, as one of the most simple and natural mental results under the circumstances. And it is therefore not to be wondered at that teachers of such unusual mental and moral power as Pythagoras and Plato, and of such deep and wide influence among men, should come to be regarded as superhuman in nature and divinely engen-

dered in origin where such mystic religious ideas were commonly held.*

With regard to the conception of God held commonly in the Pagan world, it is interesting to note that Prof. James, the great religious philosopher of Harvard University and a deep student of ancient philosophic conceptions, in his recent notable work, "Varieties of Religious Experience," seems to make the remarkable admission that he considers it rational to conceive God either as "pluralistic" or as "one and only." This is practically the conception of God held by the great philosophic Pagans among the Hindoos, Chaldeans, Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, who considered God as existing in many manifestations or personifications, such as Jupiter, Minerva, Neptune, Vesta, &c., or their equivalents, but that these pluralistic personifications or manifestations were really to be considered as all one in unison. Now many things in unity is obviously a better conception of God than mere "oneness" in itself: And we think it must also be admitted that "Allness" is a better conception of Infinity and Omnipotence than mere oneness, and "Allness" certainly involves the conception of multitude primarily and unity or oneness secondarily. The "All in All" or *The Completeness of Everything* are certainly good conceptions of God, at least in the Pantheistic sense; and all Theism necessarily involves more or less Pantheism, so that we therefore think it is logically indisputable to say with Prof. James and the old Pagans, that it is rationally admissible to conceive God either as "pluralistic" or as "one." At all events, the Christian conception of multi-personifications in unity

* The Rev. Lyman Abbott in a serious address to the students of Yale College some time ago, made a most remarkable statement in referring to the Christian doctrine of Incarnation. He stated that he sometimes wondered if the Church really believed that doctrine, and if he really believed it himself, but he was certain on one point, that it was easier to believe that God could produce such a mystery, than that men could have invented it. And this peculiar statement would seem to imply that men had never believed or "invented" this doctrine before the Christian Era!

is much nearer to the conceptions common to the philosophic Pagans than it is to the simple uncompromising monotheism of the Jewish and Mohammedan worlds who have so persistently rejected the Christian creed, whereas the Greek, Latin, Coptic, Celtic, and Teutonic races who were used to a multi or pluralistic conception, are practically the only races who have ever adopted that creed.

The Pythagorean conception of God and the soul is briefly described in the following paragraphs, which we take from Stanley's History of Philosophy, 1701.—Ed.

Pythagorean Conception of God.

Pythagoras defined what God is, thus, A mind which commeateth and is diffused through every part of the world and through all nature, and from whom all animals that are produced receive life.

God is one. He is not (as some conceive) out of the world, but entire within Himself, in a complete circle surveying all generations. He is the temperament of all ages, the agent of His own powers and works, the principle of all things, one, in heavenly luminary, and Father of all things; mind and animation of the whole, the motion of all circles.

God (as Pythagoras learned of the Magi, who term Him Oromasdes) in His body resembles light, in His soul, truth.

He said that God only is wise.

He conceiveth that the first (being) God, is neither sensible nor passible, but invisible and intelligible.

Next to the Supreme God, there are three kinds of intelligibles, gods, dæmons, heroes. That Pythagoras thus distinguished them, is manifest from his precept, that we must in worship prefer gods before dæmons, heroes before men: But in Jamblichus, he seems either to observe a different method, or to confound the terms:

teaching first of gods, then of heroes, last of dæmons; which order perhaps is the same with that of the Golden Verses,

> First, as decreed, th' immortal gods adore
> Thy oath keep ; next great heroes, then implore
> Terrestrial dæmons with due sacrifice.

By terrestrial dæmons seems to be understood (not princes, as Hierocles, but) the dæmons themselves, confined to several offices upon earth ; for

All the air is full of souls, which are esteemed dæmons and heroes; from these are sent to men dreams and presages of sickness and of health ; and not only to men, but to sheep also, and to other cattle: to these certain expiations and averrunciations, and all divinations, cledons, and the like.

All the parts of the world above the moon are governed according to Providence and firm order, and the decree of God, which they follow, but those beneath the moon by four causes : by God, by fate, by our election, by fortune. For instance, to go aboard into a ship or not, is in our power : storms and tempests to arise out of calm is by fortune : for the ship being under water to be preserved, is by the providence of God. Of fate, there are many manners and differences. it differs from fortune, as having a determination, order and consequence but fortune is spontaneous and casual, as to proceed from a boy to a youth, and orderly to pass through the other degrees of age happens by one manner of fate.

Man is of affinity with the gods, by reason that he participates of heat, wherefore God hath a providential care of us. There is also a fate of all things in general and in particular, the cause of their administration.

In Pythagoras his definition of the soul is a self-moving number, Plutarch saith, he takes number for mind. The mind is induced into the soul, *ab extrinseco*, from without, by divine participation, delibated of the Universal Divine Mind. For there is a soul intent and commeant through the whole nature of things, from which our souls are plucked. She is immortal, because that from which she is taken is immortal ; yet not a God, but the work of the eternal God. Thus Pythagoras ex-

ceedingly confirmed the opinion of his master Pherecides, who first taught, that the souls of men are sempiternal.

The soul hath a twofold life, separate and in the body; her faculties are otherwise *in anima*, otherwise *in animali*.

The soul is incorruptible; for when it goes out of the body, it goes to the soul of the world, which is of the same kind.*

When she goeth out upon the earth, she walketh in the air like a body. Mercury is the keeper of souls, he brings souls out of bodies in the earth and the sea; of which, those that are pure, he leadeth into an high place; the impure come not to them, nor to one another, but are bound by the Furies in indissoluble chains.

A summary of the Pythagoric Doctrine is extant in verse, entitled, the Golden Verses of Pythagoras; or as others say, of the Pythagoreans. For that, saith Hierocles, as gold is the best and purest of metals, so these are the best and most divine of verses.

The Golden Verses of Pythagoras.

First, in their ranks, the Immortal Gods adore.
Thy oath keep; next, great Heroes; then implore
Terrestrial Dæmons with due sacrifice.
Thy parents reverence, and near allies;
Him that is first in virtue make thy friend,
And with observance his kind speech attend:
Nor (to thy power) for light faults cast him by,
Thy pow'r is neighbor to necessity.
These know, and with intentive care pursue;
But anger, sloth, and luxury subdue.
In sight of others or thy self forbear
What's ill; but of thyself stand most in fear.
Let Justice all thy words and actions sway:
Nor from the even course of Reason stray:
For know, that all men are to die ordain'd,
And riches are as quickly lost as gain'd.
Crosses that happen by divine decree,
(If such thy lot) bear not impatiently.
Yet seek to remedy with all thy care,
And think the just have not the greatest share.
'Mongst men, discourses good and bad are spread,
Despise not those, nor be by these misled.
If any some notorious falsehood say,
Thou the report with equal judgment weigh.

*This idea seems to be identical with the Platonic and Buddhistic conceptions of soul.—Ed.

Let not men's smoother promises invite,
Nor rougher threats from just resolves thee fright.
If ought thou shouldst attempt, first ponder it;
Fools only inconsiderate acts commit;
Nor do what afterwards thou mayest repent;
First learn to know the thing on which th' art bent.
Thus thou a life shalt lead with joy replete.
Nor must thou care of outward health forget.
Such temp'rance use in exercise and diet,
As may preserve thee in a settled quiet.
Meats unprohibited, not curious, choose;
Decline what any other may accuse.
The rash expense of vanity detest,
And sordidness: A mean in all is best.
Hurt not thyself; Before thou act, advise;
Nor suffer sleep at night to close thine eyes,
Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast o'errun,
How slipt, what deeds, what duty left undone?
Thus thy account summ'd up from first to last,
Grieve for the ill, joy for what good hath past.
These study, practice these, and these affect;
To sacred virtue these thy steps direct.
Eternal Nature's fountain I attest,
Who the Tetractis on our souls imprest.
Before thy mind thou to this study bend,
Invoke the Gods to grant it a good end.
These if thy labour vanquish, thou shalt then
Know the connexure both of Gods and men;
How everything proceeds, or by what staid,
And know (as far as fit to be survey'd)
Nature alike throughout; that thou mayest learn
Not to hope hopeless things, but all discern;
And know those wretches whose perverser wills
Draw down upon their head spontaneous ills;
Unto the good that's nigh them, deaf and blind:
Some few the cure of these misfortunes find.
This only is the Fate that harms, and rolls,
Through miseries successive, human souls.
Within is a continual hidden fight
Which we to shun must study, not excite.
Great Jove! how little trouble should we know,
If thou to all men wouldst their genius show!
But fear not thou; men come of heav'nly race,
Taught by diviner Nature what t' embrace:
Which if pursu'd, thou all I nam'd shall gain,
And keep thy soul clear from thy body's stain.
In time of Pray'r and cleansing, meat's deni'd
Abstain from: thy mind's reins let reason guide:
Then, strip'd of flesh, up to free Æther soar,
A deathless God, Divine, mortal no more.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM WORKS

—OF—

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

ILLUSTRATING THE ETHICS OF THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS, SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

EXPLANATORY NOTE.

These extracts are taken from the following English works:—

Jowett's Translation of Plato's Works, published by Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1889.

Jowett's Politics of Aristotle, Oxford Edition, Clarendon Press, 1885.

Aristotle's Niomachean Ethics, Peter's Translation.

Aristotle's History of Animals, Cresswell's Translation, Bohn Edition.

Aristotle's Metaphysics.

The paragraphs quoted in these extracts are all given exactly as they appear in the translations, but not always in complete continuity, that is, for purpose of condensation many intervening clauses between several of the paragraphs in the original have been omitted in our extracts as being irrelevant or redundant or obscure. The places where such omissions have been made have not been indicated in our text, for the sake of smoother appearance and easier reading, and the quotations have thus been printed by us as if they were continuous or uninterupted from the original, but we have been always careful in our selection and arrangement of the quotations that the omitted phrases do not affect the sense and context which has been everywhere carefully preserved by a juxtaposition and succession substantially as it is in the original.

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THE SUPREME GOD OR CREATOR AND HIS CREATION OF THE UNIVERSE.

From Plato's Timæus.

Introductory Note:—

ACCORDING to the latest Biblical critics, the Book of Genesis is *a literary mosaic* made up of literary fragments of various dates and authorships, and the dates of its various parts vary from about 700 to 400 B. C. Now it is very interesting to here note that the following extract from Plato, giving the story of the Creation, is not far from being contemporary with Genesis itself, as it was written about 400 B. C. Note also the reference to a great deluge in the tale of the lost Atlantis. —C. M. H.

"Let me tell you then, why the Creator of the world generated and created this universe. He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, He desired that all things should be as like Himself as possible. This is the true beginning of Creation and of the world, which we shall do well in receiving on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad as far as this could be accomplished.

"Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible when there is no fire, or tangible which is not solid, and nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also, God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth.*

"Now the Creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. He intended, in the first place, that the whole animal should be perfect, as far as possible, and that the parts of which he was formed should be perfect; and that he should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created; and also, that he should be free from old age and unaffected by disease.

"Such was the whole scheme of the eternal God about the god that was to be, to whom He for all these reasons gave a body, smooth, even, and in every direction equidistant from a centre, entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the centre He put the soul, which He diffused through the whole, and also spread over all the body round about; and He made one solitary and only heaven a circle moving in a circle, having such excellence as to be able to hold converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having these purposes in view He created the world to be a blessed god.

"Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we have spoken of them in this order; for when He put them together He would never have allowed that the elder should serve the younger, but this is what we

* "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

say at random, because we ourselves too are very largely affected by chance. Whereas He made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And the soul he made out of the following elements and on this manner: He took of the unchangeable and indivisible essence, and also of the divisible and corporeal which is generated, and He made a third sort of intermediate essence out of them both, partaking of the nature of the same and of the other, and thus He compounded a nature which was in a mean between the indivisible and the divisible and corporeal. These three elements he took and mingled them all in one form, compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same. And when He had mixed them with the essence and out of all the three made one, He again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each of them containing an admixture of the same and of the other and of the essence.

"Now when the Creator had framed the soul according to His will, He formed within the mind the corporeal universe, and brought them together, and united them from center to center. The soul, interfused everywhere from the center to the circumference of heaven, of which she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intelligible and everlasting beings, is the best of things created.

"When the Father and Creator saw the image that He had made of the eternal gods moving and living, he was delighted, and in his joy determined to make His work still more like the pattern; and as the pattern was an

eternal creature, He sought to make the universe the same as far as might be. Now the nature of the intelligible being is eternal, and to bestow eternity on the creature was wholly impossible. But He resolved to make a moving image of eternity, and as He set in order the heaven He made, this eternal image having a motion according to number, while eternity rested in unity; and this is what we call *time*.

"Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time. And in order to accomplish this creation, He made the sun and moon and five other stars, which are called the planets, to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time, and when God made the bodies of these several stars He gave them orbits in the circle of the other.

"Until the creation of time, all things had been made in the likeness of that which was their pattern, but in so far as the universe did not as yet include within itself all animals, there was a difference. This defect the Creator supplied by fashioning them after the nature of the pattern. And as the mind perceives ideas or species of a certain nature and number in the ideal animal, He thought that this created world ought to have them of a like nature and number. There are four such; one of them is the heavenly race of the gods; another, the race of birds moving in the air; the third the watery species; and the fourth, the pedestrian and land animals. Of the divine, He made the greater part out of fire, that they might be the brightest and fairest to the sight, and He made them after the likeness of the universe in the form of a circle, and gave them to know and follow the best, distributing them over the whole circumference of the heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glory spangled with them.

"To tell of other divinities, and to know their origin, is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods, and they must surely have known the truth about their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? Although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of family traditions, we must believe them in accordance to the law. In this manner, then, according to them, the genealogy of these gods is to be received and narrated.

"Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the Creator of the universe spoke as follows:—

"Gods and sons of gods who are my works, and of whom I am the Artificer and Father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be dissolved, but only an evil being would wish to dissolve that which is harmonious and happy. And although being created, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death; having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those which bound you when ye were created. And now, listen to my instructions: Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created,—without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not have in it every kind of animal which a perfect world ought to have. On the other hand, if they were created and received life from me, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that there may be mortals, and that this universe may be truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which

I showed in creating you. The divine and immortal part of them, which is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and the gods—of that divine part I will myself give you the seed and beginning. And do you then weave together the mortal and immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give them food, and make them to grow, and receive them again in death. Thus He spake, and once more and in the same manner poured the remains of the elements into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe, no longer, however, pure as before, but diluted to the second and third degree. And when He had framed the universe He distributed souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star; and having placed them as in a chariot, He showed them the nature of the universe, and the decrees of destiny appointed for them, and told them that their first birth would be one and the same for all, and that no one should suffer at His hands; and that they must be sown in the vessels of the times severally adapted to them, and then there would come forth the most religious of animals; and as human nature was of two kinds, the superior race would hereafter be called man. Now, as they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and objects were always approaching or receding from them, in the first place there was a necessity that they should have one natural mode of perceiving external force; in the second place, they must have love, which is a mixture of pleasure and pain; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them; if they conquered these they would live righteously, and if they were unconquered by them, unrighteously. Also, He said, that he who lived well during his appointed time would return to the habitation of his star, and there

have a blessed and suitable existence. But if he failed in attaining this, in the second generation he would pass into a woman, and should he not cease from evil in that condition, he would be changed into some brute who resembled him in his evil ways, and would not cease from his toils and transformations until he followed the original principle of sameness and likeness within him," and overcame, by the help of reason, the later accretions of turbulent and irrational elements composed of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the form of his first and better nature. When He had given all these laws to His creatures, that He might be guiltless of their future evil, He sowed some of them in the earth, and some in the moon, and some in the other stars which are the measures of time; and when He had sown them He committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner that they could, and avert all but self-inflicted evils."

GREAT ANTIQUITY OF EGYPT AND HER EARLY INFLUENCE ON ANCIENT GREECE. TALE OF "THE LOST ATLANTIS."

From Plato's Timæus.

"Then listen, Socrates, to a strange tale which is, however, certainly true, as Solon, who was the wisest of the seven sages, declared. He was a relative and a great friend of my great-grandfather, Dropidas, as he himself says in several of his poems: and Dropidas told Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and told us: That there were of old great and marvelous actions of the Athenians, which have passed into oblivion through time and the destruction of the human race, and one in particular, which was the greatest of them all, the recital of which will be a suitable testimony of our gratitude to you, and also a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess, which may be sung by us at the festival in her honor.

"Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

"He replied: At the head of the Egyptian Delta, where the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is called the district of Sais, and the great city of the district is also called Sais, and is the city from which Amasis the king was sprung. And the citizens have a

deity who is their foundress: she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes called Athene. Now the citizens of this city are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that they are in some way related to them. Thither came Solon, who was received by them with great honor; and he asked the priests, who were most skillful in such matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion, when he was drawing them on to speak of antiquity, he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phoroneus, who is called "the first," and about Niobe: and after the Deluge, to tell of the lives of Deucalion and Pyrrha: and he traced the genealogy of their descendants, and attempted to reckon how many years old were the events of which he was speaking, and to give the dates. Thereupon, one of the priests, who was of a very great age, said: O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are but children, and there is never an old man who is an Hellene. Solon hearing this, said, What do you mean? I mean to say, he replied, that in mind you are all young: there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition: nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you the reason of this. There have been, and will be again, many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes: the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story, which even you have preserved, that once upon a time Phæthon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself

destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now, this has the form of a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving around the earth and in the heavens, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth recurring at long intervals of time; when this happens, those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destruction than those who dwell by rivers or on the sea-shore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never-failing saviour, saves and delivers us. When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water, among you, herdsmen and shepherds on the mountains are the survivors, whereas those of you who live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. But in this country, neither at that time nor at any other, does the water come from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below, for which reason the things preserved here are said to be the oldest. The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, the human race is always increasing at times, and at other times diminishing in numbers. And whatever happened either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed—if any action which is noble or great or in any other way remarkable, has taken place, all that has been written down of old, and is preserved in our temples; whereas you and other nations are just being provided with letters and the other things which States require; and then, at the usual period, the stream from heaven descends like a pestilence, and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and education; and thus you have to begin all over again as children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of yours which you have recounted to us, Solon, they are

no better than the tales of children; for in the first place you remember one deluge only, whereas there were many of them; and in the next place, you do not know that there dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, of whom you and your whole city are but a seed or remnant. And this was unknown to you, because for many generations the survivors of that destruction died and made no sign. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens, was first in war and was pre-eminent for the excellence of her laws, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven. Solon marveled at this, and earnestly requested the priest to inform him exactly and in order about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of the city, and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common patron and protector and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth and Hephæstus the seed of your race, and then she founded ours, the constitution of which is set down in our sacred registers as eight thousand years old. As touching the citizens of nine thousand years ago, I will briefly inform you of their laws and of the noblest of their actions; and the exact particulars of the whole we will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with your own you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is separated from all the others; next there are the artificers, who exercise their several crafts by themselves and with-

out admixture of any other; and also there is the class of shepherds and that of hunters, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are separated from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law only to engage in war; moreover, the weapons with which they are equipped are shields and spears, and this the goddess taught first among you, and then in Asiatic countries, and we among the Asiatics first adopted. Then as to wisdom, do you observe what care the law took from the very first, searching out and comprehending the whole order of things down to prophecy and medicine (the latter with a view to health); and out of these divine elements drawing what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge which was connected with them. All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city; and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess who was a lover both of war and of wisdom, selected, and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue as became the children and disciples of the gods.

"Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your State in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valor. For these histories tell of a mighty power which was aggressing wantonly against the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable; and there was an island situated in front of the straits

which you call the columns of Heracles; the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, and was the way to other islands, and from the islands you might pass through the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean; for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbor, having a narrow entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surrounding land may be most truly called a continent. Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others, as well as over parts of the continent, and, besides these, they subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. The vast power thus gathered into one, endeavored to subdue at one blow our country and yours and the whole of the land which was within the straits; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all mankind; for she was the first in courage and military skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone after having undergone the very extremity of danger, she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjected, and freely liberated all the others who dwelt within the limits of Heracles. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night of rain all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner disappeared, and was sunk beneath the sea. And this is the reason why the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable, because there is such a quantity of shallow mud in the way; and this was caused by the subsidence of the island."

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL BENEFICENT LOVE.

From Plato's Symposium.

Introductory Note:—We have here assembled the best parts of Plato's Symposium on the subject of Love to show the beauty and profundity of much of the old thought on this subject, and have thus given most of the speeches of the tragic poet Agathon and of Socrates the sculptor and philosopher. The moral as well as poetic beauty of Agathon's analysis and remarks will be readily noted, and it may recall to us the beautiful and famous hymn to love or "Charity" given by St. Paul in 1st Corinthians, 13th Chapter. "Charity" and "love" are of course interchangeable terms, and "love" is the term which is now used by the translators in the late revised version of the New Testament. As to the word "charity" itself, it should also be noted that it is derived from the Greek word "Charites" which is the Greek name of the "three graces" who were believed to have presided over all the kind and social relations and "graces" of life. It will be noted in the parallel which we have drawn farther on between the words of Paul and Agathon, that practically identical thoughts or ideas appear in each, Agathon being earlier by nearly five hundred years.

In the remarks of Socrates will be found the true

doctrine of "Platonic Love" which has popularly and incorrectly been regarded as a pure or sexless love between the sexes, whereas it does not necessarily involve a friendship between the opposite sexes at all, but rather between old men and youths, and relates particularly to the influence of the great or creative souls in producing a moral and intellectual offspring by influencing the minds and characters of others for their good and chiefly between old and young men. Note also the appearance here of that remarkable character of whom little seems to be known, viz., the Greek woman Diotima, who seems to have been a great Pythagorean philosopher and also a priestess of Zeus from the ancient democratic city of Mantinea in the Greek state of Arcadia where women had more freedom and independence than in the more aristocratic state of Athens, and who it seems was the teacher in philosophy of the great Socrates himself who shows many traces of the Pythagorean discipline and doctrine in his mode of life and teachings. The discourse between Socrates and Diotima is deeply interesting and profound, and it will be seen that one of the remarkable definitions which she gives of Love is that it is "*the desire of the everlasting possession of the good.*" Another of her remarkable statements is that, all desire of good and happiness is due to the great and subtle power of love, that love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or of soul, and that love exists essentially for the purpose of realizing immortality, as only by rebirth, whether of body or soul, is immortality made a practical reality or fact. Thus, physical man simply passes on his physical life to his mortal children, and intellectual and soulful man transmits his mental and moral attainments to his disciples—his children of the soul—all through "the great and subtle power of Love."

An illustration of the Socratic ethical doctrine that "Knowledge" essentially constitutes Good or Virtue is seen in Diotima's positive statement to Socrates that "There is nothing which men love but the good." Hence Socrates insisted that virtue can be taught for it is essentially "knowledge," and that if men only knew what "Good" was, they would always love and practice it, and it is thus chiefly through pure "*ignorance*" that they are not virtuous. Note also how this Socratic ethical theory corresponds with the interesting statement quoted in the extracts from Aristotle where he says, referring to Plato, "And therefore as Plato says man needs to be trained from his youth up to find pleasure and pain in the right objects. This is what a sound education means."—C. M. H.

AGATHON AND SOCRATES ON LOVE.

From Plato's Symposium.

The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides speak, if they were done at all, were done of necessity and not of love; had love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender:—

> "Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
> Not on the ground but on the heads of men:"

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love: for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are hard enough, but in the hearts and souls of men; in them he walks and dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is a hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and clinging always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? And he

is the youngest as well as the tenderest, and also he is of flexile form; for without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul of man without being discovered, if he were hard. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love: ungrace and love are always at war with one another. * * But I must now speak of his virtue; his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong from any god or any man: for he suffers not by force if he suffers, for force comes not near him, neither does he act by force. For all serve him of their own free-will, and where there is love as well as obedience, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs: and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken; but I have yet to speak of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet, (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art,) and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the musical

arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge.

And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame?—he whom love touches not walks in darkness. Love set in order the empire of the gods. And formerly, as I was saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, because of the rule of necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And I have a mind to say of him in verse that he is the god who—

> "Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
> Who stills the waves and bids the sufferer sleep."

He makes men to be of one mind at a banquet such as this, fulfilling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection. In sacrifices, banquets, dances, he is our lord,—supplying kindness and banishing unkindness, giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; careful of the good, uncareful of the evil. In every word, work, wish, fear,—pilot, helper, defender, savior; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a hymn and joining in that fair strain with which Love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the discourse, Phaedrus, half playful, yet having a certain

measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the God.

* * * * * * * * *

Socrates then proceeded as follows:—

In the magnificent discourse which you have uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in saying that you would begin with the nature of Love and then afterwards speak of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve.

And now I will take my leave of you, and rehearse the tale of love which I heard once upon a time from Diotima of Mantinea, who was a wise woman in this and many other branches of knowledge. She was the same who deferred the plague of Athens ten years by a sacrifice, and was my instructress in the art of love. In the attempt which I am about to make I shall pursue Agathon's method, and begin with his admissions which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well I can. For, like Agathon, she spoke first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works.

"What then is Love?" I asked; "Is he mortal?" "No." "What then?" "As in the former instance, he is neither mortal or immortal, but in a mean between them." "What is he then, Diotima?" "He is a great spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal." "And what is the nature of this spiritual power?" I said. "This is the power," she said, "which interprets and conveys to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of the gods: and this power spans the chasm which divides them, and in this all is bound together, and through this the arts of the prophet

and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; and through this power all the intercourse and speech of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual: all other wisdom, such as that of arts or handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and divine, and one of them is Love."

"But all men, Socrates," she rejoined, "are not said to love, but only some of them; and you say that all men are always loving the same things." "I myself wonder," I said, "why that is." "There is nothing to wonder at," she replied; "the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names." "Give an example," I said. She answered me as follows: "There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. And all creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets." "Very true." "Still," she said, "you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; the generic term 'poetry' is confined to that specific art which is separated off from the rest of poetry, and is concerned with music and metre; and this is what is called poetry, and they who possess this kind of poetry are called poets." "Very true," I said. "And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is due to the great and subtle power of Love; but those who, having their affections set upon him, are yet diverted into the paths of money-making or gymnastic philosophy, are not called lovers,—the name of the genus is reserved for those whose devotion takes

one form only,—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers." "In that," I said, "I am of opinion that you are right." "Yes," she said, "and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for the half of themselves; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love them not because they are their own, but because they are good, and dislike them not because they are another's, but because they are evil. There is nothing which men love but the good. Do you think that there is?" "Indeed," I answered, "I should say not." "Then," she said, "the conclusion of the whole matter is, that men love the good." "Yes," I said. "To which may be added that they love the possession of the good?" "Yes, that may be added." "And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?" "That may be added too." "Then love," she said, "may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?" "That is most true," I said.

"Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further," she said, "what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? Answer me that." "Nay, Diotima," I said, "if I had known I should not have wondered at your wisdom, or have come to you to learn." "Well," she said, "I will teach you; love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or soul."

"For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only." "What then?" "The love of generation and birth in beauty." "Yes," I said. "Yes, indeed," she replied. "But why of birth?" I said. "Because to the mortal, birth is a sort of eternity and

immortality," she replied; "and as has been already admitted, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good, if love is of the everlasting possession of the good."

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And on another occasion she said to me, "What is the reason, Socrates, of this love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love; this begins with the desire of union, to which is added the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring. Man may be supposed to do this from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?" Again I replied, "that I did not know." She said to me: "And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?" "But that," I said, "Diotima, is the reason why I come to you, because, as I have told you already, I am aware that I want a teacher; and I wish that you would explain to me this and the other mysteries of love." "Marvel not at this," she said, "if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have already admitted; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because the new is always left in the place of the old. For even in the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same: but yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every

animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of loss and reparation—hair, flesh bones, blood, and the whole body, are always changing. And this is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going. And what is yet more surprising is, that this is also true of knowledge; and not only does knowledge in general come and go, so that in this respect we are never the same; but particular knowledge also experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word 'recollection,' but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is renewed and preserved by recollection, appearing to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not by absolute sameness of existence, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar one behind—unlike the immortal in this, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality."

"Men whose bodies only are creative, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But creative souls —for there are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or retain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such

creators are all poets and other artists who may be said to have invention. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far, is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity, desires to beget and generate. And he wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed; and when he finds a fair, and noble, and well-nurtured soul, and there is union of the two in one person, he gladly embraces him, and to such a one he is full of fair speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man: and he tries to educate him; and at the touch and presence of the beautiful he brings forth the beautiful which he conceived long before, and the beautiful is ever present with him and in his memory even when absent, and in company they tend that which he brings forth, and they are bound together by a far nearer tie, and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind to be the saviors, not only of Lacedæmon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians. All of them have done many noble works, and have been the parents of

virtue of every kind, and many temples have been raised in honor of their children, which were never raised in honor of the mortal children of any one."

"And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates," said the stranger of Mantineia, "is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which, if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, which, when you now behold, you are in fond amazement, and you and many a one are content to live seeing only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty, divine and simple, and bringing into being and educating true creations of virtue and not idols only? Do you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities; for he has hold, not of an image, but of a reality, and bringing forth and educating true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?"

Such, Phaedrus—and I speak not only to you, but to all men—were the words of Diotima; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a better helper than Love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honor him as I myself honor him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, even as I praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability, now and ever.

PAUL AND PLATO PARALLELED.

—HYMN TO LOVE.—

Paul in 1 Corinthians, 13. REVISED VERSION, *About A. D. 57.*	*Agathon in Plato's Symposium, B. C. 416.*
SECTION FIRST.	SECTION FIRST.
"If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am become sounding brass or a clanging cymbal. And if I have the gift of prophecy and know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing.	"And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires has the light of fame? He whom love touches not walks in darkness. Love set in order the empire of the Gods. Therefore Phaedrus I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things."
SECTION SECOND.	SECTION SECOND.
"And if I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and	(Note. This thought of Paul is not paralleled in

if I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profiteth me nothing.

SECTION THIRD.

"Love suffereth long and is kind, love envieth not, love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not its own, is not provoked, taketh not account of evil, rejoiceth not in unrighteousness, but rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

Agathon, being simply a denunciation of ostentatious or Pharisaic virtue without real kindness or charity in the heart.—Ed.)

SECTION THIRD.

'And I have a mind to say of him in verse that he is the god who

> Gives peace on earth, and calms the stormy deep,
> Who stills the waves, and bids the sufferer sleep.

He makes men to be of one mind at a banquet such as this, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection. In sacrifices, banquets, dances, he is our lord, supplying kindness and banishing unkindness, giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him and precious to those who have the better part in him, parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace, careful of the good, uncareful of the evil.

SECTION FOURTH.

"Love never faileth . . . But now abideth faith, hope, love, these three, and the greatest of these is love. Follow after love. . ."

Note 1.—Paul was an educated Greek-Jew and doubtless familiar with Greek literature. He was a Roman citizen and a resident of the great Greek City of Tarsus in Asia Minor which was a rival of Athens itself. His epistles contain many phrases evidently taken from old Greek works. Several instances of these could be easily given, but it is not here necessary. Suffice it to say that in the very Chapter of Corinthians from which we quote, Paul uses the noted phrase "for now we see through a glass darkly," which will be found used by Socrates in the Phædo and in other places in exactly the same form and sense as used by Paul.—C. M. H.

SECTION FOURTH.

"In every word, work, wish, fear — pilot, helper, defender, saviour, glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest in whose footsteps let every man follow."

Note 2.—Agathon was a tragic poet of Athens, and his beautiful encomium to Love as recorded by Plato is necessarily in a more poetic and festive vein than that of Paul, as it was uttered at a banquet given to the great men of Athens on the occasion of his winning the prize in poetry about the year 416 B.C. Although Paul's encomium is more serious and religious in tone yet it will be noted that his ideas are substantially identical with those of Agathon, and while it is not to be presumed that Paul was a mere copier from Plato, yet it is more than probable that he was familiar with and influenced by the works of Plato, as his metaphysical style indicates this, and

it is well known that learned Jews in Alexandria and Palestine and the cities of Greece and Rome were familiar with Plato's teachings and greatly influenced by them.—C. M. H.

THE GOLDEN RULE.

From Plato's Laws, Book XI, 400 B. C.

"In the next place, dealings between man and man "require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them "is very simple: Thou shalt not touch that which is "mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing which "belongs to me without my consent: and may I, being "of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should "do to me."

Note. This is a remarkably clear and positive statement of the famous Golden Rule, uttered about one hundred years after its statement by Confucius, and over four hundred years before its statement by Jesus of Nazareth. It is interesting also to here note the careful and judicial or legal manner in which the rule is stated by the philosophic Plato so as to avoid possible misconstruction or perversion by the perverse mind. Observe carefully the effect of the parenthetical qualifying clause "being of sound mind" which seems like the careful phrasing of a lawyer in the drawing of a statute, so as to exclude misapplications and perversions of interpretation, yet fully cover all proper cases. Now the principle of the Golden Rule obviously is that of a broad reciprocal justice and sympathy and a mutuality of self-interest, which makes a man's own judgment of what he would

consider good and desirable *for himself* to be his standard for his treatment of *all other men.*

Now no man "*of sound mind*" will really desire anything bad, injurious or vicious for himself, and hence to make his judgment for self a sound and true one, the man himself must first be *of sound or normal mind and desires* and not one made abnormal by vice or excess or insanity, otherwise he might, as in the case of the abandoned drunkard, the libertine or madman, obey literally the less carefully stated formula of Jesus—"*All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them*"—and yet make a great moral perversion of the pure and elevated intention of Jesus to justify a vicious end. For example, the alcoholic or opium degenerate would gladly welcome an intoxication or drugging at the expense of some other man and return the compliment with reciprocal good nature whenever he could, thus literally obeying the loose and sweeping injunction "*All things whatsoever* ye would that men should do to you, do you even so to them."

But the judicial Plato evidently and clearly excludes this perversion by the qualifying clause "*being of sound mind*" as no man of "*sound*" mind could apply the rule in this perverted way, while the man of vicious or mad mind could readily apply the formula of Jesus literally and justify himself by it, something as the witty Cocotte did by quoting the words of Christ that "much would be forgiven her because she had loved much."

It is also interesting to note that the negative form in which the Golden Rule was given by Confucius one hundred years before Plato and five hundred years before Christ, and which Christian theologians and apologists usually try to show is inferior to the positive form of Jesus, is not really inferior on examination, but if any-

thing, legally and verbally superior, as it, like Plato's form, excludes perversions or is less subject to perversion. For example, Confucius' formula is as follows: "*What you do not like* when done to yourself, do not do to others."* Now this, it seems to us, is one of the best and simplest statements of the Golden Rule ever given, and, like Plato's, less open to perversion than Christ's, and a little reflection will, we think, show the superiority and simplicity of this Confucian or negative form over the Christian formula. Thus, what men desire to be done to themselves, as before indicated, is often very vicious, but what they do not like to be done to themselves is almost always a true evil to be avoided, and hence it is an obviously sound, just and true reciprocal rule that what they thus recognize as an evil to themselves they must avoid doing to other men, and this will be sound and true in almost all cases and not easily perverted, as is the more carelessly expressed formula in the Sermon on the Mount. Hence in basing the rule negatively on what one does not like done to one's-self, rather than positively on what one does like to be done to one's-self, it seems to be a simpler, safer and more judicious formula.

The form in which the rule has been stated by the Confucian philosopher Mencius, who was contemporary with Plato, is also very clear and simple, and is probably nearest to the positive formula of Christ, viz., "If one strives to treat others as he would be treated by them, he will not fail to come near the perfect life."

This latter form is quoted in Prof. James' lecture on The Ethics of The Chinese Sages, and is perhaps one of the most beautiful forms of the positive statement of the rule ever given.—C. M. H.

*See Legge's Chinese Classics, also Prof. James' lecture on Ethics of Chinese Sages.

RETURN NOT EVIL FOR EVIL.

Socrates' Answer to Crito in Plato's Crito.

"Then we must do not wrong. Nor when injured, injure in return, for we must injure no one at all."

"Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really meant what you were saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation, nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

"'Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither

will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

"This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

"Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

"Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God."

GOOD, NOT PLEASURE, THE SUPREME AIM OF CONDUCT.

From Plato's Gorgias.

"*Socrates.* Because, if you remember, Polus and I agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good; and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will you give a third vote for that proposition?

"*Callias.* I will.

"*Socrates.* Then pleasure as well as all else is for the sake of good, and not good for the sake of pleasure?

"*Callias.* To be sure."

SUICIDE CONDEMNED.

Socrates in the Phædo.

"Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die, though he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be right.

"Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be right? as I have certainly heard Philolaus affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although none of them has ever made me understand him.

"But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil may be accidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for may not death, too, be better than life in some cases?) and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

"I admit the appearance of inconsistency, replied Socrates, but there may not be any real inconsistency after all in this. There is a doctrine uttered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door of his prison and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that

the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs.

"And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

"Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me."

A VIRTUOUS LIFE, FEARLESS DEATH, AND GLORIOUS HEREAFTER, COMMENDED TO ALL MEN.

Socrates in the Gorgias.

"For no man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel full of injustice, is the last and worst of all evils.

"Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honors at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and when the time comes, to die. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict.

"Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as your own argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer and do not

mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true man.

"Let us then, take this discourse as our guide, which signifies to us, that the best way of life is to practice justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in that way in which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth."

THE SOUL'S IMPROVEMENT, NOT WORLDLY SUCCESS, THE TRUE AIM OF MAN'S LIFE.

SOCRATES IN PLATO'S APOLOGY.

"Men of Athens, I honor and love you: but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: O my friend, why do you, who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says Yes, but I do care; I do not depart or let him go at once; I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And this I should say to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command to God, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the

state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue come money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times."

THE TRUE LIFE, THE LIFE OF THE SOUL, NOT OF THE WORLD OR OF THE BODY.

SOCRATES IN THE PHÆDO.

"Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that a life which has no bodily pleasures and no part in them, is not worth having: but that he who thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as though he were dead.

"What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

"Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

"Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

"And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she

has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after being?

"And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by herself?

"In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere: and this is surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?

"But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the chief concern of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every man who believes that he has his mind purified.

"And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can; the release of the soul from the chains of the body?"

DEATH IS A GOOD AND NOT AN EVIL.

Socrates in the "Apology."

"Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things: either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better, and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now, if death is like this, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and

Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musæus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment: and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition: or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

"Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know this of a truth—that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my accusers or my condemners; they have done me no harm, although neither of them meant to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them."

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL AND ITS FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

From Plato's Phædo.

Introductory Note. There can be found no text in the Old or New Testament in which the doctrines of the immortal soul and its future states, as believed in by the majority of the Christian world, are so fully and clearly set forth as in these extracts from Plato, written nearly five hundred years before any book of the New Testament was composed. All texts in the Old Testament quoted for immortality and future state are very meager and vague except a few texts in the later books such as those from Ecclesiastes, 180 B. C., Daniel, 165 B. C., and Wisdom, 40 A. D., and it will thus be seen that Plato's Phædo is more than two hundred years older than the earliest of these three Old Testament Books, which contain the best texts on immortality. See supplementary notes on p. 130.—C. M. H.

SOCRATES ON IMMORTALITY.

Conversation of Socrates with his Disciples Simmias and Cebes in his Prison before his Death.

Date 399, B. C.

"Then reflect Cebes: is not the conclusion of the whole matter this,—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable? Can this my dear Cebes, be denied?

"And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes immediately, on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with the body, and which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself (for such abstraction has been the

study of her life). And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple of philosophy, and has practiced how to die easily? And is not philosophy the practice of death?

"That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world,—to the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she lives in bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions, and all other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods? Is not this true, Cebes?

"But the soul which has been polluted and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of his lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy; do you suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and unalloyed?

"And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

"Certainly not! For not in that way does the soul of a philosopher reason; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will make herself a calm of passion, and follow Reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not mat-

ter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body, be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

"There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness, and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

"Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

"Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal goes out of the way of death and is preserved safe and sound?

"Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!

"But then, O my friends, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been

happily quit, not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, as the soul plainly appears to be immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; which are indeed said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his pilgrimage in the other world.

"For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together for judgment, whence they go into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their due, and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path,—no guide would be wanted for that, and no one could miss a single path; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul is conscious of her situation, and follows in the path; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in

crime,—from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods, has also her own proper home.

"Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and mount such conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus, which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not unpardonable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and they

are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to receive them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged, for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those who are remarkable for having led holy lives are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.

"Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great.

"I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true—a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance,

and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these arrayed, she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison."

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON IMMORTALITY.

Best Texts on Immortality from the Old Testament as Compared with Plato's Phædo.

The three clearest extracts from the Old Testament on the Immortality of the Soul, referred to in the introductory note, are as follows:

1st.—Daniel, Chapter XII, verses 2 and 3.

"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting contempt.

"And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament: and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars forever and ever."

2nd.—Ecclesiastes, Chapter XII, verse 7.

"Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

We have used the St. James Version in both quotations, above given, but the language and ideas are substantially the same in both the Jewish and Douay versions.

3rd.—The Book of Wisdom, Douay Version, Chapter II, verses 23 and 24:

"For God created man incorruptible and to the image of his own likeness he made him."

"But by the envy of the devil death came into the world."

Chapter III, verses 1, 2, 3, 4:

"But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and the torment of death shall not touch them."

"In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die; and their departure was taken for misery."

"And their going away from us for utter destruction: but they are in peace."

"And though in the sight of men they suffered torments, their hope is full of immortality."

Chapter V, verses 15, 16 and 17:

"For the hope of the wicked is as dust, which is blown away with the wind; and as a thin froth which is dispersed by the storm; and as smoke that is scattered abroad by the wind; and as the remembrance of a guest of one day that passeth by."

"But the just shall live for evermore: and their reward is with the Lord, and the care of them with the Most High."

"Therefore shall they receive a kingdom of glory, and a crown of beauty at the hand of the Lord: for with his right hand he will cover them; and with his holy arm he will defend them."

Now it is interesting to note that the above texts are perhaps the very best and clearest that can be found anywhere in the Old Testament for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and yet these best Hebrew texts when compared to the Platonic texts already given are obviously very vague and meagre and also of much later date. Many other texts are quoted and used to prove immortality by Jews and Christians from the Psalms and from Job, Isaiah and Hosea, but they will all be found to be much more vague and meagre than the Hebrew texts now given and of very doubtful significance compared to them.

It will be now further interesting to consider the relative dates of these best Hebrew texts in comparison with that of the Platonic texts previously given. Thus Ecclesiastes, which contains the text which is probably most known and used as a proof for immortality, notwithstanding its very doubtful significance, dates only from about 180 B. C., whereas Plato's Phædo antedates it by more than two hundred years. Daniel, which contains some very good texts for immortality, dates only about 165 B. C., and Wisdom, which has some of the best and clearest texts, dates actually within the Christian Era, or about 40 A. D.*

*See "The Bible of To-Day," by John W. Chadwick.

How the Jewish people could have lived so long in a land like Egypt, which was saturated with the doctrine of immortality, without imbibing that doctrine, and how they could have left this wonderful old land pre-eminent in the doctrines of resurrection of the body and immortality of the soul, without taking these doctrines with them, is somewhat of a mystery: But the best students of the subject are, we think, now agreed that the old Hebrews had no definite knowledge or belief in these doctrines as the peoples all surrounding them had, such as the Egyptians, Persians and Greeks. At least the oldest Hebrew literature known to us, the old books of the Bible, contain no evidence of this belief in immortality, but if anything rather an indication of positive disbelief in it, as shown clearly in Job, Ecclesiastes and elsewhere, whereas the contemporary literature of the surrounding so-called pagan peoples is full of this doctrine stated in the most clear, detailed and beautiful manner possible, as we have already seen in Plato's Phædo.

Matthew Arnold, in his "Literature and Dogma" p. 68 has this to say of the status of the Old Testament on Immortality:

"An impartial criticism will hardly find in the Old Testament writers before the times of the Maccabees (and certainly not in the passage usually quoted to prove it) the set doctrine of the immortality of the soul or of the resurrection of the dead. But by the time of the Maccabees, when this passage of the book of Daniel was written, in the second century before Christ, the Jews have undoubtedly become familiar, not indeed with the idea of immortality of the soul as the philosophers like Plato conceived it, but with the notion of a resurrection of the dead to take their trial for acceptance or rejection in the Most High's judgment and Kingdom."

ECCLESIASTES, XII, 7.

"*Stranger than this is the conceit that the purpose of Ecclesiastes is to teach explicitly the doctrine of a future state. The strongest text for this position is that which has been graven as a motto over the entrance to Mount Auburn:—*

> THEN SHALL THE DUST RETURN TO THE EARTH,
> AS IT WAS: AND THE SPIRIT SHALL RETURN
> UNTO GOD WHO GAVE IT.

*But what this text asserts is just the opposite of Immortality. * * What it asserts is the absorption of the individual in God, the annihilation of all individual existence.*"

Dr. John W. Chadwick,
In "Bible of To-day."

(*See p. 133.*)

GATE OF MT. AUBURN CEMETERY,

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

With its misconceived text for Immortality

In that comprehensive little work, "The Bible of To-day," p. 140, Dr. John White Chadwick makes this scathing criticism on the generally false interpretation and application of that vague but popular text from Ecclesiastes:

"But your thorough-going apologist is never at a loss for explanations. The object of Ecclesiastes, he informs us, is to compel us to *infer* the doctrine of another life from the futility of all enjoyment here. Stranger than this is the conceit that the purpose of Ecclesiastes is to teach explicitly the doctrine of a future life. The strongest text for this position is that which has been graven as a motto over the entrance to Mount Auburn.* 'Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it.' But what this text asserts is just the opposite of immortality, as every critic knows who is not consciously or unconsciously a special pleader. What it asserts is the absorption of the individual in God, the annihilation of all individual existence. Interpreting, as we are bound to do, the more or less obscure statement, we must interpret this by Chapter III, verses 19 and 20: 'For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth so dieth the other. Yea, they have all one breath; so that a man has no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is vanity.' Read in the light of these clear-shining words, the motto of Mount Auburn is a denial of any personal immortality."

Now in view of the clear comparison here afforded between the Platonic and the Hebrew texts, it is hardly necessary to state that the Platonic texts will be found to give not only the clearest and fullest possible statement of the doctrine of personal immortality of the soul,

* A beautiful cemetery near Boston, Mass.

and its different states of future rewards and punishments, but that practically no question exists as to the meaning conveyed by these texts at any point as exists even to some extent in the best Hebrew texts. And another remarkable thing about these Platonic texts is the fact that the doctrine there stated is in substance and details substantially if not identically the same as that held by the old Pharisees of Christ's day, and by the Christians of our own times, particularly that oldest and largest section of Christians known as the Roman Church. And what is still more remarkable is that the doctrine of immortal soul, Heaven, Purgatory and Hell as now believed in by the majority of Christians is more fully and clearly set forth in this work of Plato than can be found in any part even of the New Testament itself, which was not composed until about half a millennium after the work of Plato was written.

From the clear and beautiful words of Socrates in the Phædo, it is also evident that these beliefs were not at all new with him or with his age, but were a common belief coming down from remote times, so that if anything seems clear from these facts it is the conclusion that these doctrines of the Phædo have been undoubtedly transmitted as a heritage from the great old pagan* peoples to the Jewish and Christian sects.—C. M. H.

* We use under protest this really absurd term "Pagan," and only in deference to the now almost universal Christian custom or usage. This term, originally meaning "rustic" or "villager," is supposed to describe the more ignorant, superstitious and idolatrous state of the rustic or peasant, as compared to the more rational and enlightened dweller in cities. Its general application, however, to races like the Egyptians, Chinese, Hindoos, Greeks and Romans, distinguished for their great intellectual and artistic culture and their development of city life, seems to be a most absurd usage of Christian custom, and it should have been displaced long ago by a term which would be more correct and would more fitly describe those great civilized Gentile races who have given us so much "enlightenment" in art, philosophy and religion.

NOTE ON THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY.

In referring above to the doctrine of Purgatory, that is, a probationary state of souls in the future life, which is so clearly stated in the Phædo, we cannot let this occasion pass without an explanatory note to show the relation of this great old Egyptian and Greek doctrine to the doctrine now prevailing in the Christian Church.

The first Christians must of course be regarded as truly a sect of the Jews, and this sect arose at a time when the Jews had been most surrounded and influenced by the pagan civilizations of Persia, Greece and Rome, and it also must not be forgotton that the great Jewish sect of the Pharisees, which preceded the sect of Christians, notwithstanding their severe denunciation by Christ, were closely related to the early Christians in many ways, and especially in the fact that both held almost exactly the same belief as to immortality of the soul and its future states in Heaven, Purgatory or Hell.* Hence the belief of the old Pharisee as to the soul and its future, was not only almost the same as that of the early Christians, but substantially the same as that of the Roman Church of to-day, and this, as we have already

* It has been suggested that the true derivation of "Pharisee" is from "Parsee," meaning the doctrine of the Parsees or Persians who believed in immortality, resurrection, good and evil spirits, etc., and who influenced the formation of this great Jewish sect to which both Christ and St. Paul belonged.

indicated, was not substantially different from the common belief held in the Greek-Roman world at the time of Christ and substantially identical with the belief of the old Greeks and Egyptians extending back to almost prehistoric times.

While we are at this point, it might be well to refer to "The Apostles Creed" for a moment, and note the old Greek or Socratic doctrine it contains:—"He descended into Hell, the third day He rose again from the dead; He ascended into Heaven." Now the Church takes pains to explain that the "Hell" here referred to is not the Hell of the damned, but the "limbo" or preparatory prison in which the redeemed souls are held previous to their release and ascent to Heaven: How this corresponds to the "Hades" or "Under World" of the old Egyptians and Greeks and to the "earthly prison" described by Socrates in the Phædo, to which the soul after the death of the body first "descends," and to the "pure home which is above," to which the soul afterwards "ascends" and to "mansions fairer," etc., is obvious and needs no further remark. Note also how the "seventh heaven" of which that Greek-Christian-Jew, Paul, had a vision which he could not even describe, corresponds to what Socrates hinted at. Notwithstanding therefore the peculiar and fallacious repugnance which the average Protestant displays to the doctrine of purgatory as being in his mind unscriptural, unhistoric and immoral, a little investigation and reflection will show that it is neither one nor the other, but is in fact a very old and respectable and morally comforting doctrine and made trebly so by its undoubted prevalence among ancient Jews and Christians, and above all among the ancient, ethical pagans — Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, who undoubtedly transmitted it to the Jews and

Christians. The modern Protestant is beginning at last to fully recognize and appreciate this point, that is, the morality, antiquity and orthodoxy of the doctrine of purgatory or a probationary state of future life, as is shown in such works as "Our Life After Death" by Rev. Arthur Chambers, (Philadelphia, Geo. W. Jacobs & Co.) which is a great Protestant plea for the soundness of the doctrine of Purgatory from an ethical, historic and Christian standpoint.—C. M. H.

REINCARNATION.

From Plato's Phaedrus.

And there is a law of the goddess Retribution, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with the god is preserved from harm until the next period, and he who always attains is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the vision of truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her feathers fall from her and she drops to earth, then the law ordains that this soul shall in the first generation pass, not into that of any other animal, but only of man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher or artist, or musician or lover; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be a righteous king or warrior or lord; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician or economist or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils or a physician; the fifth a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth a poet or imitator will be appropriate; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a Sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant; all these are states of probation, in

which he who lives righteously improves, and he who lives unrighteously deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not without philosophy, may acquire wings in the third recurring period of a thousand years; and if they choose this life three times in succession, then they have their wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to cast lots and choose their second life, and they may take any that they like. And then the soul of the man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast again into the man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form, for man ought to have intelligence, as they say, "secundum speciem," proceeding from many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw when in company with God—when looking down from above on that which we now call being and upwards towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just; for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He

is what he is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

MIND INHERES IN AND RULES THE UNIVERSE.

From Plato's Philebus.

Socrates. I must obey you, O Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but have I really, as Philebus says, disconcerted you with my playful solemnity, in asking the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?

Yet the answer is easy, as all philosophers are agreed that mind is the king of heaven and earth; in this way truly they magnify themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of an irrational and random chance, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvelous intelligence and wisdom.

Shall we, then, agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine,—nor merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves,—but shall we venture also to share in the risk, and bear the reproaches which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

We see the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, "Land ahead," in the constitution of the world.

Consider now that any one of the elements, as they exist in us, is but a small fraction of them, and of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is a fire within us, and in the universe.

And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has?

And is that universal element nourished and generated and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?

PRO. That is a question that does not deserve an answer.

SOC. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?

PRO. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?

SOC. I do not think that he could,—but now go a step further; when we see those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, do we not call them a body?

And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered as a body, because made up of the same elements.

But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?

May our body be said to have a soul?

And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements

similar and fairer far, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

Why yes, Protarchus, for surely we cannot imagine that of the four elements, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause or fourth element, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize,—that this last, I say, should be called by all the names of wisdom, and not imagine that while the other elements equally exist in a larger form, both in the entire heaven, and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, in this higher sphere the cause which is the noblest and fairest of all natures has still no existence?

But if that is not true, should we not be wiser in assenting to that other argument, which says, as we have often repeated, that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, as well as a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

PRO. Certainly not.

SOC. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, and that the power of the cause engenders this? And other gods will have other noble attributes, whereby they love severally to be called.

PRO. Very true.

SOC. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

THE GREEK CONCEPTION OF SOUL AND DEITY.

From Plato's "Phaedrus."

"The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever in motion; but that which moves and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Therefore, only that which is self-moving, never failing of self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning, but the beginning has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of something, that would have no beginning. But that, which is unbegotten must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, or anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, for in that case the whole heavens and all generation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, and this is involved in the nature of the soul. But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then must she also be without beginning, and immortal. Enough of the soul's immortality."

THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.

From Plato's Laws, Book X.

Athenian. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin; they do not know that she is among the first of bodies, and before them all, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity before those which appertain to the body?

Cleinias. But why is the word "nature" wrong?

Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to have a natural or creative power: and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.

Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, but not to move itself,—that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution, and generation and destruction,—that is also one of the many kinds of motion.

Then we must say that self-motion being the origin and beginning of motion, as well among things at rest as among things in motion, is the eldest and might-

iest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

And what is the definition of that which is named "soul?" Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given—the motion which is self-moved?

Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has been, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul which is the ruler?

In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

CLE. Certainly.

ATH. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things moving every way, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

CLE. Of course.

ATH. One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of evil.*

*NOTE.—By referring to Aristotle's idea of God as given on page 182, it will be seen that he has substantially the same conception as above given in the two preceding extracts from Plato, viz. a Motion which is self-moved or a Prime Mover which is self-moved. Plato applies this conception to describe the "Soul" in general, while Aristotle applies it to describe God in particular, but of course the "Universal Soul" or the "Soul of the Universe," as meant by Plato, is only another name for "God"—and Aristotle doubtless got his conception from this source.—C. M. H.

THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.

From Plato's "Theaetetus" and "The Republic."

Note:—The English word "idea" does not adequately express what Plato meant by the Greek term of which it is a translation. Associations and implications connected with the development of the philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and perhaps German Idealism generally, give the word a meaning that conceals the Platonic import altogether. The Platonic "idea" was the equivalent of the *permanent* or "universal" as opposed to the *transient* or "individual." It appears throughout his system in various forms and is variously represented in modern conceptions by the terms "reality," "substance," "universal," "essence," "subject," "absolute," "ultimate," "God," etc. It is not easy to select passages from his works clearly representative of its wide meaning, as it did duty for the fields of both metaphysic and the theory of knowledge. It is most clearly developed in the Theaetetus, at least for its place in the theory of knowledge. In the Phædrus it is mythically treated. I select a passage from the former dialogue as perhaps the best from which to choose. Plato, as philosophers generally, starts with sensations as the primordial elements of knowledge and

proceeds to the discovery of supersensible mental states which have as their objects the permanent in phenomena.—J. H. H.

"SOCRATES. The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

"THEAETETUS. Assuredly.

"SOC. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

"THEAET. Impossible.

"SOC. And can he who misses the truth of anything have a knowledge of that thing?

"THEAET. He cannot.

"SOC. Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be obtained?

"THEAET. Clearly.

"SOC. And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

"THEAET. That will not be right.

"SOC. And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

"THEAET. I should call all that perceiving—what other name could be given them?

"SOC. Perception would be the collective name of them?

"THEAET. Certainly.

"Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

"Theaet. Certainly not.

"Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science and knowledge?

"Theaet. No.

"Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

"Theaet. That is evident, Socrates; and knowledge is now most clearly proved to be different from perception.

"Soc. But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is, than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being."

Note:—In further discussing the question whether "knowledge" coincided with "true opinion" Plato advances to the examination of definition as the determinant of the former. He now makes Socrates start the inquiry.—J. H. H.

"Soc. Knowledge is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

"Theaet. Yes.

"Soc. In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a wagon; but he who can describe the essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a wagon,

in that he attains to a knowledge of the whole through the elements.

"THEAET. Is not that your view, Socrates?

"SOC. I want to know what is your view, my friend, and whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables (elements) or larger combinations of them to be irrational; I should like to know whether this is your view, that we may examine it?

"THEAET. That is quite my view.

"SOC. Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge who thinks that the same attribute belongs at one time to one thing, and at another time to another thing, or that the same thing has different attributes at different times?

"THEAT. Assuredly not.

"SOC. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.

"THEAET. That seems to be true.

"SOC. But what have we gained? For this perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. And yet perhaps we had better not say that at present, for very likely there may be found some one who will prefer the third of the three explanations of the definition of knowledge, one of which, as we said, must be adopted by the definer.

"THEAET. You are right in reminding me of that; for there is still one remaining: the first was the image or expression of the mind in sound; and that which has just been mentioned is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. What is the third way?

"Soc. There is further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

"Theaet. Can you give me an example of such a definition?

"Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you need only know that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolves about the earth.

"Theaet. Certainly.

"Soc. Understand why I say this: the reason is, as I was saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons say, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but will you lay hold of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

"Theaet. I understand, and am of the opinion that you are quite right in calling that a definition.

"Soc. But he, who having a right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things, will know that of which before he had only had an opinion.

"Theaet. That is what we are maintaining.

"Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed in the picture, which at the distance was not so bad.

"Theaet. What do you mean?

"Soc. I will endeavor to explain: I will suppose myself to have a true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

"Theaet. Yes.

"Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

"Theaet. True.

"Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics?

"Theaet. I suppose not.

"Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

"Theaet. True.

"Soc. Tell me, now; how in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I knew Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every member complete: how could that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some other unknown barbarian?

"Theaet. Very true.

"Soc. Or if I had further known you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and of others who resemble me?

"Theaet. Certainly not.

"Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until the distinction between your snub-nosedness and the snub-nosedness of others, as well as the other peculiarities which distinguish you, have stamped their memorial on my mind, so that when I meet you tomorrow the right impression may be recalled?

"Theaet. Most true.

"Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

"Theaet. That is evident.

"Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is that we

should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

"THEAET. How so?

"SOC. We are required to have a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we already have a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round; the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory engine, in the same circles, is nothing to us; and we may be truly described as the blind leading the blind; for to bid us add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is a rare sort of darkness.

"THEAET. Tell me, then; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

"SOC. If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of adding the definition, had used the word 'to know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the best of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to get knowledge.

"THEAET. True.

"SOC. Then when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is the explanation or definition to be added.

"THEAET. That seems to be true.

"SOC. But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything. And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying true opinion?

"THEAET. I suppose not.

"Soc. And are you still in labor and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?

"Theaet. I am sure, Socrates, that you have brought a good deal more out of me than was ever in me.

"Soc. And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

"Theaet. Very true.

"Soc. But if, Theatetus, you have, or wish to have, any more embryo thoughts, they will be all the better for the present investigation, and if you have none, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know, or have known, in this, or former ages. The office of a mid-wife, I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, and I deliver men; but they must be young, and noble, and fair."

(Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus. Jowett Trans.)

Note:—There is a passage on dialectic in the Republic which obtains its interest from its alliance with the doctrine of Ideas, and which I here quote as follows:—J. H. H.

"Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold, not an image only, but the absolute truth, but that something like this is the truth I am confident.

"Certainly, he replied.

"And further, I must tell you that the power of

dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

"Of that too, he said, you may be confident.

"And no one, I said, will argue that there is any other process or way of comprehending all true existence; for the arts in general are referable to the wants or opinions of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and construction, or for the care of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical arts which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use undisturbed, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such an arbitrary agreement will ever become science?

"Impossible, he said.

"Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes to a principle, and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to establish them; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in some outlandish slough, is by her taught to look upwards; and she uses as handmaids, in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But there is no use in our disputing about names when we have realities of such importance to consider.

"No, he said, any name will do which expresses the thought clearly.

"At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four

divisions, two for intellect and two for opinion; and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth knowledge of shadows: opinion being concerned with generation, and intellect with true being; and then to make a proportion:—as being is to generation, so is pure intellect to opinion: and, as science is to belief, so is understanding to knowledge of shadows.

"But let us leave the further distribution and division of the objects of opinion and of intellect, which will be a long inquiry many times longer than this has been.

"As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

"And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who has a conception of the essence of each thing? And may he who is unable to acquire and impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit that?

"Yes, he said; how can I deny that?

"And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until a person is able to abstract and define the idea of the good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to true existence, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither absolute good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, which is given by opinion and not by knowledge; dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake, here he arrives at the world below, and finally has his quietus."

Plato's Republic, Book VII. (Jowett's Trans.)

THE SOCRATIC UTILITARIAN THEORY OF ETHICS.

Brief:—Pleasure is essentially *Good*, and *Pain* essentially *Evil*. Virtue is simply the right choice of pleasures and pains, and for this right choice "knowledge" or "wisdom" is necessary. Hence *Virtue*, in the last analysis, is essentially *knowledge* or *wisdom*, and *vice* essentially *ignorance* or foolishness.—See Supplementary Notes at end of extract.—C. M. H.

From Dialogue of Socrates with Protagoras, in Plato's "Protagoras."

"You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

"He agreed to this.

"And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

"He does not.

"But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, don't you think that in that case he will have lived well?

"I do.

"Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

"Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honorable.

"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

"I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the rest of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.

"And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

"Certainly, he said.

"Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.

"According to your favorite mode of speech, Socrates, let us inquire about this, he said; and if the result of the inquiry is to show that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.

"Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in

him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

"I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only that but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

"Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons of whom I have asked the reason of this have said, that those who did thus were overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was now mentioning.

"Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

"Suppose, then, that you and I endeavor to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection, which is called by them being overcome by pleasure, and which, as they declare, is the reason why they know the better and choose the worse. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would reply; Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be described as being overcome by pleasure, what is it, and how do you call it? Tell us that.

"When men are overcome by eating and drinking

and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, is not that what you would call being overcome by pleasure? That they will admit. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: In what way do you say that they are evil,—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature? Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?

"I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would give that answer.

"And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain; they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

"Protagoras assented.

"Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures?—that again they would admit.

"We both of us thought that they would.

"And that I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises and military services, and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?—they would assent to that?

"He agreed.

"And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states, and empires, and wealth?—they would agree to that, if I am not mistaken?

"He assented.

"Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?—they would acknowledge that they were not?

"I think that they would, said Protagoras.

"And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?

"He assented.

"Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good; and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes greater pain than the pleasures which it has. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.

"I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

"And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains; for I say that if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.

"That is true, said Protagoras.

"Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject? Excuse me, friends, I should reply;

but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure;' and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. But I suppose that you are satisfied at having a life of pleasure which is without pain. And if you are satisfied, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences.—If this is true, then I say that the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and amazed by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. Now that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names,—first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the inquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply, 'By pleasure,' for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. 'By what?' he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil? And in answer to that

we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy: for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But how, he will reply, can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome,—what do you mean, he will say, but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good? This being the case, let us now substitute the names of pleasure and pain, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. And what measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says, 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain,'—to that I should reply: And do they differ in any other way except by reason of pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skillful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, near and distant, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other? If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you, of course, take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near, or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would

you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.

"He agreed with me.

"Now supposing that happiness consisted in making and taking large things, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would the art of measuring be the saving principle, or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things, great and small? But the art of measurement is that which would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this is the art of measurement?

"Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

"Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when men ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will acknowledge that, will they not?

"Protagoras admitted that they would.

"Well, then, I say to them, my friends; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a

consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?

"That is undeniably true.

"And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?

"They will agree to that.

"The nature of that art or science, will be a matter of future consideration; the demonstration of the existence of such a science is a sufficient answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you said: O Protagoras and Socrates, if this state is not to be called being overcome by pleasure, tell us what it is; what would you call it? If we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance," you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure,—ignorance, and that the greatest.

"Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil?

"Are not all actions, the tendency of which is to make

life painless and pleasant, honorable and useful? The honorable work is also useful and good?

"This was admitted.

"Then, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

"They all assented.

"And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

"To that they also unanimously assented.

"Then, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he might have the less.

"All of us agreed to every word of this.

"My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the relations of virtue and the essential nature of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying, that virtue can be taught—would also have become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now in the attempt to show that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other

than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to show, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you, Socrates, are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to show that it is anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught"

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

Socrates the Father of Modern or Utilitarian Ethics.

The preceding extract from the dialogue of Socrates with Protagoras, should have great interest for students of ethics, as it presents in probably the earliest and most complete form the great modern theory of ethics known as the Utilitarian and Spencerian theory, which is, as may be here seen, simply a revival of one of the old Greek schools of ethics. This theory, that pleasure is essentially good and pain essentially evil, has probably no better and clearer statement anywhere than in this extract from Socrates recorded by Plato about 400 B. C. The same theory was later used with modifications by Aristotle, 350 B. C., who copied many ideas from Plato and Socrates, and will be found freely in Aristotle's Ethics, as shown in the extracts given farther on, where he distinctly teaches that Virtue is that course of conduct which secures or leads to a beneficent final result or "end" which is desirable in itself as such *final end* and not merely as a "means" to something else. Hence he distinctly states that "The *best* of all things must be something *final*," and that "Happiness or welfare seems more than anything else to answer to this description,

EPICURUS, the much maligned and misunderstood "Philosopher of the Garden," was a great advocate of the moderate and simple life, and, after Socrates, one of the clearest exponents of the true rational theory of Pleasure—the modern utilitarian or "Spencerian" theory of ethics. He was a Deist in religion, but a disbeliever in immortality, a consistent rationalist and materialist in general thought, and a great exponent of the "atomic" theory of matter in a Universe governed by fixed laws.

GIST OF EPICUREAN ETHICS.

"*Yet some there are, who, with great flourishes, have so discoursed against pleasure itself, as if it were something ill in its own nature, and consequently not appertaining to wisdom and felicity.*"

"*When, therefore, we say in general terms, pleasure is the end of happy life, we are far from meaning the pleasures of luxurious persons, or of others, as some, either through ignorance, dissent, or ill will, interpret. We mean no more but this—Not pained in body nor troubled in mind.*"

"*For it is not perpetual feasting and drinking, not the conversation of beautiful women; not rarities of fish, nor any dainties of a profuse table, that make a happy life; but reason, with sobriety and a serene mind.*"

"*Concerning Temperance, we must first observe that it is desired not for its own sake, but for that it procureth pleasure, that is, brings peace to the minds of men, pleasing and soothing them with a kind of concord.*"

"*Hence it is understood that Temperance is to be desired, not for that it avoids some pleasures, but because he who refrains from them declines troubles, which being avoided he obtains greater pleasures. Which it so doth that the action becomes honest and decent, and we may clearly understand that the same men may be lovers both of pleasure and of decency.*"



EPICURUS.

B. C. 300.

From bust in Museo Capitolino, Rome.

for we always choose it for itself and never for the sake of something else." After Aristotle, Epicurus (about 300 B. C.) fully adopted and clearly taught this doctrine, which, therefore, also came to be called the "Epicurean" theory, and under that name has been probably the most maligned and misunderstood theory that has ever been held in the history of ethics, particularly during the Christian era and among Christian peoples, where it has been persistently misrepresented or misunderstood. Thus the term "Epicure" or "Epicurean" has come to mean in a gross sense a mere glutton or sensualist, and in a more exact sense a person of most elaborate and refined tastes in sensuous delights and indulgences: And Epicureanism is regarded as a system of moral philosophy which simply places "virtue" or "good" as consisting essentially in a life of mere pleasure or sensuous indulgence. The truth is, however, that Epicurus was a man of the greatest simplicity and moderation—the "philosopher of the Garden"—who boasted of his ability to live on the simple products of his own little field, of the entire sufficiency of "barley cakes and water" for all the needs of life, and on his capacity to properly live on a mere "obolus"—one cent—a day! Not only this, he denounced in the clearest terms a life of so-called "pleasure" or sensuous indulgence and showed that this was the very course best calculated to produce an overplus of pain and prevent the attainment of the truly happy life with the overplus or true balance of pleasure, and the minimum of pain which temperance and right living inevitably bring.

In order to clearly show what this true Epicureanism is, and how it follows on the lines laid down by Socrates and Aristotle, we will here quote a few paragraphs from the ethics of Epicurus:

"For the end of life, by the tacit consent of all men, is felicity.

"Therefore, before we inquire whether felicity really consists in pleasure, we must show, that pleasure is in its own nature good, as its contrary, pain, is in its own nature ill.

"There needs not therefore any reasoning to prove, that pleasure is to be desired, pain to be shunned; for this is manifest to our sense, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet. We need no arguments to prove this, it is enough that we give notice of it.

"First, therefore, we must consider of felicity no otherwise than as of health; it being manifest, that the state, in which the mind is free from perturbation, the body from pain, is no other than the perfect health of the whole man.

"Yet some there are, who, with great flourishes, have so discoursed against pleasure itself, as if it were something ill in its own nature, and consequently not appertaining to wisdom and felicity.

"When, therefore, we say in general terms, pleasure is the end of happy life, we are far from meaning the pleasures of luxurious persons, or of others, as some, either through ignorance, dissent, or ill will, interpret. We mean no more but this, (to repeat it once more) Not pained in body, nor troubled in mind.

"For it is not perpetual feasting and drinking; not the conversation of beautiful women; not rarities of fish, nor any other dainties of a profuse table, that make a happy life; but reason, with sobriety, and a serene mind.

"Others condemn, and exclaim on us, for affirming, that the virtues are of such a nature, as that they conduce to pleasure or felicity, as if we meant that pleasure which is obscene and infamous, but let them rail as they

please. For as they make virtue the chief good, so do we. But if the discourse be of living happily, or felicity, why should not this be a good superior to virtue, to the attainment whereof virtue itself is but subservient?

"For while nature is our guide, whatsoever we do tends to this, that we neither be pained in body nor troubled in mind; and as soon as we have attained this, all disturbances of the mind are quieted, and there is nothing beyond it that we can aim at to complete the good, both of our soul and body; for that absolute good of human nature is contained in the peace of the soul and the body.

"Hence is manifest, when I formerly said, A sober or well ordered reason procures a pleasant and happy life; we are to understand, that it procures it by means of the virtues which it ingenerates and preserves.

"By this you find why I conceive, that the virtues are connatural to a happy life, and that it is impossible to separate happy life from them. All other things, as being frail and mortal, are transitory, separable from true and constant pleasure; only virtue, as being a perpetual and immortal good, is inseparable from it."

(From History of Philosophy, by Thos. Stanley, London, 1701).

Now a little consideration will show that what Aristotle meant by the *final end*, "happiness" or "welfare" is exactly what Socrates before him and Epicurus after him meant by "pleasure." And in the last analysis it will be found, we think, to be an irrefutable proposition that "pleasure" is the essence of what we call "happiness" or well-being, and "pain" the essence of what we term unhappiness or ill-being, as demonstrated in the cogent reasonings of Socrates with Protagoras twenty-

four centuries ago in the clear and simple argument of that great rationalist, Epicurus, two centuries later, no less than in the almost identical and unanswerable reasonings of that great Socratic and Epicurean rationalist of our own day—Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics.

But opponents of this great ancient and modern school of rational ethics will persist in misunderstanding and misapplying this great decisive term "pleasure" as the true test of the final rightness of conduct, and one of the first men responsible for bringing about this confusion was probably the first great "Hedonist," Aristippus, a pupil of Socrates, who grossly misapplied the Socratic ethical theory that "pleasure" was the only good and pain the only evil, to mean merely the *initial* or *immediate* pleasure of an act, without any regard to the *ultimate, final* or *actual* pleasure when all the results and consequences of the initial act had been duly allowed for and adjusted. This is the great error of the so-called "Hedonistic school" which has too long been mistaken for the true "Epicurean" or utilitarian school. Hence, when the term "pleasure" is used in a philosophical, ethical sense, it will be obvious that it must be understood not only in the *positive* form, but also, and even much more so, in the *negative* form, that is, in *absence from pain* or disturbance, "not pained in body nor troubled in mind" as Epicurus says, for it is undeniable that this negative form of pleasure, the mere tranquil quiescent state, free from pain, which a state of normal simple health gives, is absolutely the chief and greatest element of a normal, moral, happy or well adjusted life, and not mere tense, positive pleasures, gratifications or indulgences. And in this logical view of the matter we can therefore readily recognize the real soundness of the great Socratic theory that "knowledge" or "*wisdom*" is

ARISTIPPUS might probably be called the original "Hedonist," the perverter of the Socratic doctrine of "Pleasure" as the greatest good, and the exponent of the voluptuous theory of ethics, which afterwards came to be incorrectly called "Epicureanism," but which was really a false Epicureanism. True Epicureanism is the doctrine of rational moderation resulting not in the greatest immediate delight but in the greatest ultimate utility or final permanent pleasure. (*See p. 169, &c.*

SKETCH OF ARISTIPPUS.

From Stanley's History of Philosophy.

From Cyrene Aristippus went first to Athens, invited by the fame of Socrates, concerning whom he fell into discourse with Ischomachus, meeting him casually at the Olympic Games, and inquiring what disputes they were wherewith Socrates prevailed so much upon the young men, he received from him some little seeds and scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, till, to assuage his fervent thirst, he took a voyage to Athens, and there drunk at the fountain, satisfying himself with the person, his discourse and philosophy, the end whereof was to know our evils and to acquit ourselves of them. Aristotle said, philosophy doth harm to those who misinterpret things well said. Aristippus chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous disputes of Socrates, asserted pleasure to be the ultimate end wherein all happiness doth consist.

His life was agreeable to the opinion, which he employed in luxury, sweet unguents, rich garments, wine and women; maintained by a course as different from the precepts and practice of Socrates as the things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good estate (and three country seats) he first of the Socratic disciples took money for teaching. Which Socrates observing, asked him how he came to have so much. He replied, "How came you to have so little?" A further dislike of this course Socrates expressed, when Aristippus sending him twenty minæ, he returned it, saying, his Dæmon would not suffer him to take it.

ARISTIPPUS

THE "HEDONIST" OR FALSE EPICUREAN.

the essence of virtue, and that a true resultant in actual final pleasure or happiness is the test of what is virtuous, for it is obvious that a true wisdom or knowledge of causes and effects is necessary to determine how to abstain and how to indulge so as to result in the highest degree of ultimate pleasure or happiness, positive or negative.

The neglect, therefore, to duly weigh and consider this aspect of *negative pleasure* and to regard the relation of *initial* and *ultimate pleasure* in striking a true resultant or balance, will be found to be one of the great errors which the critics of the utilitarian theory of ethics constantly fall into, and it is time that this error was abandoned by ethical reasoners, for we think that if "pleasure" be considered both in the positive and negative aspects, and in the broad sense, and the adjustment made between initial and ultimate pleasures, and a true balance struck, then the dicta of Socratic-Epicurean or Utilitarian ethics, that conduct is good or bad simply because it tends to produce pleasure or pain, happiness or unhappiness, welfare or injury, is simply impregnable, ethically, logically and philosophically, and the opposite theory that regards "virtue" itself as the "end" of ethics, and not "health," "pleasure," "happiness" or "welfare," is clearly irrational and a *reductio ad absurdum* as it is simply preferring the "means" to the "end."

A most interesting point, however, to be noted, just at this connection, is that not only is the modern utilitarian theory of ethics found stated in the teachings of Socrates in the most clear and positive manner, as above shown, but the distinctions here pointed out of the necessity of making a true adjustment of all the consequences or results of the act, for pain or pleasure, to strike the true resultant or actual balance of pleasure

which must determine the real character of the act as "good" or "virtuous," is also as clearly set forth by that "Wizard of Conversation," the great old Socrates—the real father of modern rational ethics. Let us therefore, here juxtapose a few telling paragraphs from the dialogue of Socrates, and we will readily see how clearly these points and distinctions are brought out:

"Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good; and even pleasure you deem an evil when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes greater pain than the pleasures which it has: If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.

"Would they still be evil if they had no attendant evil consequences simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature? Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like.

"And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has or gives pleasures greater than the pains; for I say that if you have some standards other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.

"If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you, of course, take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant, and you avoid that course of action in which the

pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.

"But now in laughing at us you will be laughing at yourselves, for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge, and you admitted further that they err not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring.

"Then I should say to them in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason except that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures?

"And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because afterwards they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states, and empires, and wealth?

"Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?"

Note again how the clear-thinking Epicurus voices the Socratic theory of the true ethics of pleasure in his discourse on "Temperance:"—

"Concerning Temperance we must first observe that it is desired not for its own sake but for that it procureth pleasure, that is, brings peace to the minds of men, pleasing and soothing them with a kind of concord.

"But most men not able to hold and keep to what they have resolved on, being vanquished and debilitated by the appearance of present pleasure, resign themselves to the fetters of lust, not foreseeing what will follow. But

they who enjoy pleasures so that no pain shall ensue, and who preserve their judgment constant, nor are overcome by pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done, these men obtain the greatest pleasure by pretermitting pleasure: They also many times suffer some pain to prevent falling into greater.

"Hence it is understood that Temperance is to be desired, not for that it avoids some pleasures, but because he who refrains from them declines troubles, which being avoided he obtains greater pleasures. Which it so doth that the action becomes honest and decent and we may clearly understand that the same men may be lovers both of pleasure and of decency."

(History of Philosophy, Thos. Stanley, London, 1701.)

Now it only remains to be shown how identical is the standpoint of Herbert Spencer in his Data of Ethics with that of Socrates in his dialogue with Protagoras, and how absolutely similar the arguments and challenges are in both cases, to demonstrate the truth of the statement in Prof. Hyslop's lecture that the ethical philosophy of the Socratic period is identical with modern evolutionary philosophy, and this is particularly true of the Socratic school itself, as shown by Socrates, Aristotle and Epicurus, in the extracts already given.

Let us, therefore, now compare a few test paragraphs from Spencer's Data of Ethics with the paragraphs just quoted from Socrates and Epicurus, and we will see that the identity of thought is absolute:—

"Thus there is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are in-

THE VOLUPTUOUS (?) "PLEASURES" OF THE REAL EPICURUS.

"*For my part, when I eat coarse bread and drink water, or sometimes augment my commons with a little Cytheridian Cheese, (when I have a mind to feast extraordinarily), I take great delight in it, and bid defiance to those pleasures which accompany the usual magnificence of feasts; so that if I have but bread, or barley-cakes and water, I am furnished to content even with Jove himself in point of felicity.*"

"*For my part, truly (that I may with modesty instance myself) I am content, and highly pleased with the plants and fruits of my own little gardens; and will, that this inscription be set over the Gate, Stranger, here you may stay; here the Supreme Good is pleasure; the Master of this little house is hospitable, friendly, and will entertain you with polenta, and afford you water plentifully, and will ask you, how you like your entertainment? These little Gardens invite not hunger, but satisfy it; nor increase thirst with drinks, but extinguish it with the natural and pleasant remedy.*"

"*In this pleasure I have grown old, finding by account, that my diet amounts not fully to an obolus a day, and yet some days there are, in which I abate somewhat even of that, to make trial, whether I want any thing of full and perfect pleasure, or how much, and whether it be worth great labour.*"

("Polenta"—a thick cereal mush; "obolus"—one cent.)

EPICURUS IN HIS GARDEN.

From Stanley's History.

evitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.

"Omitting people of this class (Devil Worshippers), if there are any, as beyond or beneath argument, we find that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the final justification for maintaining life, can only be the reception from it of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling; and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve life or hinder life, only on this supposition.

"Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced forms of good and bad conduct, we find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere.

"Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could still be thought of as virtues though thus productive of misery, it must be admitted that the conceptions of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct; and that as this holds of all the virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from their conducivness to happiness that they come to be classed as virtues.

"So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."

Now we think it will be readily admitted on comparison that the point of view and the argument of the old Greek thinkers could not be any nearer to that of our

modern rationalists, unless the very words themselves were identical. Note, for example, how alike are the concluding keynotes in both Socrates and Spencer. Thus Socrates asks twenty-four centuries ago, "Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?" And Spencer thus agrees with and answers Socrates over a gap of twenty-four centuries as follows:—"We find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasure or pain somewhere. It must be admitted that the conceptions of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct. So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name, gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception."

Thus we find an absolute unity in the basic ethical philosophy of the greatest thinkers among the highest civilizations of the past with the teachings of the greatest scientific moralists of our own day, and this fact should certainly lead us to give more honor and credit to these grand old ethical "pagans" than they generally get in popular estimation, and it should also increase our respect for the modern evolutionary and utilitarian school of ethics as being not only natural and rational, but simple and practical, and combining the dicta of a consensus of some of the greatest moral intellects in past and present times.—C. M. H.

HERBERT SPENCER. Born at Derby, England, April 27, 1820. The great modern exponent of Evolution and the Utilitarian Theory of Ethics. The oldest living philosopher and the greatest rationalistic thinker of the nineteenth century—the Socrates, Aristotle and Epicurus of our day.

GIST OF SPENCERIAN ETHICS, A. D., 1893.

Thus there is no escape from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.

Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced forms of good and bad conduct, we find it unquestionable that our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate from our consciousness of the certainty or probability that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere.

Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could still be thought of as virtues though thus productive of misery, it must be admitted that the conceptions of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happiness-producing conduct; and that as this holds of all the virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from their conduciveness to happiness that they come to be classed as virtues.

So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition.

Spencer's Data of Ethics, Edition 1897.



HERBERT SPENCER.

From a photograph presented by Mr. Spencer to Dr. Lewis G. Janes.

SOCRATES AND THEISTIC ETHICS.

The chief opponent of the Socratic-Epicurean or Utilitarian School of Ethics, has always been, as it now is, what may be termed the "Theistic School of Ethics." And by "Theistic" we mean that school—under whatever religious or denominational name it may assume from time to time in the world's history—which holds that the true standard and motive for human conduct is accordance with the "Will of God" or that course of conduct in man which may be held to harmonize with the "pleasure" or "desire" of the Infinite and contribute primarily or essentially to the "honor" and "glory" of God, and not primarily and essentially to the pleasure, welfare or utility of *man.*

As, however, the Theistic School of Ethics is essentially religious and dogmatic in its character and origin, it cannot be expected to show to logical or philosophic advantage with that humane utilitarian system which, as we have shown, has been developed rationally from a natural and logical basis by some of the greatest and most reverent minds of the world in past and present times, and who have thereby placed ethics on a rational, natural and self-commending basis as distinct from the purely arbitrary and dogmatic ground of Theistic Schools. And it is very interesting to here note that our old friend,

Socrates, who we have already found to be the real father of the modern utilitarian school of rational ethics, was yet one of the greatest Theists among the Pagan philosophers, and in many features of his religious belief, as we have already shown, very closely approached the belief of the Jew and Christian of apostolic days. And yet, again, this great philosophic and religious Socrates —the almost Christian Pagan—saw nothing derogatory to his Theistic conception of God and the government of the Universe in founding the true motive-basis of ethics or good conduct in man on the ground primarily and essentially of benefit, utility, pleasure, happiness, or welfare, to man himself and not primarily on the "will," "pleasure," "honor," or "glory" of God as in the purely Theistic system of ethics formulated both before and since the days of Socrates.

Now to found the motive-basis for good conduct in man on the ground primarily of "benefit" to an "Infinite and All-Perfect Being," instead of primarily on benefit to man himself, would to the logical and rational utilitarian seem not only extravagant and essentially irreverent and absurd, but as a vain and childish attempt to patronize the Infinite. For, obviously, "The Infinite" stands in no need of "benefits" from man, but man does very much need the great benefits which right conduct can confer upon himself. Hence it is reverently believed that there can be no higher, more sane, or more practical ground for human ethics than that of "enlightened self-interest" for one's-self and one's neighbor on the great lines of Prudence, Justice and Fortitude, which form the trinity of practical Virtue.

Not only do the greatest philosophers of the Greek and Roman civilizations agree with the ethics of our modern rationalists as already shown, but it is further

interesting to note that a still more ancient and extensive rational school—the Confucianists of China—is also in full accord with them. Thus the Chinese Sages teach these clear utilitarian doctrines:

"The senses and the mind are what Heaven has given us. To preserve our mental constitution and nourish our nature is the way to serve Heaven."

"To give one's-self earnestly to the duties due to men, and while respecting spiritual beings to keep aloof from them, may be called Wisdom."

"The doctrine of our Master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others—this and nothing more."*

Now the foregoing texts give us a pure utilitarianism in the Chinese form which is as true and rational in tone as anything expressed by Socrates, Epicurus or Herbert Spencer, and when taken in connection with what we have quoted from the Greek Philosophers, proves how wide and deep is the philosophic support for the utilitarian theory in ancient as well as in modern thought.

Even that great old ethical Hebrew, the prophet Micah, who was almost contemporary with Confucius, may be claimed also as a true utilitarian in Ethics, as is shown in that grand little verse which may be said to be one of the purest pieces of ethics in the Old Testament:

"What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly."† In this we have a purely ethical creed, sufficient for the regulation of any life—Justice, Kindness, Simplicity and Reasonableness—and it is purely utilitarian, as it concerns itself primarily and directly with benefit to man.—C. M. H.

*See Legge's Chinese Classics, and Prof. James' Ethics of Chinese Sages.
†Micah, VI. 8. King James Version.

ARISTOTLE ON THE IDEA OF GOD.

Note:—This extract is taken from Aristotle's Metaphysics.

After having presented the arguments for the existence of God as the first cause of the world's order, Aristotle proceeds to describe His nature more definitely in a separate chapter. The argument consists in the necessity of a prime mover as the condition of the world's motion which is supposed to be circular.—J. H. H.

"Since this is the fact of the case, and since, if it is not so, the world must have originated from chaos and nothing, which difficulties are removed by the above supposition, there exists something which never ceases to move and which moves in a circle. This is evident, both from reason and from the facts of observation. Consequently the first heaven is eternal and there exists something that moves it, and as that which is both moved and moving stands between these, there must also exist something which moves without being moved, which is eternal and a self-existent reality. It imparts motion thus. The appetitive and the conscious move without being moved. Both are in their origin one and the same. For that which appears as pleasant is desired

and the original object of the will is that which appears pleasant. We desire it because it is pleasant, but it does not appear pleasant because it is beautiful. The beginning is thought. Reason, however, is moved by the thought of the intelligible. But the intelligible is in itself only a series of things of like kind, and in this is the independent first cause, and from it comes the simple and actual. The one and the simple are nevertheless not the same. The one is that which indicates a limit; the simple is that which indicates quality. But the pleasant and that which is desirable on its own account, is also found in this series, and the first cause is always the highest or something like it. Also the final cause exists in the unmoved, and is shown in this division itself. For the final cause is contained in something. The one is or exists already, the other does not. The final cause moves as a thing that is desired. The moved imparts motion to other things. When now anything is moved it is such that it might have been otherwise. Circular motion is the first form and if this is actual this motion cannot occur otherwise than in space, although this is not according to its nature in itself. But if a moving cause which is itself unmoved but active, be assumed, it is impossible that its conduct should be otherwise. Motion is the first step in evolution and this first motion is circular and was caused by the first mover. For this reason must the first mover be necessarily existent, and in so far as it is necessary it is also noble, and with this constitutes the first principle. Necessity or the necessary has two meanings. One of them is that which is effected by some power against a natural impulse. Then there is one which denotes that without which the good cannot take place, and finally, it denotes that which cannot be otherwise, that which *is* absolutely.

On such a first cause depends both the heavens and the order of physical nature. His life is of such excellence that we can only realize it for a limited period. But this Being remains always so. For us this is impossible, but not for this Supreme Being for whom also pleasure is activity. For this reason also consciousness, perception, and thought are the most pleasant. Hopes and recollection, however, are effected through these. Thought belongs to God as his best attribute and the highest degree of thought belongs to the best Being in the highest degree. Reason knows itself by comprehending or participating in its object. It is through this comprehension and reflection that it becomes a thinking Being, so that Reason and the object thought are one and the same: for reason is that which can comprehend the thinkable and the real or existent. It is active in as much as it has this within itself. What Reason seems to possess as divine, God also has in a higher degree, and this intuitive thought is the noblest and best. If now God is always so excellent in his nature, as we are only at times and for a limited period, and this quality is worthy of reverence, so it is still more to be reverenced when it is possessed by God in a higher degree. This is the fact in his case. He is the seat of life: for the activity of Reason is life and the nature of God is activity. We say of Divinity that it is the eternal and most excellent form of life, so that this quality must belong to the eternal and uninterrupted existence of the Godhead."

Note:—It will be observed that Aristotle's conception of God as above given is substantially the same as Plato's conception of "Soul," as given in the extract from the Phaedrus and the Laws on pages 144–5, the "Universal Soul" or the "Soul of the Universe" being of course

only another name for "the Deity." And it is plain that Aristotle got his conception of God from the Platonic conception of soul, which in both cases is declared to be in essence *Motion which is self-moved.*

For further light on Aristotle's conception of God, see the last paragraphs given in the abstract of his Ethics.—C. M. H.

ARISTOTLE ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Note:—This extract is taken from Aristotle's "History of Animals," Cresswell's Translation, Bohn Edition. J. H. H.

"Nature passes so gradually from inanimate to animate things, that from their continuity their boundary and the intermediate forms are indistinct or indeterminate. The race of plants succeeds immediately that of inanimate objects, and these differ from each other in the proportion of life in which they participate; for compared with other objects appear to possess life, though when compared with animals, they appear inanimate.

"The change from plants to animals, however, is gradual, as I before observed. For a person might question to which of these classes some marine objects belong: for many of them are attached to the rocks and perish as soon as they are separated from it. The pinnæ (mollusk) are attached to the rocks, the solens (shellfish) cannot live after they are taken away from their localities; and, on the whole, all the testacea resemble plants, if we compare them with locomotive animals. Some of them appear to have no sensation; in others it is very dull. The body of some of them is naturally

flesh-like, as in those called tethides (gastropod); and the Medusae and the sponges entirely resemble plants. The progress is always gradual by which one appears to have more life and motion than another."

Note:—In that very interesting and informing work "From the Greeks to Darwin," by Prof. Osborn of Columbia University, we quote the following paragraphs which will show the great contribution which Aristotle has made to the Evolution Theory as one of its early pioneers.—C. M. H.

"With Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) we enter a new world. He towered above his predecessors, and by the force of his own genius created Natural History. In his own words, lately quoted by Romanes, we learn that the centuries preceding him yielded him nothing but vague speculation:—

"'I found no basis prepared; no models to copy. . . . Mine is the first step, and therefore a small one, though worked out with much thought and hard labor. It must be looked at as a first step and judged with indulgence. You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think I have done as much as can fairly be required for an initiatory start, as compared with more advanced departments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.'

* * * * * *

"He was attracted to natural history by his boyhood life upon the seashore, and the main parts of his ideas upon Evolution were evidently drawn from his own observations upon the gradations between marine plants and the lower and higher forms of marine animals. He was the first to conceive of a genetic series, and his con-

ception of a single chain of evolution from the polyps to man was never fully replaced until the beginning of this century. It appeared over and over again in different guises. In all his philosophy of Nature, Aristotle was guided partly by his preconceived opinions derived from Plato and Socrates, and partly by convictions derived from his own observations upon the wonderful order and perfection of the Universe. His 'perfecting principle' in Nature is only one of a score of his legacies to later speculation upon Evolution causation. Many of our later writers are Aristotelians without apparently being conscious of it.

* * * * * *

"We can pass leniently by errors which are strewn among such grand contributions to Biology and to the very foundation-stones of the Evolution idea.

* * * * * *

"While Plato had relied upon intuitions as the main ground of true knowledge, Aristotle relied upon experiment and induction. 'We must not,' he said, 'accept a general principle from logic only, but must prove its application to each fact; for it is in facts that we must seek general principles, and these must always accord with facts. Experience furnishes the particular facts from which induction is the pathway to general laws' (History of Animals, I.6.) He held that errors do not arise because the senses are false media, but because we put false interpretations upon their testimony.

"Aristotle's theories as to the origin and succession of life went far beyond what he could have reached by the legitimate application of his professed method of procedure. Having now briefly considered the materials of his knowledge, let us carefully examine how he put his facts together into an Evolution system which had the

teachings of Plato and Socrates for its primary philosophical basis.

"Aristotle believed in a complete gradation in Nature, a progressive development corresponding with the progressive life of the soul. Nature, he says, proceeds constantly by the aid of gradual transitions from the most imperfect to the most perfect, while the numerous analogies which we find in the various parts of the animal scale, show that all is governed by the same laws,—in other words, Nature is a unit as to its causation. The lowest stage is the inorganic, and this passes into the organic by direct metamorphosis, matter being transformed into life. Plants are animate as compared with minerals, and inanimate as compared with animals; they have powers of nourishment and reproduction, but no feeling or sensibility. Then come the plant-animals, or Zoöphytes; these are the marine creatures, such as sponges and sea anemones, which leave the observer most in doubt, for they grow upon rocks and die if detached. (Polyps, Aristotle wrongly thought were plants, while sponges he rightly considered animals). The third step taken by Nature is the development of animals with sensibility,—hence desire for food and other needs of life, and hence locomotion to fulfil these desires. Here was a more complex and energetic form of the original life. Man is the highest point of one long and continuous ascent; other animals have the faculty of thought; man alone generalizes and forms abstractions; he is physically superior in his erect position, in his purest and largest blood supply, largest brain, and highest temperature.

* * *

"Aristotle perceived a most marvelous adaptation in the arrangement of the world, and felt compelled to assume Intelligent Design as the primary cause of things,

by the perfection and regularity which he observed in Nature. Nothing, he held, which occurs regularly, can be the result of accident. This perfection is the outcome of an all-pervading *movement,* which we should, in nineteenth-century language, speak of as an 'internal perfecting tendency.' In Aristotle's conception of 'movement,' as outlined in his *Physics*, we find something very analogous to our modern biological conception of transformation in development, for he analyzes 'movement' as every change, as every realization of what is possible, consisting in: (a) *Substantial* movement, origin and decay, as we should now say, development and degeneration; (b) *Quantitative* movement, addition and subtraction, or, in modern terms, the gain and loss of parts; (c) *Qualitative* movement, or the transition of one material into another, in metamorphosis and change of function; (d) *Local* movement, or change of place, in the transposition of parts.

"Thus Aristotle thought out the four essential features of Evolution as a process; but we have found no evidence that he actually applied this conception to the development of organisms or of organs, as we do now in the light of our modern knowledge of the actual stages of Evolution. This enables us to understand Aristotle's view of Nature as the principle of motion and rest comprised in his four Causes. Here again he is more or less metaphysical. The first is the 'physical Material cause,' or matter itself; the second is the 'physical Formal cause,' or the forces of the 'perfecting principle;' the third is the 'abstract Final cause,' the fitness, adaptation, or purpose, the good of each and all; the fourth, presiding over all, is the 'Efficient cause,' the Prime Mover, or God.

* * * * * * *

EMPEDOCLES.

B. C. 450.

One of the Pioneers of Evolution. (See P. 191.)

"Whether or not Aristotle viewed the Prime Mover as sustaining his laws or as having preordained them, he certainly does not believe in Special Creation, either of adaptations or of organisms, nor in the interference of the Prime Mover in Nature; the struggle towards perfection is a natural process, as where he says: 'It is due to the resistance of matter to form that Nature can only rise by degrees from lower to higher types.' There is, therefore, no doubt that he was not a teleologist in the ordinary sense; at the very heart of his theory of Evolution was this 'internal perfecting tendency,' driving organisms progressively forward into more perfect types. He viewed man as the flower of Nature, towards which all had been tending, the crowning end, purpose, or final cause. His theory was then anthropocentric: 'plants are evidently for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man; thus Nature, which does nothing in vain, has done all things for the sake of man.'

"Aristotle's view is brought out clearly and emphatically in the most striking passage of all his writings where he undertakes to refute Empedocles. This is of the greatest interest to-day, because Aristotle clearly states and rejects a theory of the origin or adaptive structures in animals altogether similar to that of Darwin.

* * * * * *

"These passages seem to contain absolute evidence that Aristotle had substantially the modern conception of the Evolution of life, from a primordial, soft mass of living matter to the most perfect forms, and that even in these he believed Evolution was incomplete, for they were progressing to higher forms. His argument of the analogy between the operation of natural law, rather than of chance, in the lifeless and in the living world, is

a perfectly logical one, and his consequent rejection of the hypothesis of the Survival of the Fittest, a sound induction from his own limited knowledge of Nature. It seems perfectly clear that he placed all under secondary natural laws. If he had accepted Empedocles' hypothesis, he would have been the literal prophet of Darwinism."

ABSTRACT OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

Note:—After indicating that the ground of what is right is the *end*, as distinguished from the theories of earlier writers, Aristotle defines this end as follows:—J. H. H.

"The best of all things must be something final. If then there be only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, or if there be more than one, then the most final of them.

"Now that which is pursued as an end in itself is more final than that which is pursued as means to something else, and that is strictly final which is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means.

"Happiness or welfare seems more than anything else to answer to this description; for we always choose it for itself, and never for the sake of something else.

"But a still more precise definition is needed. This will be gained by asking, what is the function of man? For as the good or excellence of a piper or a sculptor, or the practiser of any art, and generally of those who have any function or business to do, lies in that function, so man's good would seem to lie in his function, if he has one. What then is it?

"The function of man is exercise of his vital faculties on one side in obedience to reason, and on the other with reason. Man's function then being, as we say, a kind of life or exercise of his faculties, the good man's function is to do this well and nobly.

"Nothing human is so constant as the exercise of our faculties. The highest of these exercises are the most abiding, because the happy are occupied with them most of all and most continuously. The happy man, then, as we define him, will have this required property of constancy, and all through life will preserve his character; for he will be occupied continually, or with the least possible interruption, in excellent deeds and excellent speculations: and whatever his fortune be he will take it in the noblest fashion, and bear himself always and in all things suitably, since he is truly good and 'four-square without a flaw.'

"But the dispensations of fortune are many, some great, some small. The small ones, whether good or evil, plainly are of no weight in the scale. But the great ones, when numerous, will make life happier if they be good; for they help to give a grace to life themselves, and their use is noble and good. But if they be evil, they will enfeeble and spoil happiness, for they bring pain, and often impede the exercise of our faculties.

"But nevertheless true worth shines out even here, in the calm endurance of many great misfortunes, not through insensibility, but through nobility and greatness of soul. And if it is what man does that determines the character of his life, then no happy man will become afflicted; for he will never do what is hateful and base. For we hold that the man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances, as a good

general will turn the forces at his command to the best account." Nic. Eth. Book I.

"Excellence being of these two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual excellence owes its birth and growth mainly to instruction, and so requires time and experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom. From this it is plain that none of the moral excellences or virtues is implanted in us by nature: for that which is by nature cannot be altered by training. For instance, a stone naturally tends to fall downwards, and you could not train it to rise upwards, though you tried to do so by throwing it up ten thousand times, nor could you train fire to move downwards, nor accustom anything which naturally behaves in one way to behave in another way. The virtues then come neither by nature nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity for acquiring them, and this is developed by training.

"Both virtues and vices result from and are formed by the same acts in which they manifest themselves, as is the case with the arts also. It is by harping that good harpers and bad harpers alike are produced; and so with builders and the rest. Indeed, if it were not so, they would not want anybody to teach them, but would all be born either good or bad at their trades. And it is just the same with the virtues also. It is by our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust, and by acting in circumstances of danger, and training ourselves to feel fear and confidence, that we become courageous or cowardly. In a word, the several habits or characters are formed by the same kind of acts as those which they produce.

"The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must be taken as a test of the formed habit or character. He who abstains from the pleasures of the body and rejoices

in abstinence, is temperate, while he who is vexed at having to abstain, is profligate. It is pleasure that moves us to do what is base, and pain moves us to refrain from what is noble. And therefore, as Plato says, man needs to be so trained from his youth up as to find pleasure and pain in the right objects. This is what a sound education means.

"Virtue, then, has to do with feelings or passions and with outward acts in which excess is wrong and deficiency is also blamed, but the mean is praised and is right — both of which are characteristics of virtue. Virtue, then, is a kind of moderation in as much as it aims at the mean or moderate amount. And it is a moderation in as much as it comes in the middle or mean between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect, and in as much as, while these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and in action, it finds and chooses the mean." Nic. Eth. Book II.

"Virtue, as we have seen, has to do with feelings and actions. Now praise or blame is given only to what is voluntary: that which is involuntary receives pardon, and sometimes pity.

"It seems, therefore, that a clear distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary is necessary for those who are investigating the nature of virtue, and will also help legislators in assigning rewards and punishments. That is generally held to be involuntary which is done under compulsion or through ignorance. (That is voluntary which is intentional and done with knowledge.)

"Now that we have distinguished voluntary from involuntary acts, our next task is to discuss choice or purpose. For it seems to be most intimately connected with

virtue, and to be a surer test of character than virtue itself.

"It seems that choosing is willing, but that the two terms are not identical, willing being the wider. For children and animals have will, but not choice or purpose: and acts done upon the spur of the moment are said to be voluntary, but not to be done with deliberate purpose.

"We have seen that, while we wish for the end, we deliberate upon and choose the means thereto. Actions that are concerned with means will be guided by choice, and so will be voluntary. But the acts in which the virtues are manifested are concerned with means.

"Therefore, virtue depends upon ourselves: and vice likewise. For where it lies with us to do, it lies with us not to do. Where we can say no, we can say yes. If then the doing of a deed, which is noble, lies with us, the not doing it, which is disgraceful, also lies with us.

"If these statements commend themselves to us, and if we are unable to trace our acts to any other sources than those that depend upon ourselves, then that whose source is within us must depend upon us and be voluntary. This seems to be attested by each one of us in private life, and also by the legislators; for they correct and punish those that do evil, except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the agent is not responsible, and honor those that do noble deeds.

"I say 'ignorance for which the agent is not responsible,' for the ignorance itself is punished by the law, if the agent appears to be responsible for his defective knowledge. Ignorance of any of the ordinances of the law, which a man ought to know, and easily can know, does not avert punishment. And so in other cases, where ignorance seems to be the result of negli-

gence, the offender is punished, since it lay with him to remove this ignorance, for he might have taken the requisite trouble.

"It might be objected that it was the man's character not to take the trouble.

"We reply that men are themselves responsible for acquiring such a character by a dissolute life, and for being unjust or profligate in consequence of repeated acts of wrong, or of spending their time in drinking, and so on. For it is repeated acts of a particular kind that give a man a particular character.

"We see, then, that of the vices of the body it is those that depend on ourselves that are censured, while those that do not depend upon ourselves are not censured. And if this be so, then in other fields also those vices that are blamed must depend upon ourselves.

"Some people may perhaps object to this. 'All men,' they may say, 'desire that which appears good to them, but cannot control this appearance; a man's character, whatever it be, decides what shall appear to him to be the end.'

"If, I answer, each man be in some way responsible for his habits of character, then in some way he must be responsible for this appearance also. But if this be not the case, then a man is not responsible for, or is not the cause of, his own evil doing, but it is through ignorance of the end that he does evil.

"Now supposing this to be true, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? For whether it be nature or anything else that determines what shall appear to be the end, it is determined in the same way for both alike, for the good man as well as the bad, and both alike refer all their acts of whatever kind, to it.

"And so whether we hold that it is not merely nature

that decides what appears to each to be the end, but that the man himself contributes something; or whether we hold that the end is fixed by nature, but that virtue is voluntary, in as much as the good man voluntarily takes the steps to that end—in either case vice will be just as voluntary as virtue, for self is active in the bad man just as much as in the good man, in choosing the particular acts at least, if not in determining the end.

"We have thus described in outline the nature of the virtues in general, viz., that they are forms of moderation or modes of observing the mean, and that they are habits or trained faculties; and we have shown what produces them, and how they themselves issue in the performance of the same acts which produce them, and that they depend on ourselves and are voluntary, and that they follow the guidance of right reason.

"But our particular acts are not voluntary in the same sense as our habits. We are masters of our acts from beginning to end, when we know the particular circumstances; but we are masters of the beginnings only of our habits or characters, while their growth by gradual steps is imperceptible, like the growth of disease. In as much, however, as it lay with us to employ our faculties in this way, the resulting characters are on that account voluntary." Nic. Eth. Book III.

"We have now to inquire about justice and injustice, and to ask what sort of acts they are concerned with, and in what sense justice observes the mean, and what are the extremes whose mean is that which is just.

"We see that all men intend by justice to signify the sort of habit or character that makes men apt to do what is lawful, and which further makes them act lawfully and wish what is lawful or just. By injustice they intend in like manner to signify the sort of character that

makes men act unlawfully and wish what is unlawful or unjust.

"Plainly, then, a just man will be (1) a law-abiding and (2) a fair man. A just thing, then, will be (1) that which is in accordance with law, (2) that which is fair; and the unjust thing will be (1) that which is contrary to law, and (2) that which is unfair.

"Now the laws prescribe about all manner of things, aiming at the common interest of all, or of the best men, or of those who are supreme in the state; and so in one sense we apply the term 'just' to whatever tends to produce and preserve the happiness of the community, and the several elements of that happiness. The law bids us to display courage (as not to leave our ranks, or to run, or throw away our arms), and temperance, (as not to commit adultery or outrage), and gentleness, (as not to strike or revile our neighbors), and so on with all the other virtues and vices.

"Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is complete virtue, with the addition that it is displayed toward others. On this account it is often spoken of as the chief of the virtues, and such that 'neither evening nor morning star is so lovely;' and the saying has become proverbial, 'Justice sums up all virtues in itself.'

"It is complete virtue because it is the exhibition of complete excellence: it is also complete because he that has it is able to exhibit virtue in dealing with his neighbors, and not merely in his private affairs; for there are many who can be virtuous at home, but fail in dealing with their neighbors. This is the reason why people commend the saying of Bias: 'Office will show the man;' for he that is in office *ipso facto* stands in relation to others and has dealings with them.

"This too is the reason why justice alone of all the

virtues is thought to be another's good, as implying this relation to others: for it is another's interest that justice aims at—the interest, namely, of the ruler or of our fellow-citizens.

"We have next to speak of equity and of that which is equitable, and to inquire how equity is related to justice, and how that which is equitable to that which is just. For, on consideration, they do not seem to be absolutely identical, nor yet generically different. At one time we praise that which is equitable and the equitable man, and even use the word metaphorically as a term of praise synonymous with good, showing that we consider that the more equitable a thing is the better it is. At another time we reflect and find it strange that what is equitable should be praiseworthy, if it be different from what is just; for, we argue, if it be something else, either what is just is not good, or what is equitable is not good; if both be good, they are the same.

"But what obscures the matter is that, though what is equitable is just, it is not identical with, but a correction of, that which is just according to law. The reason for this is that every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. Where, then, it is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all. What is equitable, then, is just, and better than what is just in one sense of the word—not better than what is absolutely just, but better than that which fails through its lack of qualification. And the essence of what is equitable is that it is an amendment of the law, in those points where it fails through the generality of its language." Nic. Eth. Book V.

"Now that we have discussed the several kinds of virtue, it remains to give a summary account of happiness, since we are to assume that it is the end of all that man does.

"As we have often said, that is truly valuable and pleasant which is so to the perfect man. Now, the exercise of those trained faculties which are proper to him is what each man finds most desirable; what the perfect man finds most desirable, therefore, is the exercise of virtue. Happiness, consequently, does not consist in amusement, and, indeed, it is absurd to suppose that the end is amusement, and that we toil and moil all our life long for the sake of amusing ourselves. The happy life is thought to be that which exhibits virtue; and such a life must be serious and cannot consist in amusement.

"But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the highest virtue, and that it will be the virtue or excellence of the best part of us. Now that part or faculty—call it reason or what you will—which seems naturally to rule and take the lead, and to apprehend things noble and divine—whether it be itself divine, or only the divinest part of us—is the faculty, the exercise of which, in its proper excellence, will be perfect happiness.

"That this consists in the contemplative life we have already said. This exercise of faculty must be the highest possible; for reason is the highest of our faculties, and of all knowable things those that reason deals with are the highest. We think too, that pleasure ought to be one of the ingredients of happiness; but of all virtuous exercises it is allowed that the pleasantest is the exercise of wisdom. At least philosophy is thought to have pleasures that are admirable in purity and steadfastness. What is called self-sufficiency will be most of

all found in the reflective life. The necessaries of life, indeed, are needed by the wise man as well as by the just man and others; but, when these have been provided in due quantity, the just man further needs further persons towards whom, and along with whom, he may act justly, while the wise man is able to contemplate even by himself, and the wiser he is the more he is able to do this.

"The exercise of reason seems to be superior in seriousness, and to aim at no end besides itself, and to have its proper pleasure. Its exercise seems further to be self-sufficient and inexhaustible, and to have all the other characteristics ascribed to happiness. A life that realized this idea would be something more than human; for it would not be the expression of man's nature, but of some divine element in that nature—the exercise of which is as far superior to the exercise of the other kind of virtue, as this divine element is superior to our compound nature. If then reason be divine as compared with man, the life which consists in the exercise of reason will also be divine in comparison with human life. Nevertheless, instead of listening to those who advise us as men and mortals, not to lift our thoughts above what is human and mortal, we ought rather, as far as possible, to put off our mortality and make every effort to live in the exercise of the highest of our faculties; for though it be but a small part of us, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. And indeed, this part would seem to constitute our true self, since it is the sovereign and the better part. It would be strange, then, if a man were to prefer the life of something else to the life of his true self.

"The life that consists in the exercise of the other kind of virtue is happy in a secondary sense; for the manifestation of moral virtue is emphatically human.

Justice, I mean, and courage and the other moral virtues (contrasted with the intellectual) are displayed in our relations towards one another by the observance, in every case, of what is due in contracts and services, and all sorts of outward acts as well as in our inward feelings. All these seem to be emphatically human affairs. But the happiness which consists in the exercise of the reason, is separate from our lower nature.

"That perfect happiness is some kind of speculative or reflective activity may also be shown in the following way:

"It is always supposed that the gods are, of all beings, the most blessed and happy; but what kind of actions shall we ascribe to them? Acts of justice? Surely it is ridiculous to conceive the gods engaged in trade and restoring deposits, and so on. Or acts of courage? Can we conceive them enduring fearful risks and facing danger because it is noble to do so? Or acts of liberality? But to whom are they to give? Is it not absurd to suppose that they have any money or anything of the kind? And what could acts of temperance mean with them? Surely it would be an insult to praise them for having no evil desires. In short, if we were to go through the whole list, we should find that all action is petty and unworthy of the gods.

"And yet it is universally supposed that they live, and therefore that they exert their powers; for we cannot suppose that they are sleeping like Endymion. Now if a being lives, and action cannot be ascribed to him, still less production, what remains but contemplation? It follows, then, that the divine life, which surpasses all others in blessedness, consists in contemplation." Nic. Eth. Book X.

FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Books 1 and 2.

The Fundamental Nature of a Political State or Government.

Status of Property — Socialistic and Individualistic Considered.

"Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.

"The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village.

"When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier

forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the (completed) nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

"Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the

'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,'

whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.

"Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech.

"And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

"The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed in-

justice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

"The relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. And therefore women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the state, if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are wonen.

"Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not?

"Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet among the good, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.'

"No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal

action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.

"Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause—the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is more quarreling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.

"Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. In the Laws,* it is maintained that the best state is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the state is better which is made up of more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy.

"In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which

* Plato's "Laws" is here referred to.

all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

"Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification. But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget,—that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification."

FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Book III.

Citizens and States of Various Kinds Considered. The Best Forms of Government and the Best Citizen Discussed.

"He who would inquire into the nature and various kinds of government must first of all determine 'What is a state?' At present this is a disputed question. But a state is composite, and, like any other whole, made up of many parts—these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy.

"But the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices.

"The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizens of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states.

"He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to

be a citizen of that state; and speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

"But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more grandparents. This is a short and practical definition; but there are some who raise the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontina, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said—'Mortars are made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are also a manufactured article, made, like the kettles which bear their name, by the magistrates.' Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in the government, they were citizens. (This is a better definition than the other). For the words, 'born of a father or mother, who is a citizen,' cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

"It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.' The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both: for the good man, who is free and also a subject, will not have one virtue only, say justice—but he will have distinct kinds of virtue, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ.

"Since there are many forms of government, there must be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some governments the

mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if there be such an one), in which honors are given according to virtue and merit; for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer. In oligarchies the qualification for office is high, and therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for many of them are rich. At Thebes there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from business for ten years. In many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen (and his father an alien); and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

"Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state. In the poems of Homer (Achilles complains of Agamemnon treating him) 'like some dishonored stranger,' for he who is excluded from the honors of the state is no better than an alien. But when this exclusion is concealed, then the object is to deceive the inhabitants.

"Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the differences between them.

"A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all. The govern-

ment is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government are different; and so in other cases.

"First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of government there are by which human society is regulated. We have already said, in the former part of this treatise, when drawing a distinction between household management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element) mankind meet together and maintain the political community, so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good. And we all see that men cling to life even in the midst of misfortune, seeming to find in it a natural sweetness and happiness.

"There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have been often defined already in popular works. The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature, have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household-management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the

governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed.

"Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many forms of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent. The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many. The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For citizens, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the advantages of a state. Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy (the rule of the best); and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name,—a constitution. And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but of virtue there are many kinds: and as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence, in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

"Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as

follows:—of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interests of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy; none of them the common good of all.

"The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas, freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.

"Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and democratical. For all men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case.

"But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of one state.

"Whereas, those who are for good government take into consideration (the larger question of) virtue and vice in states. Whence it may be further inferred that virtue must be the serious care of a state which truly deserves the name; for (without this ethical end) the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a convention, 'a surety to one another of justice,' as the sophist Lycophron says, and has no real power to make the citizens good and just.

"It is clear, then, that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of well-being in families and aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. They are created by friendship, for friendship is the motive of society. The end is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families

and villages having for an end a perfect and self-suffic ing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life.

"Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. And they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

"From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only.

"There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:—Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example, because they are more in number, divide among themselves the property of the rich,—is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for the lawful authority (*i. e.*, the people) willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray what is? Again, when (in the first division) all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destructive of a state; and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people,—is this just? If so, the other case (*i. e.*, the case of the majority plundering the

minority) will likewise be just. But there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.

"Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is capable of a satisfactory explanation, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute, is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is, a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them, they understand the whole. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in another person, would be fairer than in the picture. Whether this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application; for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised, and also

another which is akin to it—viz., what power should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit—are both solved. There is still a danger in allowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state, in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and certain other legislators give them the power of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better class they are useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure, sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect judgment.

"Now, does not the same principle apply to elections? For a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge; a geometrician, for example, will choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in matters of steering; and, even if there be some occupations and arts with which private persons are familiar, they certainly cannot judge better than those who know. So that, according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the calling of them to account, should be intrusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, although individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge—as a body they are as good or better. More-

over, there are some artists whose works are judged of solely, or in the best manner, not by themselves, but by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.

"In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially and above all in the highest of all—this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about Ethics. For they admit that justice is a thing having relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But there still remains a question; equality or inequality of what? Here is a difficulty which the political philosopher has to resolve. For very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other difference between him and the rest of the community; for that those who differ in any one respect have different rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights.

"But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there is good reason, why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the others much; it is in gymnastic

contests that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state, (such as wealth, virtue, etc.) And therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good reason claim office; for holders of offices must be freemen and taxpayers; a state can be no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so; for without the former a state cannot exist at all, without the latter, not well.

"If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life, as I have already said, education and virtue have superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one thing ought not to be equal in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to be unequal in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on either of these principles are perversions. All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but they have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land, and land is the common element of the state; also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same title as the noble; for they are nearly akin. And the noble are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble, since good birth is always valued in a man's own home and country. Another reason is, that those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all others. Again, the many may urge their

claim against the few; for, when taken collectively, and compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other classes who make up a state, are all living together in the same city, will there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall rule?—No doubt at all in determining who ought to rule in each of the above-mentioned forms of government. For states are characterized by differences in their governing bodies—one of them has a government of the rich, another of the virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements co-exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the virtuous to be very few in number; may we consider their numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether they are enough to administer the state, or must they be so many as will make up a state? Objections may be urged against all the aspirants to political power. For those who found their claims on wealth or family have no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be the ruler of them. In like manner he who is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all those who claim on the ground that they are free-born. In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like difficulty occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better than the other members of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the people are to be supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many.

"All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule, and hold all

other men in subjection to them, are strictly right. To those who claim to be masters of the state on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few—I do not say individually, but collectively. And another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of the higher classes or of the many, when the case which we have mentioned occurs (*i. e.* when all the elements co-exist.) Now what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of "what is equal;" and that which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue.

"If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although not enough to make up the full complement of a state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the virtues or the political power of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political power. Such an one may truly be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in power; and that for men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law—they are themselves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to

make laws for them. And for this reason democratic states have instituted ostracism; equality is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracise and banish from the city for a time those who seem to predominate too much through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or through any other political influence.

"The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all forms of government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest do so likewise.

"Hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in favor of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator should, from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should endeavor to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. The principle, however, has not been fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted forms of government, and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. In the perfect state there would be great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but when used against some one who is pre-eminent in virtue,—what is to be done with him? Mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled; on the other hand, he ought not to be a subject—that would be as if in the division of the empire of the Gods, the other Gods should claim to rule over Zeus. The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to

be the order of nature, and that men like him should be kings in their state for life.

"The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to be one of the true forms of government. Let us see whether, in order to be well governed, a state or country should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government; and whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that the manner of government is not the same in all of them.

"These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedæmonian, which is in fact a generalship, hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from one another in the manner which I have described.

"There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations.

"Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedæmonian and the absolute royalty; for most of the others lie in a region between them, having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus the inquiry

is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a single man should have the supreme power in all things? The first question falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form of government, so that this matter may be dismissed for the present. The other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by inquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws.

"The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd. Even in Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is argued that a government acting according to written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general principle which exists in law; and he is a better ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate. Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man.

"Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to advise in particular cases. (To whom we in turn make reply:) A king must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority. (Yet a further question remains behind:) When the law cannot determine a point at all, or not well, should the one

best man, or should all, decide? According to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual.

"Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. Let us assume that they are freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but filling up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good? Will not the many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is not divided against himself. To which we may answer that their character is as good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether the government is supported by force or not, provided only that a number of men equal in virtue, can be found.

"The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason, because of old, when cities were small, men

of eminent virtue were few. They were made kings because they were benefactors, and benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set up a constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury; riches became the path to honor, and so oligarchies naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies; for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no other form of government appears to be any longer possible.

"Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore, it is thought to be just, that among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law. And the rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual. On the same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and ministers of the law.

"He who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and

passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire.

"Hence it is evident, that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or neutral, and the law is the mean. Again, customary laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.

"If, as I said before, the good man has a right to rule because he is better, then two good men are better than one: this is the old saying.

"Now, from what has been said, it is manifest that, where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord over good men, or a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case, which I have already mentioned, and to which I will once more recur. But first of all, I must determine what natures are suited for royalties, and what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitutional government.

"A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in virtue and political talent are fitted for kingly government; and a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy; while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom, are those among whom there naturally exists a warlike multitude able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert.

"We maintain that the true forms of government are three, and that the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, excelling in virtue, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled, in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. We showed at the commencement of our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Clearly then in the same manner, and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good, he will frame a state (which will be truly good) whether aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same education and same habits will be found to make a good man, and a good statesman and king."

THE BEST CONSTITUTION FOR A STATE.

Preponderance of the Middle Class Recommended.

From Aristotle's Politics, Book IV.

"We have now to enquire what is the best constitution for most states, and the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favored by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of government which states in general can attain. As to those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were just now speaking, they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of states, or they approximate to the so-called constitutional government, and therefore need no separate discussion. And in fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms rests upon the same grounds. For if it has been truly said in the Ethics that the happy life is the life according to unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city.

"Now in all states there are three elements; one class is very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most ready to listen to reason. But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore, the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best governed; they are, as we say, the natural elements of a state. And this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a state, for they do not, like the poor, covet their neighbors' goods; nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely then, did Phocylides pray,—

"Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city."

"Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large, and larger if possible, than both the other classes, or at any rate, than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great, then, is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme,—either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of a middle and nearly equal condition. I will explain the reason

THE BEST AND SAFEST GOVERNMENT.

A Democracy with the Middle Class Preponderating.

"*The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is large there are least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar reason, large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle class and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a King; and Charondas, and almost all legislators.*"

Aristotle's Politics.

ARISTOTLE.

B. C. 350.

From a Sculpture in the Gal. Du Capitole.

of this hereafter, when I speak of the revolutions of states. The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of the middle class is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition; for example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators.

"We have now to consider what, and what kind of government is suitable, to what, and what kind of men. I may begin by assuming, as a general principle common to all governments, that the portion of the state which desires permanence ought to be stronger than that which desires the reverse. Now every city is composed of quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity, superiority of numbers. Quality may exist in one of the classes which make up the state, and quantity in the other. For example, the meanly-born may be more in number than the well-born, or the poor than the rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall short in quality; and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity and quality. Where the number of

the poor is more than proportioned to the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in form with the sort of people who compose it in each case. If, for example, the husbandmen exceed in number, the first form of democracy will then arise; if the artisans and laboring class, the last; and so with the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity, there oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms according to the kind of superiority possessed by the oligarchs.

"The legislator should always include the middle class in his government; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to the middle class let him look; if he makes them democratical, he should equally by his laws try to attach this class to the state. There only can the government ever be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and in that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the poor against the rulers. For neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other, and if they look for some form of government more suitable to both, they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, because they mistrust one another. The arbiter is always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political elements, the more lasting will be the state. Many even of those who desire to form aristocratical governments make a mistake, not only in giving too much power to the rich, but in attempting to overreach the people. There comes a time when, out of a false good there arises a true evil, since the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the state than those of the people."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS,

Book V.

Cause of Revolutions.

"Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class, more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

"In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. We want to know (1) what is the feeling? and (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz., the desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that

they have, not more, but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may, and may not, be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor, or the fear of dishonor and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons of these motives and dispositions which are excited in men, about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way, may be regarded as seven, and in another, as more than seven. Two of them have been already noticed; but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honor—not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, love of superiority, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.

"Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states. And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at

Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the constitutional government in consequence becoming a democracy; or, as was the case at Argos, where, after the battle at Hebdomè, the Argives, having been cut to pieces by Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, were compelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioeci; and at Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry in the times of the Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from this cause in democracies as well as in other forms of government, but not to so great an extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a government of families. Forms of government also change—sometimes even without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heræa (where, instead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans); or owing to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into the highest offices, as at Oreum, where, upon the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a constitutional and democratical government.

"Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, neither is it a multitude brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for example, the Achæans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, being the more numerous,

afterwards expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarreled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarreled and came to blows; the people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.

"Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.

"Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For example, the Chytrians at Clazomenæ did not agree with the people of the island; and the people of Colophon quarreled with the Notians; at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piræus are more democratic than those who live in the city. For just as in war, the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, however slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and there are other

antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this difference of place.

"Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into a constitutional government, because the magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens the reputation gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire of the sea, strengthened the democracy. At Argos, the notables, having distinguished themselves against the Lacedæmonians in the battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse, the people having been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, transferred the government to themselves. And generally, it should be remembered that those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.

"Revolutions break out when opposite parties, *e.g.*, the rich and the poor, are equally balanced, and there is little or nothing between them; for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent

in virtue do not stir up insurrections, being always a minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which every form of government is liable.

"Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay information against rich men until they compel them to combine, (for a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public they stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the notables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much in the same manner the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and engaging and defeating the people, established an oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of Cyme which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong the notables and so force them to combine; either they

make a division of their property, or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and sometimes they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their wealth to confiscate.

"Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is, that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the contrary are few and slight. Formerly tyrannies were more common than they now are, because great power was often placed in the hands of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which he found by the river side where they put them to graze. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he denounced Daphnæus and the rich; his enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the

people, and contrive at last even to set them above the laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates.

"These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Book VI.

Democracy Analyzed and Commended.

"The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state;—this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes. This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, and, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turn; and so it coincides with the freedom based upon equality (which was the first characteristic.)

"These are points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all should count equally; for equality implies that the rich should have no more share in the government than the poor, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers. And in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state.

"Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Is the qualification to be so distributed that five hundred rich shall be equal to a thousand poor? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts?—Which, according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution,—this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of his class put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power—but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of oquality in which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.

"Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Grant-

ed:—but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed,—the poor and the rich,—that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, but the stronger care for none of these things.

"Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an agricultural population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of

government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honor. A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account; their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at Mantinea;—yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in such a democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well, (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is in-

herent in every man. But the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain class.

"Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out, the people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers.

"The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have now been pretty fully considered. In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent, a citizen, whether father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the notables or of the middle class,—beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point the state becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye.

"The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated in the law-courts to please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned which goes into the treasury, should not be public but sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all equally attached to the state, or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

"Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues, presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property-tax and

confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid: and secondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed, after their manner, to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures also should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among them, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or at any rate, make a beginning in trade and husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst

them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, one-half of them being elected by vote, the other by lot; the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Book VII.

The Best Life for Individuals and States.

"He who would duly enquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life.

"Assuming that enough has been already said in exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz., external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy man must have all three. These propositions are universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good. Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly

cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent, but are deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet, useful as well as noble, is appropriate to such subjects.

"Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness; for external goods come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance. In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is (morally) best, and which acts rightly; and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual or state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate.

"Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the performance of good actions. If

there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections hereafter.

"Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible, raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is, or is not, more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. For these two lives—the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practiced, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim of the laws is to give men despotic power over their neighbors. And, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power; thus in Lacedæmon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed

with a view to war. And in all nations which are able to gratify their ambition, military power is held in esteem, for example, among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the war-like virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honor of wearing as many rings as they have served campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a war-like nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet many appear to think that a despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practising towards others; they demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behavior is irrational; unless the one party is born to command, and the other born to serve, in which case

men have a right to command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which are intended for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies,—all that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honorable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should enquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the same; and where there are neighbors he will have to deal with them according to their characters, and to see what duties are to be performed towards each. The end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future consideration.

"Let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practising it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life of the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is, that he who does nothing, cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we say: 'You are partly right and partly wrong.' The first class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the

despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves, as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise. And it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble.

"But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number of noble actions. If so, the man who is able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbor, ought rather to take away his power; and the father should make no account of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend; they should not bestow a thought on one another in comparison with this higher object, for the best is the most eligible, and 'doing well' is the best. There might be some truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; and hence we infer the view to be false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals share alike in the honorable and the just, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is con-

trary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

"If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for the city collectively, and for individuals. Not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are these ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions, the directing mind is most truly said to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone, should be inactive; for there may be activity also in the parts; there are many ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence it is evident that the same life is best for each individual, and for states, and for mankind collectively.

"Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have discussed other forms of government; in what remains the first point to be considered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state; for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life. And therefore we must pre-suppose many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible. There will be, a certain number of citizens, a

country in which to place them, and the like. As the weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the material proper for his work (and in proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the materials suited to him.

"First among the materials required by the statesman is population: he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country. Most persons think that a state in order to be happy, ought to be large: but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what is a small state.

"Moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a reputation for good government have a limit of population. We may argue on grounds of reason, and the same result will follow. For law is order, and good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly; to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power—of such a power as holds together the universe. Beauty is realized in number and magnitude, and the state which combines magnitude with good order, must necessarily be the most beautiful. To the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they either wholly lose their nature or are spoiled.

"A state then only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed somewhat exceed this number. But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experi-

ence. For both governors and governed have duties to be performed; the special functions of a governor are to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an overpopulous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough concerning the size of a city.

"Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to speak of what should be their character. This is a subject which can be easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate and in (northern) Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world.

"We must see also, how many things are indispensible

to the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of a state will be found among them. Let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want:

"First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them in order to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war; fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion, which is commonly called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all, there must be a power of deciding what is for the public interest, and what is just in men's dealings with one another.

"These are the things which every state may be said to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible that the community can be self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these functions.

"It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers, that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The institution of common tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as old as the reign of Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian historians say that there was a certain Italus king of Oenotria, from whom the Oenotrians were called Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying be-

tween the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one another only half-a-day's journey. They say that this Italus converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their common meals; even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici, who are now, as of old, called Ausones; and on the side towards Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtis, the Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes (which was much older) from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos. It is true, indeed, that these, and many other things, have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather, times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution (existing from time immemorial). We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply defects.

"Special care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure water; this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For

the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water, and the supply, is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated from that which is used for other purposes.

"Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. There are two things in which all well-being consists, one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means towards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to themselves a bad end, and sometimes they fail in both.

"The happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, some have the power of attaining, but to others, from some accident or defect of nature, the attainment of them is not granted; for a good life requires a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men are in a good state, in a greater degree when they are in a lower state. Others again, who possess the condition of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our object is to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly ascertain the nature of happiness.

"We have said in the Ethics, if the arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realiza-

tion and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. And I used the term 'conditional' to express that which is indispensible, and 'absolute' to express that which is good in itself. Take the case of just actions; just punishments and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because we cannot do without them—it would be better that neither individuals nor states should need anything of the sort—but actions which aim at honor and advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional action is only the choice of a lesser evil; whereas these are the foundation and creation of good. A good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can only obtain happiness under the opposite conditions. As we have already said in the Ethics, the good man is he to whom, because he is virtuous, the absolute good is his good. It is also plain that his use of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good. This makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument and not to the skill of the performer.

"It follows then from what has been said that some things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide. And therefore we can only say: May our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then enquire how a man

becomes virtuous. For even if we could suppose all the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved.

"There are three things which make men good and virtuous: these are nature, habit, reason. In the first place, every one must be born a man and not some other animal; in the second place, he must have a certain character, both of body and soul. But some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts of nature which may be turned by habit to good or bad. Most animals lead a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason in addition, and man only. Wherefore nature, habit, reason, must be in harmony with one another; (for they do not always agree); men do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator. All else is the work of education; we learn some things by habit and some by instruction.

"Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has reason in itself, and the other, not having reason in itself, is able to obey reason. And we call a man good because he has the virtues of these two parts. In which of them the end is more likely to be found is no matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or superior is that which has reason. The reason too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two parts, for there is a practical and a speculative reason, and there must be a corresponding division of actions;

the actions of the naturally better principle are to be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain to both or to all, for that is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and all actions into those which are necessary and useful, and those which are honorable. And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable. All these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all, the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and useful, but what is honorable is better. In such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many modern writers have taken a similar view; they commend the Lacedæmonian constitution, and praise the legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim, a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire

in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who have written about the Lacedæmonian constitution have praised their legislator, because the Lacedæmonians, by a training in hardships, gained great power. But surely they are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the observance of his laws, and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part of life. These writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is noble, and implies more virtue than despotic government. Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbors, for there is great evil in this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, would obviously try to obtain the power in his own state,—the crime which the Lacedæmonians accuse King Pausanias of attempting, although he had so great honor already. No such principle and no law having this object, is either statesmanlike or useful or right. For the same things are best both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the

provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they rust in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

"Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best state must also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure, for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues which are practised in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business. For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, 'There is no leisure for slaves,' and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for business and philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tends to make them insolent. Those, then, who seem to be the best-off, and to be in the possession of every good, have special need of justice and temperance—for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say), who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abundance. There is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not

to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of peace,—to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. Wherefore, we should not practice virtue after the manner of the Lacedæmonians. For they, while agreeing with other men in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in thinking that they are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue. And since these goods and the enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues of which they are the end, we must now consider how and by what means they are to be attained.

"We have already determined that nature and habit and reason are required, and what should be the character of the citizens has also been defined by us. But we have still to consider whether the training of early life is to be that of reason or habit. for these two must accord, and when in accord they will then form the best of harmonies. Reason may make mistakes and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil influence of habit. Thus much is clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, birth implies some antecedent principle, and that the end of anything has a beginning in some former end. Now, in men reason and mind are the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them. In the second place, as the soul and body are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states—reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and will and desire are implanted in children from

their very birth, but reason and understanding, are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow; none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul. Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first care will be about marriage—at what age should his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry?

"Women should marry when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both will coincide. Further, the children, if their birth takes place at the time that may reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime, when the fathers are already in the decline of life, and have nearly reached their term of three-score years and ten.

"What constitution in the parent is most advantageous to the offspring is a subject which we will hereafter consider when we speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few general remarks at present. The temperament of an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between them. A man's constitution should be inured to labor, but not to labor which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is practiced by athletes; he should be capable of all the actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.

"After the children have been born, the manner of rearing of them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength. To accustom children to the

cold from their earliest years is also an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and hardens them for military service. Hence many barbarians have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold stream: others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. For human nature should be early habituated to endure all which by habit it can be made to endure; but the process must be gradual. And children, from their natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold. Such care should attend them in the first stage of life.

"The next period lasts to the age of five; during this no demand should be made upon the child for study or labor, lest its growth be impeded; and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being inactive. This can be secured, among other ways, by amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or riotous. The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for the sports of children are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest. Those are wrong who (like Plato) in the Laws attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a like manner, exercise their bodies. Straining the voice has an effect similar to that produced by the retention of the breath in violent exertions. Besides other duties, the Directors of Education should have an eye to their bringing up, and should take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves. For until they are seven years old they must live at home; and therefore, even at this early age, all that is mean and low should be banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be

more careful to drive away than indecency of speech, for the light utterance of shameful words is akin to shameful actions. The young especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A freeman who is found saying or doing what is forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of a place at the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten, and an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or tales which are indecent. Let the rulers take care that there be no image or picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of those Gods at whose festivals the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. But the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences of such representations.

"And therefore, youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially all things which suggest vice or hate. When the five years have passed away, during the two following years they must look on at the pursuits which they are hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life into which education has to be divided, from seven to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty. (The poets) who divide ages by sevens, are not always right: we should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

Book VIII.

Public Schools and Liberal Education, Gymnastics, Music and Morals.

"And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private,—not as at present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this particular the Lacedæmonians are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their children, and make education the business of the state.

"That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether

we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on what principle we should proceed—should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it. There can be no doubt that children should be taught those useful things which are really necessary, but not all things; for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal; and to young children should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgarizing them. And any occupation, art or science, which makes the body or soul or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue, is vulgar; wherefore, we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, for they absorb and degrade the mind. There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire, but only in a certain degree, and if he attend to them too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, the same evil effects will follow. The object, also, which a man sets before him makes a great difference; if he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends, or with a view to excellence, the action will not appear illiberal; but if done for the sake of others, the very same action will be thought menial and servile. The received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarked, are partly of a liberal and partly of an illiberal character.

"The customary branches of education are in number,

four; they are—(1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised—in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once and again, the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation; and therefore the question must be asked in good earnest, what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is inconceivable, and yet amid serious occupations amusement is needed more than at other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation, and amusement gives relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), at suitable times we should introduce amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation and from the pleasure we obtain rest. Leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have leisure. For he who is occupied has in view some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an end which all men deem to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. This pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different persons, and varies according to the habit of individuals; the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest sources. It is clear then, that there are

branches of learning and education which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas, those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the management of a household, in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing, useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists, nor again, like gymnastics, which give health and strength; for neither of these is to be gained from music. There remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure; which appears to have been the reason of its introduction, this being one of the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should pass his leisure.

"Of those states which in our own day seem to take the greatest care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. Although the Lacedæmonians have not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises which they think will make them courageous. But in truth, as we have often repeated, education should not be exclusively directed to this or to any other single end. And even if we suppose the Lacedæmonians to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals courage is found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but with a gentle and lion-like temper. There are many races who are ready enough to kill and eat men such as the Achæans and Heniochi, who both live about the Black Sea; and there are other inland tribes, as bad or

worse, who all live by plunder, but have no courage. It is notorious that the Lacedæmonians, while they were themselves assiduous in their laborious drill, were superior to others, but now they are beaten both in war and gymnastic exercises. For their ancient superiority did not depend on their mode of training their youth, but only on the circumstance that they trained them at a time when others did not. Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, should have the first place; no wolf or other wild animal will face a really noble danger; such dangers are for the brave man. And parents who devote their children to gymnastics while they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them; for they make them useful to the state in one quality only, and even in this the argument proves them to be inferior to others. We should judge the Lacedæmonians not from what they have been, but from what they are; for now they have rivals who compete with their education; formerly they had none.

"It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises should be employed in education, and that for children they should be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful toil, lest the growth of the body be impaired. The evil of excessive training in early years is strikingly proved by the example of the Olympic victors; for not more than two or three of them have gained a prize both as boys and as men; their early training and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; the period of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict regimen. Men ought not to labor at the same time with their minds and with their bodies; for the two kinds of labor are opposed to one another, the labor of the

body impedes the mind, and the labor of the mind the body.

"Concerning music there are some questions which we have already raised; these we may now resume and carry further.

"The first question is whether music is or is not to be a part of education. Of the three things mentioned in our discussion, which is it?—Education or amusement or intellectual enjoyment, for it may be reckoned under all three, and seems to share in the nature of all of them. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation is of necessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain caused by toil, and intellectual enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an element, not only of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both. All men agree that music is one of the pleasantest things, whether with or without song; as Musæus says,

'Song is to mortals of all things the sweetest.'

"Hence, and with good reason it is introduced into social gatherings and entertainments, because it makes the hearts of men glad; so that on this ground alone we may assume that the young ought to be trained in it. For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with the perfect end of life, but they also provide relaxation. And whereas men rarely attain the end, but often rest by the way and amuse themselves, not only with a view to some good, but also for the pleasure's sake, it may be well for them at times to find a refreshment in music. It sometimes happens that men make amusement the end, for the end probably contains some element of pleasure, though not any ordinary or lower pleasure; but they mistake the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the other, since every pleasure has a likeness to the end of action. For the end is not eligible,

nor do the pleasures which we have described exist, for the sake of any future good but of the past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of past toils and pains. And we may infer this to be the reason why men seek happiness from common pleasures. But music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of past toil, but also as providing recreation. And who can say whether, having this use, it may not also have a nobler one? In addition to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all (for the pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages and characters), may it not have also some influence over the character and the soul? It must have such an influence if characters are affected by it. And that they are so affected is proved by the power which the songs of Olympus and of many others exercise; for beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and enthusiasm is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul. Besides, when men hear imitations, even unaccompanied by melody or rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy. Since then music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions. Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall short of the actual affections, as we know from our own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not far removed from the same feeling about realities; for example, if any one delights in the sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily follows that the sight of the original will be pleasant to

him. No other sense, such as taste or touch, has any resemblance to moral qualities; in sight only there is a little, for figures are to some extent of a moral character, and (so far) all participate in the feeling about them. Again, figures and colors are not imitations, but signs of moral habits, indications which the body gives of states of feeling. The connection of them with morals is slight, but in so far as there is any, young men should be taught to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus, or any other painter or statuary who expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere melodies there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected by each. Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed harmonies, others, again, produce a moderate and settled temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. The whole subject has been well treated by philosophical writers on this branch of education, and they confirm their arguments by facts. The same principles apply to rhythms; some have a character of rest, others of motion, and of these latter again, some have a more vulgar, others a nobler movement. Enough has been said to show that music has a power of forming the character, and should, therefore, be introduced into the education of the young. The study is suited to the stage of youth, for young persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which is not sweetened by pleasure, and music has a natural sweetness. There seems to be in us a sort of affinity to harmonies and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul is a harmony, others, that she possesses harmony.

"And now we have to determine the question which has been already raised, whether children should be themselves taught to sing and play, or not. Clearly, there is a considerable difference made in the character by the actual practice of the art. It is difficult, if not impossible, for those who do not perform to be judges of the performance of others. Besides, children should have something to do, and the rattle of Archytas, which people give to their children in order to amuse them and prevent them from breaking anything in the house, was a capital invention, for a young thing cannot be quiet. The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, and (musical) education is a rattle or toy for children of a larger growth. We conclude then that they should be taught music in such a way as to become not only critics but performers.

"The question, what is or is not, suitable for different ages may be easily answered; nor is there any difficulty in meeting the objection of those who say that the study of music is vulgar. We reply (1) in the first place, that they who are to be judges must also be performers, and that they should begin to practice early, although when they are older they may be spared the execution; they must have learned to appreciate what is good and to delight in it, thanks to the knowledge which they acquired in their youth. As to (2) the vulgarizing effect which music is supposed to exercise, this is a question (of degree), which we shall have no difficulty in determining, when we have considered to what extent freemen who are being trained to political virtue, should pursue the art, what melodies and what rhythms they should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be employed in teaching them to play, for even the instrument makes a difference. The answer to the objection turns

upon these distinctions; for it is quite possible that certain methods of teaching and learning music do really have a degrading effect. It is evident then that the learning of music ought not to impede the business of riper years, or to degrade the body or render it unfit for civil or military duties, whether for the early practice or for the later study of them.

"The right measure will be attained if students of music stop short of the arts which are practised in professional contests, and do not seek to acquire those fantastic marvels of execution which are now the fashion in such contests, and from these have passed into education. Let the young pursue their studies until they are able to feel delight in noble melodies and rhythms, and not merely in that common part of music in which every slave or child, and even some animals find pleasure.

"From these principles we may also infer what instruments should be used. The flute, or any other instrument which requires great skill, as for example the harp, ought not to be admitted into education, but only such as will make intelligent students of music or of the other parts of education. Besides, the flute is not an instrument which has a good moral effect; it is too exciting. The proper time for using it is when the performance aims, not at instruction, but at the relief of the passions. And there is a further objection; the impediment which the flute presents to the use of the voice detracts from its educational value. The ancients were therefore right in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen, although they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence, being also elated with their success, both before and after the Persian War, with more zeal than discernment they pursued every kind of knowledge, and so they

introduced the flute into education. At Lacedæmon there was a Choragus who led the Chorus with a flute, and at Athens the instrument became so popular that most freemen could play upon it. The popularity is shown by the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when he furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides. Later experience enabled men to judge what was, or was not, really conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and several other old-fashioned instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the many-stringed lyre, the 'heptagon,' 'triangle,' 'sambuca,' and the like—which are intended only to give pleasure to the hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand. There is a meaning also in the myth of the ancients, which tells how Athene invented the flute and then threw it away. It was not a bad idea of theirs, that the Goddess disliked the instrument because it made the face ugly; but with still more reason may we say that she rejected it because the acquirement of flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, since to Athene we ascribe both knowledge and art.

"Thus then we reject the professional instruments and also the professional mode of education in music—and by professional we mean that which is adopted in contests, for in this the performer practises the art, not for the sake of his own improvement, but in order to give pleasure, and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers. For this reason the execution of such music is not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and the result is that the performers are vulgarized, for the end at which they aim is bad. The vulgarity of the spectator tends to lower the character of the music and therefore of the performers: they look to him—he makes them what they are, and fashions even their bodies by the movements which he expects them to exhibit.

"We have also to consider rhythms and harmonies. Shall we use them all in education or make a distinction? and shall the distinction be that which is made by those who are engaged in education, or shall it be some other? For we see that music is produced by melody and rhythm, and we ought to know what influence these have respectively on education, and whether we should prefer excellence in melody or excellence in rhythm. But as the subject has been very well treated by many musicians of the present day, and also by philosophers who have had considerable experience of musical education, to these we would refer the more exact student of the subject; we shall only speak of it now after the manner of the legislator, having regard to general principles.

"We accept the division of melodies proposed by certain philosophers into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they say, a mode or harmony corresponding to it. But we maintain further that music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to (1) education, (2) purification (the word 'purification' we use at present without explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we will treat the subject with more precision); music may also serve (3) for intellectual enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the harmonies must be employed by us, but not all of them in the same manner. In education ethical melodies are to be preferred, but we may listen to the melodies of action and passion when they are performed by others. For feelings such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence over all. Some persons fall into a religious frenzy, whom we see disenthralled by the use of mystic

melodies, which bring healing and purification to the soul. Those who are influenced by pity or fear, and every emotional nature, have a like experience, others, in their degree are stirred by something which specially affects them, and all are in a manner purified, and their souls lightened and delighted. The melodies of purification likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind. Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which those who perform music at the theatre should be invited to compete. But since the spectators are of two kinds—the one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics, laborers, and the like—there ought to be contests and exhibitions instituted for the relaxation of the second class also. And the melodies will correspond to their minds; for as their minds are perverted from the natural state, so there are exaggerated and corrupted harmonies which are in like manner a perversion. A man receives pleasure from what is natural to him, and therefore professional musicians may be allowed to practice this lower sort of music before an audience of a lower type. But, for the purposes of education, as I have already said, those modes and melodies should be employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian; though we may include any others which are approved by philosophers who have had a musical education. The Socrates of the Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian, a fact of

which the connoisseurs of music offer many proofs, saying, among other things, that Philoxenus, having attempted to compose his tales as a dithyramb in the Dorian mode, found it impossible, and fell back into the more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And, whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and the mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean between the other harmonies (the Phrygian and the Lydian), it is evident that our youth should be taught the Dorian music.

"Two principles have to be kept in view, what is possible, what is becoming: at these every man ought to aim. But even these are relative to age; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the severe melodies, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs should be of the more relaxed kind. Wherefore, the musicians likewise blame Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to excite men), but because they have no strength in them. And so with a view to a time of life when men begin to grow old, they ought to practice the gentler harmonies and melodies as well as the others. And if there be any harmony, such as the Lydian above all others appears to be, which is suited to children of tender age, and possesses the elements both of order and of education, clearly (we ought to use it, for) education should be based upon three principles—the mean, the possible, the becoming, these three."

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CONDENSED FROM

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

BY

THOMAS STANLEY.

LONDON, 1701,

BY CHAS. M. HIGGINS.

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LIFE OF SOCRATES.

"The great English philosopher, John Stuart Mill, has somewhere observed that mankind cannot be too often reminded that there was once a man of the name of Socrates."

Prof. Harnack—"What is Christianity?"

"Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthroned,
By Gods, and Wisdom's self, as wisest own'd.
Thee the Athenians gave a poisonous draught,
But first thy wisdom from your lips they quaffed."

Note:—In this condensation we have preserved as far as possible the quaint language, punctuation, and obsolete words of this deep and interesting old book of two centuries ago.

C. M. H.

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CONDENSED FROM STANLEY'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, LONDON, 1701.

Socrates was by country an Athenian, born at Alopece, a town belonging to the Antiochian Tribe.

His parents were very mean; Sophroniscus (an Athenian) his father, a statuary or carver of images in stone; Phaenareta, his mother, a midwife, a woman of a bold, generous and quick spirit, as is implied by the character Plato gives her, of which professions of his parents, he is observed to have been so far from feeling ashamed, that he often took occasion to mention them.

The day of Socrates' birth was the sixth of the month Thargelion (about May 20) memorable for the birth of Diana. The day following, viz., the seventh of this month, was the birthday of Plato, both of which were kept with much solemnity by the Greek philosophers (even to the time of Plotinus) as is affirmed by Plutarch.

Plutarch saith that as soon as he was born, Sophroniscus, his father, consulting the oracle, was by it advised to suffer his son to do what he pleased, never compelling him to do what he disliked, nor diverting him from that whereto he was inclined; to give thanks for him by sacrifice to Jupiter Agoræus and the muses; to be no farther solicitous for him, he had one guide of his life within him, better than five hundred masters.

But his father, not observant of the oracle's direction, applied him to his own trade of carving statues, contrary to his inclination, whereupon some have argued him of disobedience, reporting that oftentimes, when his father bade him work, he refused, and went away, following his own will.

His father dying, left him fourscore minæ, which, being entrusted with a friend for improvement, they miscarried. This loss, by which he was reduced to incredible poverty, Socrates passed over with silence, but was thereupon necessitated to continue his trade for ordinary subsistence. Duris, Pausanias, and the Scholiast of Aristophanes affirm three statues of the Graces clothed (for so they were most anciently made, not naked) set up before the entrance into the tower at Athens, were his work. Pausanias implieth as much of a statue of Mercury in the same place; which Pliny seems not to have understood, who saith, they were made by a certain person named Socrates, but not the painter. But being naturally averse to this profession, he only followed it when necessity enforced him.

These intermissions from his trade were bestowed upon philosophy; whereunto he was naturally addicted, which being observed by Crito, a rich philosopher of Athens, he took him from his shop, being much in love with his candor and ingenuity, and instructed, or rather gave him the means to be instructed by others; taking so much care of him, that he never suffered him to want necessaries. And though his poverty was at first so great as to be brought by some into a proverb, yet he became at last, as Demetrius affirms, master of a house, and fourscore minæ, which Crito put out to interest: But his mind (saith Libanius) was raised far above his fortune, and more to the advantage of his country; not aiming at wealth, or the acquisition thereof by sordid arts, he considered that of all things which man can call his, the soul is the chief; that he only is truly happy who purifies that from vice; that the only means conducing thereto, is wisdom, in pursuit whereof he neglected all other ways of profit and pleasure.

We have alleged the universal consent of authors, that Socrates possessed the spirit of prophecy and was inspired and accompanied by a divine or spiritual attendant; yet is there some disagreement concerning the name, more concerning the nature of it.

It is commonly named his "dæmon", by which title, he himself owned it: Plato sometimes calls it his guardian; Apuleius his God, because (saith Saint Augustine) the name of dæmon at last grows odious.* But we must observe, that he did not account it a God, but sent from God, and in that sense affirmed the signs to come from God, to wit, by mediation of this spirit. This, besides other places, we may argue from his first epistle, where he speaks of the sign itself; he useth the word dæmon, when of the advice, whereof that sign was the instrument, he names God. Thus are we to understand these, and all other places of the same nature in Plato, where Socrates, speaking of the dæmon, saith, if it pleases God, you shall learn much, and the sign from God did not offer to stay me.

Others confine this prescience within the soul of Socrates himself, that he said, his genius advised him, they interpret it, as we usually say, his mind gave him, or so inclined him: in this sense indeed dæmon is not seldom taken; but this is inconsistent with the description which Socrates gives of a voice and signs ab exteriore, besides, this knowledge is not above human nature.

Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have a particular care of men; which Maximus Tyrius, and Apuleius describe in such manner, that they want only the name of a good angel.

*By this Augustine probably meant that the word "dæmon," had come to mean, as it now does with us, an evil spirit only, whereas originally the term dæmon or demon, was applied to a spiritual being either good or evil. Thus in a similar way practically the same word or term was originally used either for God or devil. For example, the word "deuce" we now apply to the great *evil* spirit or *devil* only, whereas we apply the term "Deus" to the great good spirit or God, yet both words, as may be seen, are substantially identical.—Ed.

But there want not those who give it that appellation: Lactanius having proved that God sends angels to guard mankind, adds, and Socrates affirmed there was a dæmon constantly near him, which kept him company from a child, by whose beck and instruction he guided his life. Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist, "He hath given his angels charge over thee, that they should keep thee in all thy ways." We learn out of Scripture (saith he) that every man hath a guardian appointed him from above; and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner: All souls having chosen a condition of living, they proceed in order thereto, being moved by the dæmon, which is proper to every one, and is sent along with them to preserve them in this life, and to perfect those things whereof they have made choice. And immediately after; you may believe, saith he, that Socrates means this, when he often affirmed that he was governed by a dæmon. More plainly Eugubinus, the dæmon of Socrates, saith he, mentioned so often by Plato (seeing that Socrates was a good man, and exhorted all men to virtue, and by the dæmon was always excited to that which was good) may perhaps not unjustly be thought his angel, as that which appeared to Baalam the prophet, and diverted him from his wickedness. But, Ficinus expressly; if you are not pleased, saith he, speaking of this spirit, to call the familiar guide of a man his spirit, call it if you please, his good angel.

Of his Person and Virtues.

As to his person, he was very unhandsome, of a melancholy complexion, bald, a flat nose, eyes sticking out, a severe downcast look, difficult in speech, and too concise, his language rough and careless, but more efficacious than all the eloquence of Themistocles, Pericles, or any

other; so acute that he could maintain either side in any question, therefore is reproached by Aristophanes as having two languages, whereof one was to defend wrong; fervent in dispute, often so transported, that he would beat himself, and tear his beard, to the derision of the standers-by, which he took quietly: patient to be reargued; sometimes he covered his face in discourse, that he might not be diverted by any object of sight: his constitution strong and hardy, which he preserved such, by taking diligent care of his health; well bearing cold, hunger, and upon occasion, excess of wine without disturbance: his habit the same in winter as in summer, having but one garment a year; no shoes, his diet sparing. In fine, his countenance promised so little, that Zopyrus a physiognomist who undertook to discover the dispositions of men by their looks said he was stupid, because there were obstructions in his jugular parts; adding, he was given to women and many other vices; whereat Alcibiades and other friends of his that were present, knowing, him free from those imputations, fell a laughing, but Socrates justified his skill, answering, he was by nature prone to those vices, but suppressed his inclinations by reason, whence Alcibiades used to say, he resembled the image of Silenus as he did indeed in his countenance, baldness, and flat nose carved on the outside of little boxes, sitting and playing on a pipe; for as those boxes within held images of the Gods, so was he adorned with chastity, integrity, and all inward beauty, ravished, as Plutarch saith, with a divine zeal to virtue, in all kinds whereof Xenophon, Laertius and others, assert these instances.

He was so wise, that he never erred in judging betwixt better and worse, nor thereto needed any other help: Yet he constantly professed, that he only knew that he

knew nothing: for which reason he was by the oracle o Apollo at Delphi, declared of all men the most wise in this manner to Charephon, many witnesses being present:—

Wise Sophocles, wiser Euripedes,
But wisest of all men is Socrates.

Apollo (saith Cicero) conceiving the only wisdom of mankind to consist in not thinking themselves to know those things whereof they are ignorant. This oracle, though he were nothing exalted with it himself, procured him much envy.

He was so religious, that he never did anything without advising, first with the Gods, never was known to attempt or speak any impiety.

He bore a reverence to the Gods, not human, but such as transcended the greatest fear: some say it was out of his great reverence to the divinity that he used to swear by a cock, a dog, and a plain tree (under which they used to sit) though it were interpreted atheism.

He was constant, and a lover of the public good, as appears in his acquitting the ten captains, in his denying thirty tyrants to fetch Leon in, his refusing to escape out of prison, and reproving such as grieved for his death. Xantippe used to say, that when the state was oppressed with a thousand miseries, he always went abroad and came home with the same look, never more cheerful, or more troubled, for he bore a mind smooth and cheerful upon all occasions, far remote from grief, and above all, fear: in his declining age, falling sick, he was asked by one that came to visit him, how he did? Very well (saith he) either way; if I live, I shall have more emulation, if I die, more praise.

He was so temperate, that he never preferred that which is pleasant before that which is wholesome. He

never did eat more than appetite (which was his sauce) made delightful; all drink was pleasing to him, because he never drank but when he was thirsty, and then with such temperate caution, that he poured out the first draught of water upon the ground, and if he were at any time invited to a feast, he, which to others is very difficult, with much ease took care not to eat more than consisted with his health, whereof he was very careful, because the exercises of the soul depend thereon and in order thereto, used to walk constantly before meals, whereupon being asked by one that observed it, what he did, I get broth, saith he, for my supper. To this temperance it is imputed, though Athens were often in his time visited with the pestilence, he alone escaped it.

He was so frugal, that how little soever he had, it was always enough. Wanting the means to live splendidly, he taught not anxiously how to acquire more, but how to accommodate his manner of life to that which he had, wherewith he was so contented, that he affirmed himself to come nearest the gods, because he wanted least. Seeing the great variety of things exposed to sale, he would say to himself, how many things there are that I need not; and often had in his mouth these verses,

> Purple, which gold and gems adorn,
> Is by tragedians to be worn.

Alcibiades ambitiously munificent, sent him many great presents: Xantippe admiring their value, desired him to accept them: We (answered Socrates) will contest in liberality with Alcibiades, not accepting, by a kind of munificence what he hath sent us.

To the same, who offered him a large plot of ground to build a house upon: and if I wanted shoes (saith he) would you give me leather to make them? But deserve I not to be derided if I accepted it?

He slighted Archelaus, King of Macedonia, and Scopas, son of Cranonias, and Euriloeus, son of Larisæus, not accepting their money nor going to them. Archelaus sending to him to desire his company, he said, he would not go to one, from whom he should receive benefits, which he could not equal with return. To Perdiccas, who demanded why he would not come to him, he answered, lest I die the most ignoble death, that is lest I receive a benefit which I cannot requite.

Coming home late one night from a feast, some wild young men knowing of his return, lay in wait for him, attired like furies, with vizards and torches, whereby they used to affright such as they met; Socrates as soon as he saw them, nothing troubled, made a stand, and fell to questioning them, according to his usual manner, as if he had been in the Lyceum or Academy.

He despised those that cavilled at him. Being told that such an one had reviled him behind his back: Let him beat me, saith he, whilst I am not by: And that another spoke ill of him: He hath not yet learned, said he, to speak well.

Being kicked by an insolent young fellow, and seeing, those that were with him much incensed, ready to pursue him, he said, what if an ass kick me, would you have me kick again, or sue him? But the fellow escaped not unpunished, for every one reproached him for this insolence, and called him the reviler, so that at last for vexation he hanged himself.

Another striking him a box on the ear, he said no more, but that it was hard a man knew not when to go abroad with a helmet.

Another fell upon him with much violence, which he endured without the least disturbance, suffering him to vent his anger, which he did so long, till he made his

face all swelled and bruised. Whensoever he perceived himself to grow incensed with any of his friends,

Before the storm arose,
He to the harbor goes.

He used to moderate his voice, to look smilingly and moderately upon them, reserving himself untainted with passion, by recourse to the contrary.

He taught not such as conversed with him to be covetous, for he took no money of his scholars, therein expressing his own liberality.

Hunger or want could never force him to flatter any: Yet was he very complaisant and facete in company: as he one day openly at dinner reproved one of his friends somewhat harshly. Plato said to him, had not this been better told in private? Socrates immediately answered, and had you not done better, if you had told me so in private? Being demanded what countryman he was, he answered, neither of Athens, nor Greece, but of the world. Sometimes he would feast in a fine robe, as Plato describes him, and when the time allowed, learned to sing, saying, it was no shame to learn anything which one knew not: He also danced every day, conceiving that exercise healthful; nor was he ashamed to play with little children.

He was so just, that he never in the least wronged any man, but on the contrary, benefited all such as conversed with him, as much as he could.

His continence was invincible: He despised the beauty of Alcibiades, derided Theodota and Caliste, two eminent courtezans of that time.

He took great delight in the conversation of good men; to such he communicated whatsoever he knew; with them he studied the writings of the ancient wise men, selecting what was good out of them.

His Wives and Children.

He had two wives, the first Xantippe, a citizen's daughter of Athens, as Theodoret affirms.

She was (according to the character A. Gellius gives her) curst, froward, chiding and scolding always both day and night, and for that reason he chose her, as he professed to Antisthenes, from observing, that they who would be excellent in horsemanship, chose the roughest horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they may easily rule others: He, desirous to use much conversation with men, took her to wife, knowing, if he could bear with her, he might easily converse with all men. To Alcibiades, who said, her scolding was intolerable, he professed it was nothing to him, being used to it, like such as live in the continual noise of a mill: besides, saith he, cannot you endure the cackling of hens? But they, answered Alcibiades, bring me eggs and chickens: and my Xantippe, replies Socrates, children.

Of her impatience and his sufferance, there are several instances: one day before some of his friends, she fell into the usual extravagancies of her passion, whereupon he not answering anything, went forth with them, but was no sooner out at the door, when she, running up into the chamber, threw down water upon his head, whereat turning to his friends, did I not tell you, saith he, that after so much thunder we should have rain?

Having brought Euthydemus from the Palæstræ to dine with him, Xantippe running to the table, angry, overturned it; Euthydemus, much troubled, rose up, and would have gone away, when Socrates said: did not a hen the other day, the very same thing at your house, yet I was not angry thereat?

His other wife was named Myrto, niece to Lysimachus,

daughter of Aristedes, not the just, as Laertius, and from him Suidas, affirms, but another of that name, the third from him, as is observed by Athenæus, for the two daughters of Aristides the Just, could not but be of great age before the 77th Olympiad, wherein Socrates was born, long before which time Aristides died an old man in exile; for that Themistocles died the second year of the 77th Olympiad is certain, and as Æmilius Probus affirms, Aristides died four years before Themistocles was banished from Athens, hereupon Plutarch more cautiously calls her not the daughter, but niece of Aristides.

Some, because Xantippe (as is manifest from Plato) outlived him, believe he was first married to Myrto, but that he had both these wives at the same time, which is attested by Demetrius Phalereus, Aristoxenus (to whom Athenaeus saith, that Aristotle gave the ground) Calisthenes and Porphyrius: whence Aristippus in his epistle to his daughter Myrto, advised her to go to Athens, and above all to honor Xantippe and Myrto, and to live with them as he with Socrates.

The occasion, whereupon the Athenians, who from the time of Cecrops had strictly observed single marriage, allowed bigamy, in the time of Socrates, was this; in the second year of the 87th Olympiad and the third of the 88th, Athens was visited extremely with the pestilence, which attended by war and famine occasioned so great a scarcity of men, that they made an edict it might be lawful for any that would to take two wives. Euripedes made use of this indulgence, and that Socrates also did so, is attested by Satyrus the peripatetic, and Hieronymus the Rhodian, who recorded the Order; to which Athenæus imputes the silence of the comic poets in this particular, who omitted no grounds of reproach. Plu-

tarch implies, that he took her out of charity, for she was a widow (without any portion or dowry) extremely in want.

Porphyrus reports, that when these two (Xantippe and Myrto) quarrelled, they would at last fall both upon Socrates, and beat him, because he stood by and never parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with him, as with one another.

By Xantippe he had a son, named Lamprocles, who could not brook her impatience so well as his father, and being vexed by her into disobedience, was reclaimed by Socrates; he died young, as may be gathered from Plutarch, who saith, Timarchus of Chæronea, dying very young, desired earnestly of Socrates that he might be buried near his son Lamprocles, who died but few days before, being his dear friend, and of the same age. It appears from Plato, that he had more sons by her, for in his Apology he mentions three, two grown men, the other a child, which seems to be the same, brought by Xantippe to him in prison the day of his death, and as Plutarch describes it, held in her lap.

By Myrto he had two sons: the eldest Sophroniscus, the youngest Menedemus, or Menexenus, though some say he had Menedemus by Xantippe.

The Teachers of Socrates.

The first master of Socrates was Anaxagoras. Aristoneus saith, that as soon as Anaxagoras left the city, Socrates applied himself to Archelaus, which, according to Porphyrius, was in the seventeenth year of his age. Of him he was much beloved, and traveled with him to Samos, to Pytho, and to the Isthmus.

He was pupil likewise to Damon, whom Plato calls a most pleasing teacher of Music, and all other things that

he would teach himself, to young men. Damon was pupil to Agathocles, master to Pericles, Clinias and others; intimate with Prodicus. He was banished by the unjust ostracism of the Athenians for his excellence in music.

To these teachers add Diotyma and Aspasia, women excellently learned, the first supposed to have been inspired with a prophetical spirit. By her Socrates affirmed that he was instructed concerning love, by corporeal beauty to find out that of the soul; of the angelical mind, of God. See Plato's Phaedrus, and that long discourse in his Symposium upon this subject, which Socrates confesseth to be owing to her.

Aspasia was a famous Milesian woman, not only excellent herself in rhetoric, but brought many scholars to great perfection in it, of whom were Pericles the Athenian and (as himself acknowledgeth) Socrates.

Of Euenus he learned poetry, of Ichomachus, husbandry, of Theodorus Geometry.

Aristagoras a Melian, is named likewise as his master.

His School and Pupils.

That Socrates had a proper school, may be argued from Aristophanes, who derided some particulars in it, and calls it his Phrontisterium.

Plato and Phædrus mention as places frequented by him and his auditors, the academy Lycæum, and a pleasant meadow without the city on the side of the River Ilissus.

Xenophon affirms, he was continually abroad, that in the morning he visited the places of public walking and exercise; when it was full, the forum; and the rest of the day he sought out the most populous meetings, where he disputed openly for every one to hear.

He did only teach, saith Plutarch, when the benches were prepared, and himself in the chair, or in set hours of reading and discourse, or appointments of walking with his friends, but even when he played, when he ate or drank, when he was in the camp or market; finally, when he was in prison; thus he made every place a school of virtue.

His manner of teaching was answerable to his opinion, that the soul pre-existent to the body, in her first separate condition, endowed with perfect knowledge, by immersion into matter, became stupefied, and in a manner lost, until awakened by discourse from sensible objects; whereby by degrees she recovers her first knowledge; for this reason he taught only by irony and induction: In this irony (saith Cicero) and dissimulation he far exceeded all men in pleasantness and urbanity.

Induction is by Cicero defined a manner of discourse, which gains the assent of him with whom it is held, to things not doubtful, by which assents it causeth that he yield to a doubtful thing, by reason of the likeness it hath to those things whereunto he assented: This kind of speech Socrates most used, because he would not himself use any argument of persuasion, but rather chose to work something out of that which was granted by him with whom he disputed, which he, by reason of that which he already yielded unto, must necessarily approve; of which he gives a large example in Plato's Meno.

For this reason he used to say, his skill had some affinity with that of his mother, he being like a midwife' though barren (as he modestly affirms) in himself, endeavored with a particular gift in assisting others, to bring forth what they had within themselves; and this was one reason why he refused to take money, affirming

that he knew nothing himself, and that he was never master to any.

These disputes of Socrates were committed to writing by his scholars, wherein Xenophon gave example to the rest, in doing it first, with most punctualness, as Plato with most liberty, intermixing so much of his own, that it is not easy to distinguish the master from the scholar: whence Socrates hearing him recite his Lysis, said, how many things doth this young man feign of me?

Of His Philosophy.

Porphyrius, who traduced Socrates, affirms, he was ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to write, which, when upon any occasion he did, it was to derision, and that he could read no better than a stammering schoolboy: To which we shall oppose these authorities: Xenophon who attests he was excellent in all kinds of learning, instanceth in Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astrology; Plato, in Natural Philosophy; Idomeneus, in Rhetoric: Laertius in medicine: in a word, Cicero avers, that by the testimony of learned men, and the judgment of all Greece, as well in wisdom, acuteness, politeness and subtlety, as in eloquence, variety and copiousness, to whatsoever part he gave himself, he was without exception Prince of all.

Noting how little advantage speculation brought to the life and conversation of mankind, Socrates opposed all pure science or speculative philosophy, and applied himself almost purely to practical ethics. He first, saith Cicero, called philosophy away from things involved by nature in secrecy, wherein, until his time all philosophers had been employed, and brought her to common life, to inquire of virtues and vices, good and evil.

Man, who was the sole subject of his philosophy, having a twofold relation of divine speculation and human

conversation, his doctrines were in the former respect metaphysical, in the latter moral.

His metaphysical opinions may be thus collected and abridged out of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch and others.

Philosophy is the way to true happiness, the offices whereof are two, to contemplate God, and to abstract the soul from corporeal sense.

There are three principles of all things, God, Matter, and Ideas; God is the universal intellect; matter the subject of generation and corruption; idea is an incorporeal substance, the intellect of God; God the Intellect of the World.

God is one, perfect in Himself, giving the being, and well-being of every creature; what He is (saith he) I know not, what He is not, I know.

That God, not chance, made the world and all creatures; that He will reward such as please Him, and punish such as displease Him. That God is such and so great that He at once sees all, hears all, is everywhere, and orders all. This is the sum of his discourse with Aristodemus, to which we may annex what is cited under his name (if not mistaken) by Stobæus.

> Care, if by care ought may effected be;
> If not, why car'st thou, when God cares for thee?

He held, that the Gods know all things, said, done, or silently desired.

The soul is immortal, for what is always movable is immortal.

The soul is pre-existent to the body, endued with knowledge of eternal ideas. Thus is all her learning only reminiscence, a recovery of her first knowledge.

The body being compounded, that is, made up of several combined elements, is, like all material compounds, destructible, and is therefore dissolved by death: The

soul, being simple or of the nature of an element, is, like all elements, indestructible, and is therefore incapable of corruption, and passeth into another life. The souls of men are divine, to whom, when they go out of the body, the way of their return to Heaven is open, which to the best and most just is the most expedite.

The souls of the good after death, are in a happy estate, united to God in a blessed inaccessible place; the bad, in convenient places, suffer condign punishment.

To do good, is the best course of life, therein fortune hath share.

They are best, and best pleasing to God, who do anything, with any art or calling; who followeth none, is useless, to the public, and hated of God.

He taught everywhere, that a just man and a happy, were all one, and used to curse him who first by opinion divided honesty and profit (which are coherent by nature) as having done an impious act, for they are truly wicked who separate profitable and just, which depends on law. The Stoics have followed him so far, that whatsoever is honest, the same they esteem profitable.

Being demanded by Gorgius, if he accounted not the great King of Persia happy? I know not, answered he, how he is furnished with learning and virtue; as conceiving that true happiness consisteth in these two, not in the frail gifts of fortune.

He said he wondered at those who carve images of stone, that they take such care to make stones resemble men, whilst they neglect, and suffer themselves to resemble stones.

He advised young men to behold themselves every day in a glass, that if they were beautiful, they might study to deserve it; if deformed, to supply or hide it by learning.

He said, to begin well is not a small thing, but depending on a small moment.

He said, virtue was the beauty, vice the deformity of the soul.

He said, outward beauty was a sign of inward beauty, and therefore chose such auditors.

In the life of man, as in an image, every part ought to be beautiful.

To one who demanded what nobility is, he answered, a good temper of soul and body.

He said, the office of a wise man is to discern what is good and honest, and to shun that which is dishonest.

Justice and every other virtue is wisdom.

To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know those things whereof we are ignorant, is next to madness.

That a pious person is rightly defined, such a one as knows what is lawful as to the Gods; just, he that knows what is lawful to men; that a man is wise as far as he knows; that what is profitable is fair to that whereto it is profitable.

He conceived the only wisdom of man to consist in not thinking he understands those things which he doth not understand.

He affirmed, there is but one good thing, knowledge; one ill, ignorance; but that riches and nobility had nothing in them of worth, but on the contrary all evils.

When a man openeth his mouth, his virtues are as manifest, as images in a temple.

Being demanded what wisdom was, he answered, the composure of the soul; being demanded who were wise, they, said he, who do not easily err.

He said, be not forward in speech, for many times the tongue hath cut off the head.

In war, steel is better than gold; in life, wisdom excelleth wealth.

That the greatest of vices is ingratitude; the greatest of obligations, that to parents; that a disobedient son the Gods will not bless, nor men love.

Our prayers should be for blessings in general, for God knows best what is good for us; our offerings proportioned to our abilities, for He considers integrity, not munificence.

He said (with the Pythian Oracle) that the Gods are to be worshipped according to the law of the city where a man lives, they who do otherwise, he thought superstitious and vain.

The best way of worshipping God is to do what He commands.

That a man ought to inure himself to voluntary labor and sufferance, so as what shall be imposed by necessity, may appear in him not compulsive but free; that soft ways of living in pleasures beget no good constitution of body, nor knowledge of the mind; that tolerance raiseth us to high attempts, is the effect of his discourse with Aristippus.

He said, Death resembled either a deep sleep, or a long journey out of our native country, or an absolute annihilation of soul and body, examining all which he affirmed, death to be in none of those respects evil; as to the first, saith Plutarch, it is not ill with those that sleep, and we esteem that sleep sweetest which is deepest; and if we look on it as a journey, it is rather a blessing, for thereby we are freed from the slavery and affections of the flesh which possess and infatuate the mind; in the last respect, it makes us insensible of ill and pain, as well as of good and pleasure.

He said, an honest death is better than a dishonest life.

That happiness consists not in luxury and pride, that to want nothing is divine, to want the least next to

divine, is the conclusion of his discourse with Antipho. Being demanded whom he thought richest, he answered, him who is contented with least, for content is the riches of nature. It is the property of God to need nothing; to need least, nighest to God.

That health of body ought diligently to be preserved, as that whereon all knowledge of the soul depends, is the sum of his discourse with Epigenes.

He advised one that complained he had no delight in his meat, to refrain from eating, whereby his diet would become more pleasant, cheap and wholesome.

He said, the hungry wanted no sauce, the thirsty no choice of wines.

He commended quiet and leisure above all things.

Being asked what was a young man's virtue, he answered, to do nothing too much.

He said, we ought not to seek pleasures in others, but in ourselves, the body being predisposed according as it ought.

Being demanded from what things we ought to refrain most, he answered, from sordid unjust pleasures.

When a woman saith she loveth thee, take heed of those words, more than when she revileth thee.

There is no better way to glory than to endeavor to be good, as well as to seem such.

Good men must let the world see that their manners are more firm than an oath.

They are not kings, he said, who are in possession of a throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who know how to govern.

A king is a ruler of willing subjects according to the laws, a tyrant is a ruler of subjects against their will, not according to the laws, but arbitrary.

The offices of a good citizen are in peace, to enrich the

commonwealth, in war to subdue the enemies thereof, in embassy to make friends of foes, in sedition to appease the people by eloquence.

Being demanded, what city was strongest, he said, that which hath good men.

Being demanded, what city is best, he said, that wherein are proposed most rewards of virtue.

Being demanded, what city lives best, he said, that which liveth according to law, and punisheth the unjust.

His Scholars and Auditors.

Whereas (saith Cicero) many springing from Socrates by reason that out of his several various disputes diffused everywhere, one laid hold of one thing, another of another; there were some, as it were, so many several families differing amongst themselves, much disjoined and disagreeing, yet all these philosophers would be called, and conceived themselves to be the Socratics: of these were

Plato, from whom came Aristotle and Xenocrates, the first taking the name of Peripatetic, the other of Academic.

Antisthenes, who chiefly affected the patience and hardiness in Socrates, his discourse, from whom came first the Cynics, then the Stoics.

Aristippus, who was more delighted with his more voluptuous disputations, from him sprung the Cyrenaic Philosophy.

Others there were who likewise called themselves Socratics, but their sects by the strength and arguments of the former, are broken and quite extinct: such were

Phædo, an Elean, who instituted a particular school, from him called Eliack, which afterwards was called Eretriack, from Menedemus, who taught at Eretria, from him Pyrrho, thence the Pyrrhonians.

Euclid of Megara, institutor of the Megaric school, so named from Clinomachus, his disciple, called the dialectic, ending in Zeno, the Citian, who introduced the Stoic.

The Herillians are named also, as a sect that would be called Socratic. To these recited by Cicero, Suidas adds

Bryso of Heraclea, who, together with Euclid, invented disputative logic.

Theodorus, surnamed the Atheist, who invented a peculiar sect called Theodorean, the opinion which he taught was indifference.

Other disciples of Socrates there were, who followed his philosophy, not appropriating out of it any particular sect, and therefore most properly deserve the title of Socratics, such are Crito, Chærephon, Xenophon Æschines, Simias, Cebes, Glauco, and Terpsion.

The last kind of his auditors were those who made no profession of philosophy, of whom were

Critias and Alcibiades, who afterwards proved the most ambitious spirits of the Athenians, but it was discovered in neither whilst they conversed with Socrates, either that their youth was not capable of expressing their vice, or that they cunningly complied (as Xenophon conjectures) with Socrates, in hopes of being by his conversation enabled to manage their former designs, which as soon as they attempted they left off their friendship with Socrates. Critias fell from him and converted his affection into hate, because he reproved his love to Euthydemus; Alcibiades, naturally dissolute, was reclaimed by Socrates, and continued such whilst he conversed with him. He was of form so exquisite as gave occasion to some to calumniate the friendship betwixt him and Socrates, to which effect Aristoxenus is cited

by Laertius and Athenæus, and some verses of Aspasia by the latter; his vindication we refer to Plato and Xenophon.

Of Socrates his instructions to Alcibiades there are these instances.

He told him he was nothing of what a man ought to be, that he had no advantage by the greatness of his birth above an ordinary porter; whereat Alcibiades, much troubled, with tears besought him to instruct him in virtue, and to reform his vices.

Perceiving Alcibiades to be exceedingly proud of his riches and lands, he showed him a map of the world, and bade him find Attica therein; which done, he desired that he would show him his own lands, he answered, that they were not there. Do you boast, replies Socrates, of that which you see is no (considerable) part of the earth?

Alcibiades being by reason of his youth bashful and fearful to make an oration to the people, Socrates thus encouraged him. Do you not esteem (saith he) that shoemaker (naming him) an inconsiderable fellow? Alcibiades assenting; and so likewise (continues he) that crier and that tent-maker? Alcibiades granting this, doth not, saith he, the Athenian Commonwealth consist of these? If you contemn them single, fear them not in an Assembly. To these add

The four sons of Crito the philosopher; the eldest, Critobolus, exceeding handsome and rich, but by Socrates (who valued his own estate at five minæ) demonstrated to be poorer than himself.

The second Aermogenes, who falling into poverty, Socrates persuaded Diodorus his friend, to entertain.

The third, Epigenes, a young man of an infirm body, whom Socrates advised to study his own health, as that

wherein consisted the well-being and knowledge of his mind.

The youngest, Cresippus.

Of poets, Euripides (as the writer of his life affirms) and Euenus.

Of orators, Lysias, eminent in that kind easy to be understood, hard to be imitated, he came to Athens in the second year of the 82nd Olympiad. Lysis, whom of refractory he made pliant, and Isocrates, of whom when very young, Socrates presaged great things.

In the number of his scholars and auditors were also Adimantus and Glauco, sons to Aristo, brothers to Plato: and Charmides, son of Glauco. Glauco, before he was twenty years old, had taken upon him to be an orator, and aimed at some great office in the commonwealth, not to be wrought off from this fancy which made him everywhere appear ridiculous, until addressed by some friends to Socrates, who made him acknowledge his own error and ignorance of that which he had undertaken. On the contrary, his son Glauco, of excellent parts, fit for any office in the commonwealth, yet timorously shunning all public affairs, was by Socrates induced to undertake the magistracy.

Nicostratus, son of Theidotides and his brother Theodotus.

Æantodorus, and his brother Apollodorus.

Lysanias, father of Æschines.

Chærecrates, brother to Chærephon, betwixt whom there was a great quarrel, but reconciled by Socrates.

Paralus, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages.

Antipho, a Cephisiean, father of Epigenes: with whom he discoursed of self-indulgence, teaching gratis, and of veracity in Xenophon.

Eumares, a Phliasian, and Xenomedes, an Athenian.

Besides these, there are with whom Socrates discoursed and instructed,

Aristodemus, surnamed the little, who would not sacrifice, pray, or use divination, but derided all such as did, was by Socrates convinced.

Aristarchus troubled that he had a charge of kindred lying upon him, by Socrates converted to a willing liberality towards them.

Eutherus, who returning from travel, his lands taken away, his father having left him nothing, chose rather to follow a trade than to apply himself to friends, but diverted by Socrates.

Diodorus, whom Socrates persuaded to take Hermogenes.

Enthydemus, who had collected many sentences of poets and sophists, thought he excelled all his equals, and hoped no less of his superiors, who was by Socrates constrained to acknowledge his own error and ignorance, and departed much troubled.

Hippias, an Elean, with whom Socrates discoursed of justice.

Nicomedes, Pericles, and Iphicrates, with whom he discoursed concerning the office of a General. Into the last he infused courage, by showing him the cocks of Midas brustling against those of Callias.

Theætetus, disputing of Knowledge, he dismissed, inspired as it were with divine wisdom.

Euthyphron, who intended to accuse his own father, he dissuaded.

With Pharrhasius, a painter, Clito, a statuary, and Pistias, an armorer, he disputes in Xenophon concerning their several arts.

His Writings.

They who affirm that Socrates wrote nothing (as Cicero, Plutarch, Dion, Chrysostom, Aristides, Origen, and others) mean in respect to his philosophy, in which kind he never wrote anything himself, but what he discoursed was committed to writing by Xenophon, Plato and others of his scholars. Hence the works of Plato (particularly Phædo) went under the name of Socrates, and are so cited by Aristotle; but that some things were written by Socrates himself, is evident from those who affirm.

He wrote, together with Euripides, and aided him in making tragedies, whence Mnesilochus.

> The Phrygians is Euripides new play
> But Socrates gave it the best array.

And again, Euripides is steered by Socrates and Callias.

> Now thou with pride and self-conceit o'erflow'st;
> But all the cause to Socrates thou owest.

Hither refer we that of Cicero, who saith, when Euripides made his play Orestes, Socrates revoked the three first verses. He wrote also some fables of Æsop in verse, not very elegant, mentioned by Plato, Plutarch, and Lærtius, beginning thus:

> To those who dwelt in Corinth, Æsop said,
> Virtue with vulgar wisdom be not weigh'd.

A pæan or hymn in honor of Apollo and Diana: One that went under his name, beginning thus:

> Dælian Apollo, and thou fair,
> Diana, hail; immortal pair.

is by Dyonisidorus denied to be his: This is mentioned also by Plato, to which some add

The Encomium of Gryllus, son of Xenophon, slain in the Mantinean Fight, which the disagreement of times will not allow; more certain it is he framed

Dialogues, which he gave to Æschines, seeing him in want, that he might get money by them; to these add Epistles, some whereof are published by Leo Allatius; that he writ more is implied by Arrian and Athenæus.

His Military Actions.

It is observed by many, that Socrates little affected travel, his life being wholly spent at home, saving when he went out in military service.

In the second year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad broke forth a war, the greatest that ever happened amongst the Grecians, betwixt the Lacedemonians and the Athenians. In this war was Socrates thrice personally engaged; first at the siege of Polydæa. Here Alcibiades, his comrade, attests, Socrates outwent all soldiers in hardiness; and if at any time, saith he, as it often happens in war, the provisions failed, there was none could bear the want of meat and drink like him, yet on the other side in times of feasting, he only seemed to enjoy them, and though of himself he would not drink, yet being invited, he far out-drank all others, and which is strangest of all, never any man saw him drunk. The excesses of cold in the winter, which in that country are extraordinary, he as wonderfully endured, when the frost was so sharp, that very few durst go out of their tents, and those wrapping their legs and thighs in skins and furs, he went along with them, having no more clothes than those he usually wore. He walked barefooted upon the ice with less tenderness than others in shoes, to the wonder of the soldiers, who thought themselves reproached by his hardiness. His contemplative rapture at the same time was no less worthy admiration; he fell into a deep contemplation one morning, and continued all the while standing in the same posture; at noon it was taken notice of by the soldiers; who told it from

one another, that Socrates had stood still in the same place all that morning: in the evening some Ionian soldiers wrapping themselves warm, came and lay down by him in the open field, to watch if he would continue all night in the same posture, which he did, until the morning, and as soon as the sun arose, saluted it, and retired. Of these kind of raptures A. Gellius saith he had many. We must not omit how he behaved himself there in fight; seeing his friend Alcibiades deeply engaged, and much wounded, he stepped before him, defended him and his arms from the enemy, and brought him safely off. Nor was his modesty inferior to his love or courage, for whereas after the battle, the generals were to bestow an honorable reward upon him that had fought best, the judges assigned it to Socrates, he declined it, and by his earnest intercession, procured that it might be conferred upon Alcibiades.

The second action of Socrates was in the first year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad at Delium, a town in Boetia. Socrates in this engagement behaved himself with his accustomed valor (so well, that Laches confesseth, if the rest had fought like him, they had not lost the day) and care of his friends; for seeing Xenophon unhorsed in the flight, and thrown down on the ground (himself likewise having his horse slain under him, fought on foot) he took him upon his shoulders and carried him many a stadia, and defended him till they gave over the pursuit. And being thus at the loss of the day, with others dispersed in flight (amongst whom was Laches the Archon, and Alcibiades) in the constant slowness of his retreat expressed a courage far above Laches, frequently looking back and round about, as greedy to be revenged of the enemy, if any should pursue them; which was the means that brought him off more safely, for they who

express least fear in their retreat, are less subject to be assaulted, than such as repose their confidence in flying.

His Falling out with the Sophists and with Anytus. The Cause of his Death.

The Sophists, masters of language in those times, saith Cicero (whereof was Gorgius of Lecontium, Thrasimachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus a Cian, Hippias an Elian, and many others) professed in arrogant words to teach, how an inferior cause (such was their phrase) might by speaking, be made superior, and used a sweet fluent kind of rhetoric, argute in sentence, lofty in words, fitter for ostentation than pleading, for the schools and academies, rather than the forum, were so highly esteemed, that wheresoever they came, they could persuade the young men to forsake all other conversation for theirs. These Socrates opposed; and often by his subtlety of disputing, refelling their principles, with his accustomed interrogatories, demonstrated that they were indeed much beneath the esteem they had gained, that they themselves understood nothing of that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew the young men from their empty conversation: these, who till then had been looked upon as angels for wit and eloquence, he proved to be vain affecters of words, ignorant of those things which they professed, and had more need to give money to be taught, than to take (as they used) money for teaching. The Athenians taken with these reproofs which Socrates gave them, derided them, and excited their children to the study of solid virtue.

Another quarrel Socrates had of long continuance, for it was the occasion of his death, but begun many years before, with Anytus, an orator by profession, privately

maintained and enriched by leather-dressers: He had put two of his sons to Socrates to be taught, but not being pleased, that whilst they were in that way, they had not learned so much, as to be able thereby to get their living; he took them from Socrates, and put them to that trade which himself was ashamed to own; wherewith Socrates being much displeased in respect of the two youths, whose ruin he presaged, (and truly, for they fell afterwards into debaucheries which occasioned it) spared not to reproach Anytus in discoursing to his scholars, telling them, that the trade of dressing leather was not fit to be spoken of amongst young men, for they who benefit themselves by any art, cherish and profess it, as Acumenus Physic, Damon and Connus Music; even Anytus, whilst his sons were his scholars, was not ashamed of that which they learned, though it were not sufficient to maintain them by pleading; but for himself, he gloried that he walked invisible with Pluto's Helmet, or Gyges's Ring, concealing from the people the true means of his subsistence, which indeed was by dressing leather, which was not just; to be ashamed of the trade, and not of the profit; for he ought to own this, or to disclaim that.

Anytus (saith Ælian) to answer this reproach, studied all occasions and ways of revenge; but feared the Athenians, doubting if he should accuse Socrates, how they would take it, his name being in high esteem for many respects, chiefly for opposing the Sophists, who neither taught nor knew any solid learning. He advised with Melitus, a young man, an orator, unknown to Socrates, described by Plato, with long plain hair, a high nose, and a thin beard, one that for a drachm might be bought into anything, by whose counsel he begins by making trial in lesser things, to found how the Athen-

ians would entertain a charge against his life; for to have accused him upon the very first, he conceived unsafe, as well for the reason already mentioned, as lest the friends and followers of Socrates should divert the anger of the judges upon himself, for falsely accusing a person so far from being guilty of any wrong to the state, that he was the only ornament thereof. To this end he suborns Aristophanes, a comic poet, whose only business was to raise mirth, to bring Socrates upon the stage, taxing him with crimes which most men knew him free from, impertinent discourse, making an ill cause by argument seem good, introducing new and strange deities, whilst himself believed and reverenced none; hereby to insinuate an ill opinion of him, even into those who most frequented him. Aristophanes taking this theme, interweaves it with much abusive mirth; the best of the Grecians was his subject, not Cleon, the Lacedæmonians, the Thebans, or Pericles himself, but a person dear to all the Gods, especially Apollo. At first (by reason of the novelty of the thing, the unusual personating of Socrates upon the stage) the Athenians, who expected nothing less, were struck with wonder. Then (being naturally envious, apt to detract from the best persons, not only of such as bore office in the commonwealth, but any that were eminent for learning and virtue) they begun to be taken with the Clouds (so was the play named) and cried up the actor that personated Socrates with more applause than ever any before, giving him with many shouts the victory, and sending word to the judges, that they should set down no name but that of Aristophanes. Socrates came seldom to the theatre, unless when Euripides contested with any new tragedian, there, or in the Pyræum, then he went, for he affected the wisdom, goodness, and sweetness of his

verse; sometimes Alcibiades and Critias would invite him to a comedy, and in a manner compel him; for he was so far from esteeming comedians, that he contemned them as lying, abusing, and unprofitable; whereat they were much displeased: These (with other things suggested by Anytus and Melitus) were the ground of Aristophanes in his comedy, who, it is likely, got a great sum of money by it, they being eager in prosecution of their design, and he prepared by want, and malice, to receive their impression: In fine, the play got extraordinary credit, that of Cratonus being verified.

The theatre was then
Fill'd with malicious men.

It being at that time the feast of Bacchus, a multitude of Grecians went to see the play: Socrates being personated on the stage and often named, (nor was it much the players should represent him, for the potters frequently did it upon their stone jugs) the strangers that were present (not knowing whom the comedy abused) raised a hum and whisper, everyone asking who that Socrates was, which he observing (for he came not thither by chance, but because he knew himself should be abused in the play, had chosen the most conspicuous seat in the theatre) to put the strangers out of doubt, he rose up, and all the while the play lasted, continued in that posture (laughing). One that was present asked him if it did not vex him to see himself brought upon the stage. Not at all (answered he) methinks I am at a feast where every one enjoys me. This comedy was first acted when Isarchus was Archon, Cratinus Victor in the first year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad: Aristophanes being by some reprehended for it, to vindicate himself, caused it to be acted again the year following Amintas being Archon, but with worse order than at first

Amipsias also (another comic poet) derided him thus in Tribune.

> O Socrates, the best of few, the vainest
> Of many men; and art thou come amongst us?
> Where is thy gown? did not this great misfortune
> Befall thee by the leather-dresser's help?

His Trial.

Many years passed since the first falling out betwixt Socrates and Anytus, during which time one continued openly reproving, the other, secretly undermining, until at length Anytus seeing the time suit with his design, procured Melitus to prefer a bill against him to the Senate in these terms.

Melitus, son of Melitus, a Pythean, accuseth Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, an Alopecian. Socrates, violates the law, not believing the Deities which this city believeth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates the law likewise in corrupting youth; the punishment death.

This Bill being preferred upon oath, Crito became bound to the Judges for his appearance at the day of trial. Soon after Anytus sent privately to him, desiring him to forbear the mention of his trade, and assuring him that he would thereupon withdraw his action; but Socrates returned answer, that he would never forbear speaking truth as long as he lived, that he would always use the same speeches concerning him; that his accusation was not of force enough to make him refrain from speaking those things which he thought himself before obliged to say.

The interval of time betwixt his accusation and trial, he employed in his usual philosophical exercises, not taking any care to provide his defence, for which being observed and questioned by Hermogenes, son of Hip-

ponicus, I provide apology enough (saith he) in considering and pursuing the constant course of my life; Hermogenes demanding how that could be, because (saith he) I never did any unjust act, which I conceive the best apology. But we often see judges (saith Hermogenes) overswayed by rhetoric, to condemn the innocent, and acquit the guilty. The truth is, replied Socrates, going about to make my apology, I was twice withheld by the dæmon, whereat Hermogenes wondering, is it strange (continues he) that God should think it fit for me to die at this time? Hitherto no man hath lived more uprightly, which as it is now my greatest comfort, so it was the greatest delight to myself and friends; if I live longer, I know I must undergo what is proper to old age, defects of hearing and sight, slowness to apprehend, aptness to forget, how can I then be pleased to live longer and grow worse: it is likely God in His love to me hath ordained that I should die in the most convenient age, and by the gentlest means; for if I die by sentence I am allowed the benefit of the most easy kind of death; I shall give my friends the least trouble, I shall do nothing unseemly before those that are present, and shall depart sound in body and soul; is not this very desirable? God with much reason forbids me to make any defence. If I could effect it, I should only stay longer to be taken away by the torment of diseases, and imperfections of age, which truly Hermogenes I desire not; if when I give an account of my actions towards God and men, the judges think fit to condemn me, I will rather choose to die than beg of them a life worse than death.

Other friends used the same persuasions to him with assurance of victory. Lysias, an excellent orator, offered him an oration, which he had written in his de-

fence, desiring him if he thought good to make use of it at his trial; Socrates perused it, and told him, that it was a good one, but not fit for him. Lysias asking how that could be? Why (saith he) may not a garment or shoes be rich, yet not fit for me? If you should bring me Sicionian shoes, I would not wear them though they were fit for my feet, because they are effeminate: He conceived the oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but not stout and manly; for though it were very bitter against the judges, yet was it more rhetorical than became a philosopher.

The day of trial being come, Anytus, Lyco, and Melitus prepared to accuse him, one in behalf of the people, the second of the orators, the last of the poets. Melitus first went up into the chair proper for that purpose, and there spoke an oration which was in itself mean enough, but withal delivered so unhappily and schoolboy like, that sometimes he was out with fear, and turned about to be prompted like a player, enough to beget laughter even in those that were most concerned in so serious a cause.

That Socrates persuaded his auditors to contemn the received laws, saying it was fit only for fools to be governed by a bean (meaning the votes of the Senate counted by beans.)

That he was intimately conversant with Critias and Alcibiades, one most covetous and violent in the oligarchy, the other ambitious of tyranny.

That he taught disrespect and disobedience to parents, telling his scholars he would make them wiser than their fathers, and that it was lawful for any one to bind his father if he were mad, and for those that were the more wise, to do as much to those that were less wise.

That he taught also disrespect of all other kinsmen,

saying they were not useful to the sick, or to the accused, the first being in more need of a physician, the latter of an orator; that the goodwill of unable friends was nothing worth, that only the most knowing persons were most worthy of honor; by which means he would arrogate all respect to himself.

That he selected out of the poets some ill places, and perverted others that were not so, to excite his friends to impious actions.

That he often repeated and misinterpreted these words of Homer, as if the poet allowed the poor to be beaten.

> When he a Prince, or some great person meets,
> Such with soft language kindly thus he greets;
> Happy above the reach of fear are you;
> Sit down, and bid your followers do so too.
> But of the lower sort when any speaks,
> Forth these words with blows his anger breaks,
> Be quiet; to thy betters wretch submit;
> For action and advice alike unfit.

Melitus (his oration ended) came down; next him came Anytus with a long malicious speech, and last of all Lyco with all the artifice of rhetoric concluded the accusation.

Socrates would not (as was the custom) procure an advocate to plead for him; all the while his accusers were speaking, he seemed to employ his mind about nothing less: as soon as they had done, he went up into the chair, (in which action he observed that the dæmon did not withhold him) and with an angry smile begun this unpremeditated answer, not as a suppliant, or guilty person, but as if master of the judges themselves, with a free contumacy proceeding not from pride, but the greatness of his mind.

But I wonder first (Athenians) how Melitus came by this knowledge, that (as he saith) I do not worship those Gods the city worships? Others have seen me,

(and so might Melitus if he had pleased) sacrifice at common festivals on the public altars; how do I introduce new Deities when I profess to be directed in all my actions by the voice of God? They who observe the notes of birds, or answers of men, are guided by the voice: none doubts of thunder whether it be loud or oraculous. Doth not the priestess on the tripod convey to us by voice what the God delivers to her? And that He foreknows events, communicating them to whom pleaseth him, all men (as well as I) believe and profess. Others call those that foretell events, augurs, soothsayers, and diviners, I the dæmon, and (I conceive) more religiously than they who ascribe a divine power to birds. That I am no impostor herein, many can attest who have asked my advice, and never found it fail. Here there arose a murmur in the Senate, some not believing, others envying what he said, that he should surpass them in such a particular favor of the Deity: Let such as are incredulous hear this also to confirm their opinion that I am not favored of the Gods; when Chærephon in the presence of many witnesses, questioned the Delphian Oracle concerning me, Apollo answered, that no man was more free, more just, or more wise; (here another murmur arose amongst the judges: he proceeded.) Yet the same God said more of Lycurgus the Lacedæmonian Law-giver, that he knew not whether to call him a God or a Man; me he compared not with the Gods, though he gave me the priority amongst men. But trust not the God herein, consider me exactly yourselves; whom know you less a servant to corporeal pleasures, whom more free? I accept not either rewards or gifts; who more just than he who conforms himself to the present time, as he needs not the help of any other; who will say he deserves not the

title of wise, who since he was able, never desisted to learn by enquiry all good possible: and that I took not this pains in vain, is evident in that, many citizens and strangers studious of virtue, prefer my conversation above all others: What is the reason that though all men know I have no wealth to requite them, so many desire to oblige me by gifts? That I require no return from any, yet engage so many? That when the city being besieged, every one lamented his condition, I was no more moved than when it was most flourishing? That whilst others lay out money on outward things to please themselves, I furnish myself, from within myself, with things that please me better. If none can disprove what I have said, deserve I not the commendations both of Gods and men? And yet you Melitus pretend that with these instructions I corrupt youth; every one knows what it is to corrupt youth: can you name but one that I of religious have made impious, of modest, impudent, of frugal, prodigal, of sober, debauched, of hardy, effiminate, or the like? But I know those, answered Melitus, whom you have persuaded to be more obedient to you than to their own parents. That as far as concerns instruction, replied Socrates, I confess this they know to be my proper care: For their health men obey physicians before their parents, in lawsuits counsellors before their kindred; do you not in war prefer the most experienced soldiers to command before your own allies? Yes, answers Melitus, 'tis fit we should; and do you think it reason, then, replies Socrates, if others are preferred for such things as they are excellent in, that because in the opinion of some, I have an advantage beyond others in educating youth, which is the greatest benefit amongst men, I ought therefore to die? Anytus and Melitus (saith he, addressing himself to the

judges) may procure my death, hurt me they cannot: To fear death is to seem wise, and not to be so; for it is to pretend to understand that which we understand not: No man knows what death is, whether it be not the greatest happiness that can arrive to a man, and yet all fear and shun it as if they were sure it were the greatest misfortune.

This and more (saith Xenophon) was said both by himself and his friends, but the judges were so little pleased with his unusual manner of pleading, that as Plato went up into the chair, and began a speech in these words, Though I, Athenians, am the youngest of those that come up in this place, they all cried out, of those that go down, which he thereupon was constrained to do, and they proceeding to vote, Socrates was cast by 281 voices; it was the custom of Athens, as Cicero observes, when any one was cast, if the fault were not capital, to impose a pecuniary mulct; when the judges had voted in that manner, the guilty person was asked the highest rate whereat he estimated his offence; the judges, willing to favor Socrates, propounded that demand to him, he answered 25 (or as Eubulides saith) 100 drachms, nor would he suffer his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobolus, and Apollodorus (who desired him to estimate it at 50 minæ, promising to undertake the sum) to pay anything for him, saying, that to pay a penalty was to own an offence, and telling the judges that (for what he stood accused) he deserved the highest honors and rewards, and daily sustenance at the public charge out of the Prytanæum, which was the greatest honor that was amongst the Grecians; with this answer the judges were so exasperated, that they condemned him to death by eighty votes more.

The sentence being past, he could not forbear smiling,

and turning to his friends, saith thus, They who have suborned false witnesses against me, and they who have born such testimonies, are doubtless conscious to themselves of great impiety and injustice; but as for me, what should more deject me now than before I was condemned, being nothing the more guilty; they could not prove I named any new Gods for Jupiter, Juno, and the rest, or swore by such: how did I corrupt young men by inuring them to sufferance and frugality? Of capital offences, as Sacrilege, Theft, and Treason, my very adversaries acquit me; which makes me wonder how I come to be condemned to die; yet that I die unjustly will not trouble me, it is not a reproach to me, but to those who condemned me; I am much satisfied with the example of Palamedes, who suffered death in the like manner; he is much more commended than Ulysses the procurer of his death. I know both future and past times will witness, I never hurt or injured any, but on the contrary, have advantaged all that conversed with me to my utmost ability, communicating what good I could, gratis. This said, he went away, his carriage answerable to his words, his eyes, gesture, and gait expressing much cheerfulness.

His Imprisonment.

Socrates (saith Seneca) with the same resolved look, wherewith he singly opposed the thirty tyrants, entered the prison, and took away all ignominy from the place, which could not be a prison whilst he was there: Here (being fettered by the eleven officers) he continued thirty days after he was condemned upon this occasion: The ship which carried Theseus and fourteen more persons into Creet; he vowed if they got safe home (as it fortuned they did) to dedicate to Apollo, and to send it every year with a present to Delos, which custom the

Athenians religiously observed; before the solemnity, they used to lustrate their city, and all condemned persons were reprieved till it returned from Delos, which sometimes, the wind not serving, was a long time. The priest of Apollo began the solemnity, by crowning the poop of the ship, which happening the day before Socrates was condemned, occasioned his lying in prison so long after.

In this interval he was visited by his friend, with whom he passed the time in dispute after his usual manner: he was often solicited by them to an escape, some of them offered to carry him away by force, which he not only refused, but derided, asking, if they knew any place out of Attica, whither death could not come. Crito, two days before his death, came very early in the morning to him to the same purpose, having by his frequent visits and gifts gained some interest in the jailor, but finding him asleep, sat still by him, admiring the soundness of his sleep, the happy equality of his mind; as soon as he waked, he told him that he came to bring sad news, if not such to him, yet to all his friends, that the ship would certainly be at home to-morrow at furthest (some that came from Sunium affirming they had left it there) but that in all likelihood it would come that day, and he should die the next. In good time be it, answered Socrates, but I do not believe it will come to-day; for the day following I must die, as they say, who have the power in their hands; but that I shall not die to-morrow, but the day after, I guess by a dream I had this night, that a woman very beautiful, in a white garment, saluted me by my name, saying

> Thou, ere three days are told,
> Rich Phithya shalt behold.

(The same relation, according to Lærtius, he made to

Æschines.) This occasion Crito took to persuade him to save himself, which he pressed with many arguments; that his friends would be accused of covetousness, as more desirous to spare their wealth, than to redeem him; that it might be effected with little trouble and expense to them who were provided for it; that himself was rich enough to do it, or if not, Simmias, Cebes, and others would join with him; that he ought not voluntarily to thrust himself into destruction, when he might avoid it; that he should leave his children in an uncertain mean estate; that it would not be construed constancy, but want of courage. Consider well these reasons, saith he, or rather (for it is now no time to stand considering) be persuaded, what is to be done, must be done this night, or it will be too late. Socrates answered, that his cheerful readiness to relieve him was much to be esteemed, if agreeable to justice, otherwise, the less just, the more blamable: that opinion and censure ought not to be regarded, but truth and equity; that wrong must not be requited with wrong; that faith should be kept more strictly with a city than with private persons; that he had voluntarily subjected himself to the laws of his country, by living under their government, and to violate them at last, were great injustice: That by breaking prison, he should not only draw his friends into many inconveniences, but himself also into many dangers, only to live and die in exile; that in such a condition, he should be nothing more capable to bring up his children well, but dying honestly, his friends would take the more care of them: That whatsoever inconvenience might ensue, nothing was to be preferred before justice; that if he should escape by treachery, the remainder of his life would be never the more happy, nor himself after death better entertained in the next world. These

things (saith he) I hear like the Corybantian Pipes, the sound of these words makes me deaf to every thing else; therefore, whatever you shall say to the contrary, will be to no purpose; but if you have any other business, speak. Crito answering, he had not any else: as for this then (concludes he) speak no more of it, let us go the way which God points out to us. * * *

Let every one, therefore, prepare for this journey against the time that fate shall call him away: you Simmias, Cebes, and the rest here present shall go at your appointed hour, me fate now summons (as the tragedian saith), and perhaps it is time that I go into the bath, for I think it best to wash before I take the poison, that I may save the women the labor of washing me when I am dead. * * * * *

I cannot persuade Crito, saith he, that I am any thing more than the carcass you will anon behold, and therefore he takes this care for my interment; it seems that what even now I told him that as soon as I have taken the poison, I shall go to the joys of the blessed, hath been to little purpose; he was my bail, bound to the judges for my appearance, you must now be my sureties to him that I am departed; let him not say that Socrates is carried to the grave, or laid under ground, for know, dear Crito, such a mistake were a wrong to my soul; be not dejected, tell the world my body only is buried, and that after what manner thou pleasest. This said, he arose and retired into an inward room, taking Crito with him, leaving us discoursing upon our own misery, shortly to be deprived like orphans of so dear a father. After his bathing, came his wife and the other women of his family with his sons, two of them children, one a youth; when he had taken order with these about his domestic affairs, he dismissed them and came out to us.

It was now sunset, (for he had staid long within) when the officer entered, and after a little pause said: "I have not, Socrates observed that carriage in you which I have found in others, but as I thought you the most generous, the mildest and best of all men that ever came into this place, so I now see you hate me not, for that whereof others are the cause: you know the message I bring, farewell; bear what you cannot remedy:" With that he departed weeping; "Fare thee well," (said Socrates) "I will:" "How civil is this man! I found him the same all the time of my imprisonment, he would often visit me, discourse with me, used me always courteously, and now see how kindly he weeps for me: but come Crito, let us do as he bids us, if the poison be ready, let it be brought in;" "The sun is yet scarce set," answers Crito: "others take it late after a plentiful supper and full cups; make not so much haste, there is time enough," he replies, "They who do so think they gain time, but what shall I gain by drinking it late? Only deceive myself as covetous of life, and sparing of that which is no longer mine; pray let it be as I say:" Then Crito sent one of the attendants, who immediately returned, and with him the man that was to administer the poison, bringing a cup in his hand, to whom Socrates said, "Prithee honest friend (for thou art well versed in these businesses) what must I do?" "Nothing," said he, "but as soon as you have drunk, walk till you find your legs begin to fail, then lie down," and in so saying, he gave him the cup. Socrates took it cheerfully, not changing either countenance or color, and looking pleasantly upon him, demanded whether he might spill any of it in libation, who answered, he had made no more than would just serve; "yet," saith Socrates, "I may pray to God, and will, that my passage

hence may be happy, which I beseech Him to grant," and in the same instant drank it off easily without any disturbance; many of us who till now had refrained from tears, when we saw him put the cup to his mouth and drink off the poison, were not able to contain any longer; which Socrates observing, friend (saith he) what mean you? For this reason I sent away the women lest they should be so unquiet: I have heard we should die with gratulation and applause, be quiet then and take it patiently. These words made us with shame suppress our tears; when he had walked a while, perceiving his legs to fail, he lay down on his back as the executioner directed him, who looking on his feet pinched them hard, asked him if he felt it, he answered no, he did the like to his legs, and showing us how every part successively grew cold and stiff, told us when that chillness came at his heart he would die; not long after he spake these last words, O Crito, I owe Æsculapius a cock, pay it, neglect it not. It shall be done, saith Crito; will you have any thing else? He made no answer, lay still a while, then stretched himself forth; with that the executioner uncovered him, his eyes were set, Crito closed them. This (saith Plato) was the end of the best, the wisest, and most just of men: a story, which Cicero professeth, he never read wihout tears.

Aristotle saith, that a Magus coming from Syria to Athens, not only reprehended Socrates for many things, but foretold him also that he should die a violent death.

Lærtius closeth his life with this epigram,

> Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthron'd,
> By Gods, and Wisdom's self as wisest own'd.
> Thee the Athenians gave a pois'nous draught.
> But first thy wisdom from your lips they quaft.

What Happened After His Death.

He was buried with tears and much solemnity (contrary to his own direction) by his friends, amongst whom the excessive grief of Plato is observed by Plutarch, and the mourning habit of Isocrates: As soon as they had performed that last service, fearing the cruelty of the tyrants, they stole out of the city, the greater part to Megara to Euclid, where they were kindly received, the rest to other parts.

Soon after, a Lacedæmonian youth, who had never more acquaintance with Socrates than what fame gave him, took a journey to Athens, intending to become his disciple; being come as far as the City Gates, and ready to enter with joy, to be so near the end at which he aimed, instead of Socrates, he meets there the news of his death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would not go within the City Gates, but enquiring the place where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into a passionate discourse, accompanied with many tears, to the enclosed dead body; when night was come, he fell asleep upon the sepulchre; the next morning, affectionately kissing the dust that lay upon it, and with much passion taking leave of the place, he returned to Megara.

Suidas tells a like story, (for that there were more examples than one of this kind, Libanius implies) of a Chian named Crysas, who coming to Athens to hear Socrates, went to his tomb, and slept there, to whom Socrates appeared in a dream, and discoursed with him; with which only satisfaction he went directly home again.

By these accidents the Athenians were awakened into a sense of their injustice, considering they were ob-

noxious to the censure of the Lacedæmonians by extraordinary crimes, whose children were so affectionate to the philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take such long journeys to see Socrates, whom they would not keep when he was with them; hereat they became so exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked men that were the occasion of his death piecemeal with their teeth, the whole city cried out, they disclaimed the act, and that the authors thereof ought to be put to death. Antisthenes furthered their rage by this means. Some young men of Pontus invited to Athens by the fame of Socrates, met with Antisthenes, who carried them to Anytus, telling them he was much wiser than Socrates; whereupon those that were present, with much indignation, turned Anytus out of the city: thence he went to Heraclea, where some say the citizens also expelled him, others that they stoned him to death. Melitus was by the Athenians condemned and put to death, others affirm the like of all his accusers without trial. Plutarch, that they so much hated them, as they would not suffer them to kindle fire at their houses, they would not answer them any question, they would not wash with them, but threw away the water they had touched as impure, until unable to brook this hatred, they hanged themselves.

In further testimony of their penitence, they called home his friends to their former liberty of meeting, they forbade public spectacles of games and wrestling for a time, they caused his statue, made in brass by Lysippus, to be set up in the Pompeum, and (a plague ensuing, which they imputed to the injustice of this act) they made an order that no man should mention Socrates publicly, or on the theatre, that so they might forget what they had done: Euripides (restrained by this order

from doing it directly) reproached them overtly in a tragedy, named Palamedes (in whom he alluded to Socrates) particularly in these verses,

> A Philomele ne'r mischief knew,
> Is slain, alas ! is slain by you.

At which words, all the spectators understanding they were meant of Socrates, fell a weeping.

The death of this sole person (saith Eunapius) brought a general calamity upon the city; for it may easily be collected by computation of times, that from thenceforward the Athenians did nothing considerable, but the city by degrees decayed, and with it all Greece.

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